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PROLOGUE
July 2000: I am standing in the busy hallway of District of Columbia
Superior Court, where life swirls around like a tempest. There are young
and old, faces of color, women with small babies-all huddled around oddly
out-of-place orange and yellow plastic chairs lining the hall. Uniformed D.C.
metro police lounge in groups, swapping stories and laughing, while
inscrutable U.S. Marshals in ties and with military crew cuts determinedly
enter courtrooms, accompanied by young, impeccably groomed, grey-suited
U.S. Attorneys. I stand with my client, Jamal,' who, at nineteen years old, still
retains a beautiful baby face, with neatly done-up plats and the latest Nike
sneakers. Jamal might have come straight from the soundstage of MTV's
TRL or a teen TV show. This, however, is no TV show, and Jamal is here for
the civil-protection order ("CPO") portion of his domestic violence
proceedings.2 He had been arrested ten days ago after his eighteen-year-old
girlfriend, Britney, called the police and claimed that he punched her and
threw a plate at her. As of late, domestic violence advocates had been
subpoenaing defendants to testify at CPO hearings in the hopes of
producing self-incriminating statements that could be used against
1. Because of privacy concerns, the characters in this narrative are fictional. The events,
however, are real. They are an amalgam of many similar experiences I had while defending
cases in domestic violence court.
2. The District of Columbia has enacted legislation providing civil remedies to movants
who make a showing of"good cause to believe the respondent has committed or is threatening
an intrafamily offense." D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c) (2001). A civil protection order ("CPO") lasts
for up to one year and is renewable upon motion "for good cause shown." Id. § 16-1005(d).
CPOs place serious burdens on respondents. They are routinely ordered to leave their homes,
stay away from their children, pay substantial amounts of money, and submit to counseling. Id.
§16-1005(c). CPOs impose these burdens on respondents without any finding of criminality
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Moreover, respondents are rarely represented by counsel in
protection order proceedings. See D.C. COURTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL
AND ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 143 (1992) (finding that
seventy percent of petitioners and respondents in protection order hearings are
unrepresented). Domestic Violence Clinic Director, Deborah Epstein, describes the CPO
process:
Few respondents in any jurisdiction are represented by counsel in civil protection
order cases, so they are unlikely to be advised of their right to request a hearing in
the month following the receipt of what, on its face, appears to be a final court
order. Even in those instances where a hearing is scheduled and held, this only
provides the respondent with an opportunity to undo the order long after it has
gone into effect. He is likely to spend at least thirty days, and most likely far longer,
ordered out of his home, forced to stay away from a range of persons and places,
with no access to his children, and without the use of his car.
Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. &
MARYL. REv. 1843, 1872-73 (2002).
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defendants in later criminal trials. I am here to make sure that the judge
honorsJamal's Fifth Amendment privilege.
A few minutes before we enter the courtroom Britney shuffles up. She is
equally cute and colorful, squeezed into tight-stretch jeans with platform
flip-flops and yellow shoulder-length braids. She looks more ready for the
galleria mall than for court. She asks if I am Jamal's attorney, and I reply in
the affirmative. She says, "The other lady told me I have to be here, but I
didn't want to come." She goes on to explain that she and Jamal live
together with their baby in a project called Lincoln Heights-a place,
incidentally, where a young male like Jamal is lucky to make it to age
nineteen without a severe criminal record or drug habit. Britney tells me
that she only called the police "cause I was mad and wanted him out the
house." She does not want to pursue charges against Jamal and adamantly
refuses to comply with any no-contact order.4 Then, in a more hushed tone,
she asks, "What if I just leave now and don't show up later-will they drop
the case?"
So here I am again, straddling the line between zealous advocacy, ethics
violation, and obstruction of justice.5 The answer to Britney's question is
3. Without counsel, respondents at CPO hearings feel compelled to testify to counter the
testimony of petitioners. While some family court judges fairly remind defendants of the
potential for incrimination, others are more than willing to see defendants take the stand.
Indeed, in the absence of testimony from the defendant, the issuance of a CPO is basically pro
forma. Judges often make adverse inferences against defendants who assert their privilege. See,
e.g., Frizado v. Frizado, 651 N.E.2d 1206, 1210-11 (Mass. 1995) (drawing an adverse inference
against a CPO respondent who refused to testify on ground of self-incrimination); Wolf v.
Rosson, Nos. 84603, 84650, 2005 WL 628235 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2005) (same). See generally
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid
adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to
probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment 'does not preclude the inference
where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.'" (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 439
(McNaughton rev. 1961))).
4. In Washington, D.C., domestic violence complainants can obtain a renewable 10-day
temporary restraining order ("TRO") ex parte. See D.C. SUPER. Cr. Civ. R. 65(b). These orders
routinely contain provisions requiring respondents to have limited or no contact with
petitioners. See, e.g., In re Peak, 759 A.2d 612, 614 (D.C. 2000) (describing the terms of a TRO).
5. Investigating cases and therefore talking to witnesses is part of a defense attorney's
duty as a zealous advocate and essential to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
However, witness-defense attorney interaction always presents a dicey situation. The ethical
rules place limits on the extent to which defense attorneys may advise witnesses of the
consequences of their testimony or lack of testimony. ABA Model Rule 4.3 states, "The lawyer
shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel,
if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a
reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (1983). Courts have found that ethical rules prevent defense attorneys
from advising potential prosecution witnesses of their Fifth Amendment privileges. See, e.g.,
State v. Fosse, 424 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (finding such conduct to be an ethical
violation). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, a predecessor of the ABA Model
Rules, also prohibits lawyers from "advis[ing] or caus[ing] a person to secrete himself ... for
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likely "yes." The government rarely serves domestic violence witnesses
6
properly, and judges routinely dismiss cases when witnesses fail to show up.
I say, "Britney, I can't tell you what to do. I am not your attorney. However,
let's sit down, and you can tell me what happened between you two.
"
Just as I am finishing my sentence, a young woman rushes up and
inserts herself betweenjamal, Britney, and me. She is blonde, no more than
twenty-four, with a hip haircut and an enormous diamond engagement ring.
"Domestic violence clinic student," I think to myself.8 She glares at me and
demands, "What are you doing talking to my victim, and why is your
defendant near her? He's violating the no-contact order!"9 A new, but as-of-
the purpose of making him unavailable as a witness." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-109(B) (1980).
Moreover, the federal obstruction of justice statute makes it a felony when a person
"knowingly . . .corruptly persuades . . .or engages in misleading conduct toward another
person, with intent to influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official
proceeding" and "intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents,
or dissuades any person from attending or testifying in an official proceeding." 18 U.S.C. §
1512(b) & (c) (2000). Courts have found that attorneys who advise witnesses not to testify
commit obstruction of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding that an attorney who advised a witness not to testify at grand jury was guilty of
"corrupt[ly]" influencing witness).
6. D.C. law requires that witnesses be served with process in person. See D.C. SUPER. CT.
R. CRiM. P. 17(d) ("Service of a subpoena shall be made by delivering a copy thereof to the
person named and by tendering to that person the fee for one day's attendance and the
mileage allowed by law."). The U.S. Attorney's office generally mailed subpoenas to domestic
violence witnesses, and thus the witnesses were not properly served. When essential witnesses
failed to show up for trial, judges often dismissed cases for want of prosecution. See Robinson v.
United States, 769 A.2d 747, 756 n.19 (D.C. 2001) (citing a study of one D.C. domestic violence
calendar that revealed that the court dismissed for want of prosecution charges against 47% of
male defendants and 22% of female defendants).
7. Of course, I am hoping to get a written statement from Britney that might be used
later for impeachment at trial. Even such constitutionally required investigation is fraught with
risk to defense attorneys. One prosecutor cautions:
Proceeding on their own initiative or at the perpetrator's direction, victims may ask
the defendant's lawyer to prepare an affidavit recanting the statement provided to
law enforcement. The criminal defense lawyer who does so will be strolling
through an ethical minefield. Among the ethical violations or other problems that
may arise are: conflict of interest (Rule 1.7), offering a frivolous defense (Rule
3.1), offering false evidence (Rule 3.3(a)(4)) and conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice (Rule 8.4(e)), plus potential problems with witness
tampering, obstruction of justice, aiding and abetting and conspiracy, not to
mention the risk of being sued for malpractice by the battered spouse/victim who
decides to recant the recantation drafted by the perpetrator's conflicted lawyer.
Nicole Howland, The Landscape of Domestic Violence in South Carolina, 16 S.C. LAW 40, 42-43 (Nov.
2004).
8. For a brief description of a domestic violence clinic by its director, see Deborah
Epstein, Fighting Domestic Violence in the Nation's Capital, 3 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POvERTY 93, 94-
95 (1995).
9. See supra note 4 (discussing TROs and no-contact orders).
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yet unsuccessful, tactic of the clinic students is to assert that domestic
violence victim-witnesses were "represented parties" under the ethical rules
and thus any defense attorney who attempted to talk to them violated ABA
Model Rule 4.2.'0 This was an effort to prevent defense attorneys from
obtaining statements in preparation for trial. I reply, "Britney came up to
me. Apparently, she does not want to pursue this case or have no contact
withJamal." The advocate replies sarcastically, "I'm sure she told you that she
wants to drop the case." 1
Britney turns to the advocate and protests, "I don't want to be here, and
Ms. Gruber told me I could leave." The advocate shoots me an accusatory
glance, so I defensively reply, "No, I told her that I could not give her any
advice on what to do, but, as you can see, she does not want to pursue this
case."' 2 The advocate snaps, "Well, we'll just see about that. Come on Britney
10. Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, also known as the "anti-contact
rule," prohibits contact between lawyers and represented parties. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1983). Needless to say, crime victims are not "represented" by prosecutors,
and Rule 4.2 does not generally require defenders to refrain from speaking to them. See Neil
Salon, Note, Prosecutors and Model Rule 4.2: An Examination of Appropriate Remedies, 12 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 393, 404-05 (1999) (discussing application of Rule 4.2 to prosecutors and
defense attorneys). The issue of whether a defense attorney is bound by Rule 4.2 becomes more
complicated when the witness to a criminal case obtains the aid of an advocate for her civil-
protection-order hearing. Prosecutor Nicole Howland represents the prosecutorial point of
view of Rule 4.2, stating, "Lawyers representing perpetrators need to be circumspect even when
they deal with victims at arms length. If the victim has a lawyer, direct communications with the
victim are forbidden without the lawyer's consent. Rule 4.2." Howland, supra note 7, at 43.
11. Prosecutors widely entertain the notion that defense attorneys tell prosecution
witnesses not to show up at trial. Moreover, they seem to believe that but for defense attorneys'
persuasion, such witnesses would cooperate with the government. Former prosecutor Cheryl
Hanna, for example, states, "Defense attorneys often informed women that if they did not
appear in court, they would probably not be arrested [for failing to comply with a subpoena].
Day after day, women would not appear and defense attorneys would request dismissals." Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109
HARV. L. REv. 1850, 1892 (1996). Domestic violence prosecutor Erin Claypoole warns other
prosecutors, "The most obvious defense strategy in domestic violence cases is to get the victim
on their team. This is to be expected and should not get you off track." Erin Leigh Claypoole,
Evidence-Based Prosecution: Prosecuting Domestic Violence Cases Without a Victim, PROSECUTOR, Jan.-
Feb. 2005, at 18, 26. Similarly, prosecutor Leslie Hagen writes, "The raw emotions, self-doubt,
rationalization, insecurity, and introspection of the victim can easily be exploited by defense
attorneys in their zealousness to find exculpatory and contradictory evidence." Leslie A. Hagen
& Kim Morden Rattet, Communications and Violence Against Women: Relevant Michigan Law on
Privilege, Confidentiality, and Mandatory Reporting, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 186, 190 (2000).
12. I have some reason for concern, as the U.S. Attorney's Office holds an enormous
amount of power when it comes to interfering with the life of a disfavored defense attorney.
One scholar explains:
[D]efense attorneys are placed in a position where their adversary, the prosecutor,
has the discretionary ability to cause them to suffer severe economic costs and
affect their livelihood. Given these considerations, some method must be
92 IOWA LAWREVIEW
we need to talk, away from them. "1' With that, she leads Britney away through
the mass of humanity gathered in the bustling hall. Ten minutes later, we
are all seated at counsel table. I listen as the judge orders a renewable one-
year civil-protection order, including a requirement that Jamal have no
contact with Britney or the baby. 14 Britney looks down as the judge reads the
order.
5
developed to assure defense attorneys that the practices will not be used in bad
faith, nor used selectively against particular attorneys as a response to zealous
advocacy.
William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 858 (1988).
13. One Assistant Attorney General explains the distrust that prosecutors have for defense
attorneys. She states, "[P ] rosecutors may come to see defense attorneys as representatives of the
'criminals' lobby.' In this view, defense attorneys use their stature as members of the bar to
pursue the interests of criminal defendants not just inside the courtroom but in all of the
attorneys' professional endeavors." Jo Ann Harris, The Practice of Federal Criminal Law: Lower the
Decibel Level, Raise the Civility Level, CRIM.JUST. Fall 1994, at 38. Harris also notes, however, that
defense attorneys harbor similar negative stereotypes about prosecutors. She observes, "For
criminal defense attorneys-and often for their clients-it is tempting and all too easy to see
the prosecutor as the most convenient stand-in for the ubiquitous government that the defense
attorney feels obligated to fight on all fronts in order to promote the client's interests." Id. at
37. As a result, prosecutors often discourage victims and witnesses from talking to defense
attorneys. See David S. Caudill, Professional Deregulation of Prosecutors: Defense Contact with Victims,
Survivors, and Witnesses in the Era of Victims' Rights, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 103 (2003)
("Prosecutors and victim advocates are becoming more brazen about discouraging witnesses
from speaking to defense counsel and investigators." (quoting Hon. Louis D. Coffin, et al.,
Pretrial Conferences, Pretrial Hearings and Discovery Motion Practice, in 1 MASSACHUSETTS DISTRICT
COURT CRIMINAL DEFENSE MANUAL § 8.4.2(a) (Cathleen L. Bennett et al. eds., rev. ed. 2000))).
14. While it is quite easy for an alleged domestic violence victim to obtain a protection
order, the orders are not in fact effective at eliminating contact between the domestic partners,
One study revealed that sixty percent of protection orders are violated within one year of
issuance. See Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements
on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1292 (2000) (citing a study from The
Commission on Domestic Violence). One of the reasons for the failure of the CPO system, is
that the no-contact premise of the orders does not address adequately the complex relationship
issues involved in a domestic violence case. See id. at 1293-94 (noting the complexity of
domestic violence due to the family dynamics and emotional relationships involved).
15. So what is the moral of this story? Many would simply believe that if Jamal is in fact
guilty then the correct result occurred. Hopefully, however, this narrative invites us to consider
the larger social context of crime and question common stereotypes of domestic violence
defendants and accusers. See Pedro A. Malavet, Literature and the Arts as Antisubordination Praxis:
LatCrit Theory and Cultural Production: The Confessions of an Accidental Crit, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1293, 1301-02 (2000) ("Minority and subordinated communities utilize narratives to counter
the 'singular homogenized experience' produced by the essentializing of identities imposed by
majority society."). Not every domestic violence defendant is a prototypical serial abuser who
hates women. Not every victim is weak-willed and afraid. I can say from my anecdotal evidence
that most of the people who end up in domestic violence court are marginalized minorities,
immigrants, and/or economically disadvantaged. The paradigm of the "burning bed" meek
housewife and her white, middle-class, secretive abuser husband may exist somewhere, but not
generally in D.C. Superior Court. Moreover, this story serves as a counter-narrative to the
multitude of scholarly articles on domestic violence that draw in the reader by beginning with
graphic descriptions of the worst cases of abuse.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past several years, domestic violence reforms, which include
sweeping protection orders,"' advocates, 17 specialized courts,"' special
evidentiary rules,' 9 mandatory arrests, and no-drop policies, 20 have become
increasingly popular and common in criminal court systems. 2  The appeal of
such domestic violence reforms often crosses political and philosophical
lines. Many of the most ardent feminists and strict conservative policymakers
would agree that Jamal and Britney should be permanently separated and
Jamal should be incarcerated. 2' Feminists might see such an outcome as the
system taking domestic violence seriously and purging itself of the
24patriarchal idea that woman abuse is legitimate. Conservatives would
consider incarceration appropriate retribution for Jamal's moral culpability
16. See generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 811-1094 (1993)
(surveying CPO statutes in all 50 states, D.C., and Puerto Rico); Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection
Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 51,53-
56 (2000) (explaining the process of obtaining a CPO and discussing its effectiveness in
preventing domestic violence).
17. See SuzanneJ. Schmitz, What's the Harm?: Rethinking the Role of Domestic Violence Advocates
and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 295, 296-99 (2004)
(describing the function of the domestic violence victim's advocate).
18. See Tsai, supra note 14, at 1293 (discussing the role of specialized domestic violence
courts).
19. See generally Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against
Women, 36 IND. L. REv. 687 (2003).
20. See Hanna, supra note 11, at 1849-1910 (suggesting that mandatory-arrest and no-drop
policies promote sufficiently important social interests to outweigh the wishes of the individual
victim as to the prosecution of her partner). But see Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate
Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550 (1999) (arguing that such
policies increase the number of abuse victims).
21. See infta note 90 (describing prevalence of mandatory policies).
22. See Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 7, 19 (2004)
(asserting that the typical legal response to domestic violence is separation).
23. Former prosecutor Cheryl Hanna notes that domestic violence is one area of law
where conservative and feminist ideologies converge:
Feminists argue that criminalization of domestic violence is one way to correct the
historical, legal, and moral disparities in legal protections afforded to women,
making public what traditionally has been thought of as a private crime ... [and]
... social conservatives, not normally supportive of feminist legal reform, advocate
using the law to enforce public morality and further the goals of retribution. They
too have been supportive of criminal justice reforms in this area.
Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1505, 1514 (1998); see also infra note 245 and accompanying text (George W. Bush
declaring "war" on domestic violence).
24. See, e.g., Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding
the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267, 323 (1985) (applauding no-drop policies
for the "strong" statement they send against domestic violence).
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15and management ofJamal's dangerousness. But how could two camps with
such different views of state power converge on the use of that power against
Jamal? By embracing harsh criminalization policies, domestic violence
reformers actually strayed from the underlying values of the feminist
movement. They have also bolstered conservative ideologies and thus
reinforced, rather than dismantled, inequality. Of course, not all feminists
work in the area of domestic violence. Moreover, many of the ones who do
work in this area do not advocate criminalization as a solution to domestic
violence. It is undeniable, however, that domestic violence reform is a huge
part of the feminist movement and that criminalization efforts are in the
forefront of domestic violence reforms.26
In the late 1960s and 1970s, feminists spearheaded the domestic
violence and rape-reform movements17 and described gendered crimes as
manifestations of larger patriarchal attitudes and policies infecting society in
general. 28 The criminal system failed to address gendered crimes adequately,
exposing the extent to which such patriarchal beliefs pervaded the legal
structure . 9 Feminists directed their initial efforts at equalizing and civilizing
the criminal justice system's treatment of female victims, 3 0 providing access
25. Lynne Henderson explains, "According to the conservative argument, deterrence
often doesn't work, rehabilitation doesn't work, and retribution and incapacitation are the only
tenable justifications for punishment of criminals." Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims'
flights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 947 (1985).
26. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (outlining the efforts within criminal law to
curb domestic violence).
27. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 20-34
(2000) (describing the contemporary women's movement and domestic violence reform
efforts); EmilyJ. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence
Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 1657, 1666 (2004) (noting that the women's movement of the late
1960s and 1970s brought attention to domestic violence).
28. Domestic violence pioneer Elizabeth Schneider explains:
Feminists in the United States had argued for more than two centuries that
women's legally sanctioned subordination within the family denied them equality
and citizenship. They saw intimate violence as an important vehicle of this
subordination .... Feminists claimed that domestic violence threatened not only
women's right to physical integrity and perhaps even life itself, but women's
liberty, autonomy, and equality.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 4.
29. See Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1300-03 (1993)
(describing how patriarchy and domestic violence are deeply rooted in U.S. legal history and
institutions).
30. Morrison Torrey describes the effects of early liberal feminist efforts to equalize
treatment of rape victims. She states, "Because liberal feminism was the dominant strain of the
women's movement in the 1970s and 1980s, the classic liberal ideology of privacy, autonomy,
and individual choice shaped emerging rape reform." Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal
Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One Form of Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARYJ.
WOMEN & L. 35,38 (1995).
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and resources to such victims, and creating programs to address the
economic and social realities that kept women in abusive relationships or led
them to remain silent about rape.
Around the same time, the spark of a new and powerful criminal-reform
movement appeared. In response to a perception, however false, that crime
32rates were perpetually rising and that the court system afforded too many
rights to defendants, 33 a grassroots movement revolving around the victim
emerged.34 The crime victims' rights movement inserted new players,
justifications, and a barrage of new legislation into criminal jurisprudence. 5
The general public lauded the plethora of reforms in the name of
empowering victims, leaving the only criticism to come from civil libertarians
who expressed the unpopular view that the reforms posed threats to
defendants' civil rights.36 However, while the movement engages the
31. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 21, 44 (discussing, respectively, initial shelter efforts
and calls for formal equality and the effort to pressure police to protect abuse victims); Sack,
supra note 27, at 1666 (describing the early battered women's advocacy movement as a
"grassroots effort to provide services and shelter to domestic violence victims, independent of
state involvement").
32. See KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE PUBLIC MIND 5-8 (1995) (suggesting that
public opinion, fueled by media exaggeration, became increasingly tough on crime despite
steady crime rates since 1973, and that politicians and policymakers escalated the get-tough
rhetoric and responded with a crackdown on crime); see also U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, KEY CRIME & JUSTICE FACTS AT A GLANCE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/glance/cv2.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007) (indicating relatively steady violent crime rates
between 1973 and 1993 and a drastic drop in violent crime from 1993-2003).
33. See Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1998) (noting that victims' rights were meant to counter
defendants' rights); Thad H. Westbrook, At Least Treat Us Like Criminals!: South Carolina Responds
to Victims'Pleasfor Equal Rights, 49 S.C. L. REV. 575, 579-80 (1998) (describing the victims' rights
movement as a response to Warren Court reforms).
34. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic Overview, 3
BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 3, 6 (1999-2000) (describing the origins of the victims' rights movement).
35. Florida was the first state to add a provision to its constitution discussing the rights of
victims. The provision reads:
Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of
homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be
heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent
that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b). In addition, there is an entire chapter of the Florida Statutes
dedicated to victim assistance. FLA. STAT. § 960 (2005). For an overview of the role of the victim
in prosecution after these reforms, see Peggy M. Tobolowski, Victim Participation in the Criminal
Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21 (1999).
36. Lynne Henderson notes that "the symbolic strength of the term 'victims' rights'
overrides careful scrutiny: Who could be anti-victim?" Henderson, supra note 25, at 952; see also
AndrewJ. Karmen, Who's Against Victims' Rights? The Nature of the Opposition to Pro-Victim Initiatives
in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 157 (1992). "Who could oppose the
legitimate demands of people espousing such a just and noble cause as the 'empowerment' of
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rhetoric of individual rights and victim autonomy, it is really not about
victim agency. Rather than securing victim autonomy without qualification,
many victims' rights reforms simply seek to position the victim in the legal
system in a way that inexorably leads to more liability and punishment for
the defendant.3s In a sense, the victim is a foil, a tool of an even larger and
more dangerous program of vigorous individuality and denial of socialS•• 39
responsibility. The victims' rights movement is and always has been a
product of conservative tough-on-crime ideology.
40
Unfortunately, feminist criminal law reform, which began laudably with
the goal of vindicating the autonomy and rights of women, has increasingly
mirrored the victims' rights movement and its criminalization goals. Many of
the widespread domestic violence reforms are more about increasing the
likelihood of defendants going to jail than about supporting the individual
desires, welfare, and interests of victims.4' Reformers have embraced
innocent victims who suffered physical injuries, psychological harm, or financial losses? Who or
what could stand in the way of initiatives to alleviate the plight of crime victims?" Id. at 157.
37. I have elsewhere noted:
[T]he victims' rights movement is more of an anti-crime, even anti-defendant
movement, than a movement intended solely to give victims of crime more
participation in the criminal process. As a result, the calls for the granting of party
or near-party status are a means to empowering the victim only when the victim's
interests are adverse to the defendant's. Given this philosophy, the victims' rights
movement certainly would not advocate an increased role for the victim in the
criminal trial if doing so provided further defenses to the defendant. Ultimately
then, it appears that the true end of privatization is increased punishment.
Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on Wrongful Victim
Behavior in an Era of Victims'Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REv. 645, 666-67 (2003).
38. Victims' rights reforms, for example, seek to empower victims who feel the
prosecution is too lenient. To this end, statutes require prosecutors to consult with victims
before entering into plea agreements or dismissing cases. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-832(f)
(2005). The North Carolina statute provides:
Prior to the disposition of the case, the district attorney's office shall offer the
victim the opportunity to consult with the prosecuting attorney to obtain the views
of the victim about the disposition of the case, including the victim's views about
dismissal, plea or negotiations, sentencing, and any pretrial diversion programs.
Id.
39. Markus Dubber notes, "As a matter of fact, the vindication of victims' rights has
everything to do with the war on crime. As a matter of principle, the vindication of victims'
rights has nothing to do with the war on crime." MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICrIMS IN THE WAR ON
CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS 167 (2002).
40. See Dubber, supra note 34, at 6 (characterizing the victims' rights reform effort as a
political movement backed by tough-on-crime politicians).
41. See infta notes 71-76 and accompanying text (describing mandatory policies).
Reformers counter that such policies "work." However, while some studies suggest that
mandatory policies may reduce the incidences of domestic violence, other data indicates that
such policies actually increase the risk of harm to women. See Nichole Miras Mordini, Note,
Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety
and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 295, 320-22 (2004) (citing an Indiana study revealing that
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incarceration and separation models, despite a plethora of gender and race-
42based scholarly critiques. Moreover, the domestic violence system treats
victims with increasing amounts of paternalism and disdain, as more
advocates and jurists buy into the belief that female victims are weak,
damaged, and unable to recognize their own interests.
41
This Article cautions domestic violence reformers to adhere to the
original feminist program of recognizing women's autonomy and pressuring
society to change the patriarchal institutions and attitudes that give rise to
gendered crimes.44 Feminists should see that both victims and victimizers
operate within an imperfect society with institutionalized racism, sexism, and
economic discriminaion. Part I of the Article describes the origins and
goals of feminist criminal law reform. Part II discusses the very different
mandatory policies could be harmful to women and that battered women were most likely to
ensure their safety when they had the power to drop charges).
42. Domestic violence scholar Donna Coker explains:
The . . . problem with anti-domestic violence discourse and law is the pervasive
presumption that women should leave battering partners and that doing so will
increase their safety.... Separation threatens women's tenuous hold on economic
viability, for without the batterer's income or his assistance with childcare, for
example, women may lose jobs, housing, and even their children. It is a cruel trap
when the state's legal interventions rest on the presumption that women who are
"serious" about ending domestic violence will leave their partner while, at the same
time, reducing dramatically the availability of public assistance that makes leaving
somewhat possible.
Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color,
33 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1009, 1017-18 (2000). Scholars also argue that separation is not a historic
goal of domestic violence reform. See Goodmark, supra note 22, at 20 (asserting that ending
violence, rather than separation, was the historic goal of reform).
43. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child
Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1041, 1086 (1991) (asserting that by emphasizing the passive
and helpless aspects of battered women, reformers have created a legal image of battered
women as helpless defective creatures rather than capable women temporarily affected by
problematic circumstances); see also G. Kristian Micchio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest,
Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUs. L. REv. 237,
242 (2005) (noting that certain proponents of aggressive domestic violence policing tactics
"reify[] the cultural stereotypes of the incapacitated and irrational woman-stereotypes that
confine women to, rather than liberate women from, oppressive homes").
44. See Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple
Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4J.L. & POL'Y 463, 505 (1996) (asserting
that the domestic-law-enforcement model, which takes power out of the hands of battered
women, is in philosophical opposition with feminist principles of individual and community
empowerment).
45. Donna Coker discusses the intimate relationship between institutionalized racism and
criminal law enforcement. She asserts that one reason why discrimination continues to pervade
criminal law enforcement is that "whites are seldom aware of the degree to which white
privilege protects them from police suspicion and surveillance. The invisibility of white privilege
(to whites) encourages them to presume that system maltreatment is, in some part, the fault of
the victim of such maltreatment." Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of Racial
Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93J. CRJM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 831 (2003).
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origins and philosophies of the crime victims' rights movement and its
incorporation of the discursive methodology of describing victims as objects
and defendants as pure agents to support tough-on-crime policies. Part III
describes how conservatives have historically used this discursive
methodology to justify women's subordination. Part IV explores the ways in
which the feminist criminal law reform movement has begun to resemble
the victims' rights movement and replicate its conservative goals by, among
other things, adopting the dialectic of objectification and agency. Finally,
Part V provides some suggestions to move domestic violence reform in a
direction more true to its roots by envisioning all parties in the domestic
violence system as complex actors who are capable of making free choices
and yet constrained by their social realities.
I. THE ORIGINAL IDEOLOGY OF FEMINIST CRIMINAL LAW REFORM
Scholars sometimes characterize domestic violence and rape reform as
part of the larger victims' rights movement. 46 The purposes behind, and
origins of, feminist criminal law reform, however, are quite distinct from
those underlying the more general crime victims' rights movement.
Domestic violence and rape reform were part of a larger effort to resist
47patriarchal structures and secure social justice for women.
Historically, liberal feminists called for the formal equality of genders,
requiring, at the very least, that criminal laws treat men and women
equally.48 The lack of law enforcement against men who committed crimes
against women represented formal inequality in the criminal justice system.49
46. See, e.g., Alice Koskela, Victim's Rights Amendments: An Irresistible Political Force Transforms
the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO L, REV. 157, 163 (1997) (noting that the feminist criminal
law reforms were intimately tied to the development of the victims' rights movement).
47. See Micchio, supra note 43, at 250 (asserting that the principle of social justice and the
idea that women should be free from physical and psychological control drove feminist
domestic violence reform).
48. Feminist Mary Becker describes liberal feminism:
Liberal feminism assumes that people are autonomous individuals making
decisions in their own self-interest in light of their individual preferences. Human
well-being therefore should increase as individuals have more choices. Sexism
operates by pressuring or requiring, sometimes by law, individuals to fulfill male
and female roles regardless of their individual preferences. The solution to
inequality between women and men is to offer individuals the same choices
regardless of sex. The legal standard of formal equality is an expression of this
solution.
Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21,
32-33.
49. Elizabeth Schneider discusses her fight for formal equality in the case of State v.
Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977). She explains how feminists developed a "legal argument
for women's 'equal right to trial,' which challenged sex-bias in the law of self-defense."
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 607 (1986).
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Moreover, the substantive law itself often contained explicit biases against
women. Rape law, for example, treated rape complainants differently than
other complaining witnesses. Women alleging rape faced presumptions of
incredibility, justifying special evidentiary requirements like resistance and
corroboration.5 0 Feminists brought to light historical formal legal barriers to
gender equality in the criminal process, debunking the myth of legal
neutrality.
51
The second wave of feminism brought rape and domestic violence
reform to the forefront of the feminist movement. Motivated in part by
Catherine MacKinnon's theory, feminists moved beyond purely liberal
reasoning and asserted that under-enforcement of domestic violence and
rape laws represented more than just the failure of the criminal justice
system to render formal equality.52 The lack of enforcement of these laws
reified patriarchal views that women are objects and reflected conservative
ideology that subordinated women's issues by deeming them private and
50. The common law of rape in many jurisdictions required that a prosecution could only
be maintained if evidence existed that the victim "resisted to the utmost." This requirement
came from a belief that women alleging rape could not be legally credited without physical
corroboration. Courts would enforce the requirement even in the face of evidence that
resistance would have been dangerous. See People v. DeFrates, 210 N.E.2d 467, 470 (111. 1965)
(finding insufficient evidence of rape in the absence of resistance and asserting that victim's
report of rape "may as well be accounted for by a belated sense of guilt occurring when a
dalliance unintentionally extended into the daylight hours"). Courts have never required such
physical corroboration of crime from victims of non-gendered crimes. Non-sexual assault,
burglary, and theft victims, for example, never have to show that they resisted the crimes in
order for a prosecution to result. For a discussion of the formal legal barriers to gender equality
in the rape trial, see Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem of Tort-Type Defenses
in the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 203, 225-30 (1997).
51. See, e.g., Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batterer Through Legislation: Will it Work
This Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709, 714-17 (2004) (observing that William Blackstone endorsed
"domestic chastisement" as a necessary part of the patriarchal family structure).
52. MacKinnon asserts that the characterization of sexual and domestic relationships as
"private" is political methodology employed by men to subordinate women. She states:
Unlike the ways in which men systematically enslave, violate, dehumanize, and
exterminate other men, expressing political inequalities among men, men's forms
of dominance over women have been accomplished socially as well as
economically, prior to the operation of law, without express state acts, often in
intimate contexts, as every life.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161 (1989). Mary Becker
explains:
MacKinnon's bottom line-the prize we need to keep our eyes on-is power. We
need continuously to look for subtle and not-so-subtle ways in which differences
between women and men are turned time after time into advantages (more
power) for men and disadvantages (less power) for women. Sex is the core of this
phenomena: sexuality appears as the interactive dynamic of gender as an
inequality.
Becker, supra note 48, at 37-38.
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thus inappropriate for legal response.53 Feminists characterized sexual
power over women as both a symptom of patriarchal values and a tool of
maintaining gender dominance, in which the state was complicit for its
failure to intervene.5 4 Feminists fought against the patriarchal attitudes that
sought to render women objects of men and deny women agency in55• 56
domestic55 and sexual relationships. Scholars describe how feminists linked
domestic violence to state discrimination:
The battered women's movement of the 1970s to the 1980s was the
product of the social movements of the 1960s that challenged
conceptions of power based on race, sex, and sexual orientation.
This movement was integral to the women's liberation movement
because it challenged male hegemony over women's bodies in the
home. The battered women's movement developed an ideology
that contested the appropriation of women's bodies, challenged
conceptions of male supremacy in the family, and analyzed how the
individual power of the patriarch was supported and legitimized by
the state. 7
In the feminist mindset, domestic violence and rape were not merely
about individual "deviant" males asserting illegitimate power over individual
53. Schneider observes that the battered women's movement "created the theoretical
concept of battering, and the issue has now moved from social invisibility as a 'private problem'
to an important public concern." SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 5.
54. MacKinnon sought to obliterate the public/private distinction, rejecting the notion
that "intimate" violence was beyond the reach of state action. See Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1308 (1991). See generally Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973 (1991).
55. See Micchio, supra note 43, at 252-53 ("Judicial inquiry started from the point that
some physical violence was acceptable to preserve the 'natural order of things'-of which
familial harmony and male hegemony were integral parts.").
56. Mary Becker describes patriarchy in the context of sexual agency:
Patriarchy denies that women can be sexual agents making moral decisions in light
of their own sexual desires. Patriarchy teaches that a woman should agree to sex
with "her" man when he desires it regardless of whether she desires it or is likely to
find it pleasurable. As beings with their own ends and purposes, women should be
encouraged to develop as sexual agents capable of saying "no" to sex they do not
desire and seeking their own sexual pleasures.
Becker, supra note 48, at 50-51.
57. Micchio, supra note 43, at 248-49 (footnotes omitted). Elizabeth Schneider also traces
the domestic violence movement to the 1960s. She observes:
In the late 1960s a movement of feminist activists and lawyers began to bring the
problem of woman abuse to public attention. At that time, there was no legal
recognition of a harm of violence against women by intimates-today known as
domestic violence. It simply didn't exist in the legal vocabulary.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 3.
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women. Rather such crimes reflected larger social inequalities. 8 Sexualand
domestic crimes were problematic precisely because they reproduced and
reinforced not only biases within the legal system, but also the vigorously
defended patriarchal mindset of society.5 9 As one feminist asserted:
Battering may be experienced as a personal violation, but it is an
act facilitated and made possible by societal gender inequalities.
The batterer does not, and indeed could not, act alone. Social
supports for battering include widespread denial of its frequency or
harm, economic structures that render women vulnerable, and
sexist ideology that holds women accountable for male violence
and for the emotional lives of families, and that fosters deference
to male familial control. 60
Feminists thus recognized the close relationship between domestic violence
61and widespread economic gender discrimination.
The earliest domestic violence and rape reforms sought to address both
systemic inequality and patriarchal social attitudes. In terms of formal
equality, reforms targeted legal and practical barriers to female victims'
participation in the criminal process. Law reforms removed evidentiary
barriers to prosecution of sexual crimes.62 Courts and legislatures, for
58. See Micchio, supra note 43, at 254 (asserting that domestic abuse, like homophobia, is a
social problem rather than a defect in the "psyche of individual men").
59. Lynne Henderson summarizes the view that law is inherently gendered, as explained
by Carol Smart in her book Feminism and the Power of Law. Henderson observes, "Smart focuses
on particular issues for feminists concerned with law and seeks to demonstrate that law's
patriarchy is impervious to women's concerns and voices. She argues throughout that feminist
efforts to change law are and will be co-opted either by legal phallocentrism or right wing
antifeminism." Lynn Henderson, Law's Patriarchy, 25 LAW & Soc'y REv. 411, 432 (1991)
(citations omitted).
60. Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking,
47 UCLA L. REv. 1, 39 (1999).
61. Scholars observe:
Leading feminists and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights suggest that violence
against women begins with educational and economic discrimination .... Men
learn to consider women burdens, stiflers and drags on their freedom. Women, in
turn, do not have the economic independence and access to day care that would
enable them to leave abusive settings. Feminists also suggest that violence begins
with the infantilization of women so that men hold them in contempt and see
them as easily dismissed or lampooned and ready targets for anger.
Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REv. 1099,
1156 (1993) (quoting MARCIA PALLY, SENSE AND CENSORSHIP: THE VANITY OF BONFIRES 14
(1991)).
62. The previous view had been that rape complainants were a priori incredible.
Wigmore's treatise on evidence once characterized the rape complainant as follows:
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls and
women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are
multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements
92 IOWA LA WREVIEW
example, began to eliminate or temper the marital exemption, which had
63
served to deny married women access to the legal system altogether.
Corroboration and resistance requirements, which burdened complaining
witnesses in rape cases with presumptions of incredibility, were also
abandoned. 64
In addition to formal legal reforms, other policies targeted prevailing
attitudes that prevented female victims from securing justice. Feminists
organized class-action lawsuits against police departments whose officers
deliberately failed to intervene to protect women. 65 Moreover, police and
prosecutors were trained to treat rape and domestic violence victims with
respect 66 to lessen the overwhelming stigma associated with being a female
victim of a gendered crime that is symptomatic of the patriarchal mindset.
61
or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary
physiological or emotional conditions.... The real victim, however, too often ...
is the innocent man ....
3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924a, at 736 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
63. See Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction,
43 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 351, 367-69 (1995) (surveying state laws and finding that four states retain
the marital exemption, twenty-four states allow for prosecution of spousal rape under certain
circumstances, and twenty-two have eliminated the distinction between spousal and non-spousal
rape); see, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984) ("[A] marriage license should
not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity.").
64. See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 113-24 (Cal. 1986) (discussing in detail
reasons for rejecting the resistance requirement). Courts and legislatures had justified such
requirements by the danger of false conviction in a "he said, she said" situation. Feminists
successfully challenged the logic of these requirements as nothing more than sexism,
demonstrating that such presumptions applied only to gendered crimes and not to any other
crimes where the primary evidence was victim-witness testimony. See supra text accompanying
note 50.
65. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 44 (describing these efforts); Thurman v. City of
Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1526-29 (D. Conn. 1984) (finding that plaintiff had stated a
claim under the Equal Protection Clause based on police's failure to intervene in domestic
violence); Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (finding that battered
women presented justiciable case against police and family court), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978); see also Christine O'Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy
Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 940-44 (1999) (discussing Bruno and Thurman).
66. See Andrea A. Curcio, The Georgia Roundtable Discussion Model: Another Way to Approach
Reforming Rape Laws, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 565, 578 (2004) ("In many jurisdictions, police and
prosecutors now have formal training sessions designed to educate them about rape myths and
the need 'to take . . . more seriously the testimony of [acquaintance rape victims], especially
those whose sexual choices and conduct have traditionally been taken to be provocative,
improper, or immoral.'" (quoting George E. Panichas, Rape, Autonomy, and Consent, 35 LAW &
Soc'vREV. 231, 233 (2001))).
67. Fearing that prevailing patriarchal attitudes lead society to see them as loose, weak,
untruthful, or crazy, many women victims are reluctant to report or seek help for gendered
crimes. I have elsewhere stated:
While I appreciate the magnitude of the social and institutional problems
surrounding the rape trial, these problems must be given social and institutional
solutions. Society must be informed about gender equality . . . . Police,
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As one scholar explains, the battered woman "wears the stench of shame and
embarrassment while her mate bathes in society's fountain of
indecisiveness." 8 In addition, feminists secured funding for services for rape
and domestic violence victims. Shelters began to provide abuse victims with
alternatives to staying in abusive relationships. 6 9 Such early reforms did not
mandate that victims' wishes necessarily coincide with state prosecutorial
aims. Rather, they sought to give victims the option to access the legal system
or external services if they so desired.7 °
As time passed, domestic violence reform became more prosecutorial in
nature and policies involving intrusive state intervention emerged. Many
feminists embraced mandatory arrest and prosecution policies as countering
patriarchy within the criminal justice system.7' They asserted that such
policies served to correct the inevitable inequities produced by a
72discretionary system. Namely, police, prosecutors, judges, and jurors,
internalizing patriarchal attitudes, simply did not treat victims of domestic
violence the same way as other crime ViCtims. 7 3 Reformers argued that police
prosecutors, and hospital workers must receive training on treating rape victims
sensitively. People must learn not to stigmatize rape victims.
Gruber, supra note 50, at 232.
68. White, supra note 51, at 722-23.
69. Emily Sack explains that "[t]he early battered women's advocacy movement was a
grassroots effort to provide services and shelter to domestic violence victims, independent of
state involvement." Sack, supra note 27, at 1666.
70. See id. (discussing initial reformers' efforts to develop various types of assistance for
victims).
71. See Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 339, 340 (1995) (describing 1970s women's groups' proposals of structural
reforms and policy changes as a counter to sluggish responses from state actors to feminists'
calls for domestic violence intervention); Sack, supra note 27, at 1666 (noting the call for
increasingly aggressive police intervention and prosecution).
72. There are both intralegal and extralegal solutions to the problems presented by
discretion. Extralegal solutions seek to eliminate the prevailing ideologies that lead discretion
to be synonymous with discrimination. See Gruber, supra note 37, at 683 (proposing extralegal
solutions to the problem of jury nullification in rape cases). Intralegal solutions take the
prevailing ideology for granted and propose structural legal changes to account for them. See
Sack, supra note 27, at 1689-90 (indicating that without mandatory policies, police and
prosecutors would not make the "right choices"). Structural changes in such a context,
however, are often highly problematic in that they temper discretion by changing procedural
balances within the trial. See Gruber, supra note 37, at 644-60 (criticizing structural rape
reforms as potentially violative of defendants' procedural rights). See generally Dan M. Kahan,
Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000)
(discussing the relationship between social norms and criminal law).
73. See infra notes 74-75. Similar discrimination against minority victims is evidenced in
other areas of criminal prosecution, most notably imposition of the death penalty. Well-known
statistics have revealed that defendants who commit homicide on victims of color are much less
likely to receive the death penalty than those who kill white victims. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987) (citing the "Baldus study," which demonstrated that in Georgia
92 IOWA LA WREVIEW
viewed domestic violence as either a legitimate exercise of male control
within a relationship or at least a private problem inappropriate for public
concern.74 They also asserted that prosecutors were unwilling to bring
domestic violence cases to trial because of their own patriarchal beliefs or
fear that the complainant would not cooperate or the jury would not
convict. 75 Supporters of mandatory policies thus equated formal equality
with ensuring that the percentage of domestic violence cases prosecuted in
court roughly equaled the prosecution levels of other crimes.
76
The alliance between early domestic violence advocates and law
enforcement, however, was tenuous at best, as feminists realized the risks of
using state power to make the lives of women better.7 7 First, state power and
women's fights had not enjoyed philosophical symmetry in the past.7 State
institutional mechanisms had historically subverted efforts toward women's
empowerment. 79 In addition, the criminal justice system itself was infested
with racial, socioeconomic, and gender biases that manifested every time•80
criminal enforcement was increased. No doubt, if more persons were
arrested and incarcerated for domestic violence, minorities, immigrants, and
the poor would suffer the negative effects disproportionately.8' In addition,
given the social context of law enforcement, minority victims of domestic
violence were often penalized for being involved in the justice system at all.
Mandatory arrest policies created the risk that women could be arrested
murders involving white victims resulted in the death penalty far more than murders involving
black victims).
74. See Mordini, supra note 41, at 312 (discussing police attitudes).
75. See id. at 317; O'Connor, supra note 65, at 942-43 (attributing prosecutor reluctance to
the belief that domestic violence is a private problem and the fear that victims would not follow
through on the case); Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 181 (1997).
76. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 16 (1999) (noting that
mandatory policies put domestic violence in a position of rough parity with non-domestic
crimes).
77. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 182 (observing that feminists "were skeptical of an
affirmative role for the state; they saw the state as maintaining, enforcing, and legitimizing male
violence against women, not remedying it").
78. See Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49
DEPAUL L. REv. 817, 821 (2000) ("The criminal route also serves to give control to the state.
Where sensitivity to women is not a real priority, women can sacrifice control, getting little
support in return. [In addition], many of the assumptions underlying criminal law are
'nonneutral.").
79. See Sack, supra note 27, at 1675-76 (noting that many feminists saw the criminal justice
system as the very embodiment of institutionalized male power over women).
80. See Cahn, supra note 78, at 820 (observing that because domestic violence reform has
resulted in the disproportionate punishment of African American men, many African American
women victims are reluctant to seek state remedies).
81. See infra notes 272-76 and accompanying text (describing the impact of
criminalization on minorities).
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S 82when their abusers counterclaimed violence, and increased police
attention placed battered women in other forms of jeopardy.5  Finally,
resorting to state power to aid domestic violence victims smacked of the type
84of paternalism feminists had been fighting for years.
Nonetheless, there were significant benefits to a feminist law-
enforcement alliance. First, there was the symbolic value of state actorsS 85
taking domestic violence seriously. Prosecution of those who abuse women,
many hoped, would send a message to society not to tolerate violence within
domestic relationships.86 This might have some salutary effect on changing
sexist attitudes about wife abuse.8s Reformers further believed that aggressive
82. See Coker, supra note 42, at 1043-45.
83. Id. at 1047-48 (noting that some jurisdictions require police to report suspected child
abuse when they respond to a domestic violence call where children are present and that many
abused women become defendants themselves "as a direct result of being battered").
84. Christine O'Connor observes:
State intervention, particularly policies that mandate victim participation or no-
contact orders, is premised upon a presumption that the state knows what is right
for all women. These policies effectively tell the victim that her input is
unnecessary, or even unworthy of consideration, in determining what has occurred
and what is best for her family.
O'Connor, supra note 65, at 962; see also Sack, supra note 27, at 1666 (noting that many
feminists saw the criminal justice system as having an interest in maintaining the status quo of
male dominance).
85. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 186 (asserting that mandatory prosecution policies
"send a message that domestic violence shall not be treated as a less serious crime than violence
between strangers"); Sack, supra note 27, at 1670-71 (asserting the message-sending power of
mandatory policies).
86. Schneider further states that mandatory policies "transform the private nature of
domestic violence into a public matter," SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 186, thus echoing
MacKinnon's criticism of the sexist public/private distinction. See MacKinnon supra note 54, at
1311. Interestingly, some scholars have noted that black women have a very different history
with the public/private distinction, in that they have historically been considered property of
the public realm. Jennifer C. Nash observes:
Because the black body is culturally, socially, and legally hyper-surveyed and
because the black female body is inscribed and engraved with particular gendered
and racialized cultural meanings, the black female subject has never been granted
the same kind of privacy as the white female, the privacy that some feminists have
argued needs to be "exploded."
Jennifer C. Nash, From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist Legal Theory, 11
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 303, 319 (2005).
87. See Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the
Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 269, 274 n.21 (2000) (noting that such attitudes
formed over centuries of condonation of male dominance in the domestic realm). While some
hope that mandatory policies will effect attitude change, others believe that only a multi-
pronged approach will work. See Tsai, supra note 14, at 1325 (expressing doubt that criminal
laws alone, in the absence of far-reaching social reforms, could change such deeply held
beliefs).
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state intervention would deter future violence. s In addition, they hoped
properly administered state intervention that treated women with
appropriate dignity might empower women to stay abuse-free. s
As a result, formal requirements that police must arrest whenever there
is probable cause to believe domestic violence occurred and prosecutorial
no-drop policies began to materialize around the nation.90 Such policies, in
88. See Sack, supra note 27, at 1673-74 (asserting that no-drop policies increase
prosecution levels and lower recidivism rates).
89. Elizabeth Schneider describes a study by anthropologist Sally Merry of domestic
violence victims in a small town in Hawaii. In response to an increase in domestic violence, the
town had enacted reforms increasing the availability of protective orders, increasing penalties
for domestic violence, and instituting domestic violence control programs for batterers. In
addition, the town established shelters and provided other forms of support for battered
women. According to Schneider, Merry found that the system "had a considerable impact on
the participants' understanding of themselves, violence, and the role of law ... . 'The court
becomes a place for women to turn for protection rather than a place that reinforces male
authority.'" SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 49-50 (quoting Sally Engle Merry, Wife Battering and the
Ambiguities of Rights, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 271, 275 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1995)).
90. All fifty states now allow police to make warrantless arrests of those accused of
domestic violence offenses. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (2001) (allowing
warrantless arrest for domestic violence, but only mandating arrest in cases of "serious injury");
HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906 (1993); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/302 (2004); IOWA CODE § 236.12 (2)
(2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.005 (LexisNexis 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-21 (2005);
O'Connor, supra note 65, at 942. In addition, several states make arrest in domestic violence
cases mandatory. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (2004) (entitled "Mandatory arrest for
crimes involving domestic violence, violation of protective orders, and violation of conditions of
release"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(c) (1) (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6(1) (2006);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38b(a) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.100 (2006).
States have also adopted legislation calling for the implementation of special
prosecution policies. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 236.12(3) (2005) ("A peace officer's identification
of the primary physical aggressor shall not be based on the consent of the victim to any
subsequent prosecution or on the relationship of the persons involved in the incident, and shall
not be based solely upon the absence of visible indications of injury or impairment."); FLA.
STAT. § 741.2901(2) (2005) ("The state attorney in each circuit shall adopt a pro-prosecution
policy for acts of domestic violence, as defined in § 741.28, and an intake policy and procedures
coordinated with the clerk of court for violations of injunctions for protection against domestic
violence."); MINN. STAT. § 611A.0311 (b) (4) (2003) (mandating "procedures to encourage the
prosecution of all domestic abuse cases where a crime can be proven"). Utah's legislative
scheme provides stringent directives to judges in domestic violence cases. UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-36-2.7 (2003), entitled, "Dismissal-Diversion prohibited-Plea in abeyance-Release before
trial," states:
(1) Because of the serious nature of domestic violence, the court, in domestic
violence actions:(a) may not dismiss any charge or delay disposition because of
concurrent divorce or other civil proceedings; (b) may not require proof that
either party is seeking a dissolution of marriage before instigation of criminal
proceedings; (c) shall waive any requirement that the victim's location be disclosed
other than to the defendant's attorney, upon a showing that there is any possibility
of further violence, and order the defendant's attorney not to disclose the victim's
location to his client; (d) shall identify, on the docket sheets, the criminal actions
arising from acts of domestic violence; (e) may dismiss a charge on stipulation of
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theory, left no room for police and prosecutors to use their discretion to
operationalize the sexist belief that domestic violence is not a crime.9 '
Mandatory arrest and prosecution were supposed to be cure-alls that would
temper the patriarchal system and better protect interests of women, but
something funny happened along the way. Rather than merely police and
prosecutors resisting pro-enforcement policies, abused women themselves
were reluctant to participate in state intervention.9 2 For a variety of social,
economic, and emotional reasons, women either wanted to stay out of the
system themselves or desired that the system exempt their partners from
enforcement.
9 3
This development threw a significant curveball to feminists. Feminists
were prepared to fight actively against police and prosecutor support of
under-enforcement, which reformers could fairly and easily characterize as
informed by patriarchy,94 but now they had to account for women's desires
to stay out of the system.95 Feminist domestic violence reformers found
themselves at a very important crossroad.99 The resistance of women victims
to the intervention of the criminal system caused pioneers in the movement
the prosecutor and the victim; and (f) may hold a plea in abeyance, in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter 2a, making treatment or any other requirement for
the defendant a condition of that status....
(4) When a court dismisses criminal charges or a prosecutor moves to dismiss
charges against a defendant accused of a domestic violence offense, the specific
reasons for dismissal shall be recorded in the court file and made a part of the
statewide domestic violence network described in Section 30-6-8....
(6) The court may not approve diversion for a perpetrator of domestic violence.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7 (2003). In addition to legislated prosecution schemes,
municipalities and prosecutors' offices have adopted their own no-drop policies. See O'Connor,
supra note 65, at 943-47 (surveying state and municipal formal and informal no-drop-
prosecution policies).
91. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing police and prosecutor
attitudes).
92. See Coker, supra note 42, at 1042-49 (describing women-victims' reluctance to
participate in the criminal process).
93. See infta notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
95. Elizabeth Schneider explains how the feminist law reformer must exist in a "murky
middle ground" between accepting state power and resisting state control of women.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 196.
96. See Micchio, supra note 43, at 322 (asserting that feminists are at a "historical moment"
in which they must reconsider the decision to sacrifice female autonomy for male-dominated
state intervention). Ren~e R6mkens similarly observes that the battered women's movement is
currently "at a moment in history [where] feminist legal politics in the domain of domestic
violence seem to have entered mainstream politics, certainly in the United States." Symposium,
Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, Elizabeth M. Schneider, Christine
Harrington, Sally Engle Meny, Renie Rdmkens, & Marianne Wesson, 10J.L. & POL'Y 313, 337 (2002)
[hereinafter Battered Women Symposium].
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to engage in serious self reflection.97 Reformers such as Elizabeth Schneider
mused on the dangers of criminalization and questioned whether feminists
had directed disproportionate efforts towards prosecution, but fell short of
calling for an abandonment of mandatory policies.9 Others like Donna
Coker and Holly MaGuigan openly and frankly reject mandatory policies
and pro-prosecution sentiments.9 9 Given the importance of these voices, the
larger reform movement faced a critical choice-forge ahead with
criminalization policies and come up with arguments minimizing the
importance of victim resistance or scale back on criminalization policies and
focus elsewhere on the problem.'00
It was at this moment that domestic violence reformers faced a
dilemma: On the one hand, many reformers thought that aggressive
prosecution of domestic violence was necessary to delegitimize this form of
gender subordination. On the other hand, reformers worried that pushing
forward with prosecutions against a woman's wishes ran contrary to feminist
adherence to a woman's autonomy. 1° 1 Nonetheless, reformers made a
choice. Simply taking a look at the pervasiveness of mandatory arrest and no-
97. Sally Merry muses:
I wonder if the success of the battered women's movement in bringing these cases
to court and achieving at least minimal standards for arrest, prosecution, and even
occasional incarceration is in part because it dovetailed with these other agendas,
both the refocus on victims and the increase of control and surveillance over men
of color.
Battered Women Symposium, supra note 96, at 332.
98. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 182-88 (discussing the dilemmas presented
by mandatory policies).
99. See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A
Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 801, 806-07 (2001) (noting some potential benefits of
mandatory policies as well as the complexity of the issue, but concluding that mandatory polices
do not strike a good balance between reform efforts and state power). MaGuigan states, "[a] t a
minimum, we must not enact additional mandatory arrest laws. Where they exist, we should
urge prosecutors to use discretion in making decisions about which victims will have their safety
endangered by prosecution. We must encourage prosecutors not to adopt no-drop policies."
Holly MaGuigan, Wading into Professor Schneider's "Murky Middle Ground" Between Acceptance and
Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 427,
443-44 (2003).
100. By "elsewhere," I mean focusing political power, academic capital, and reform efforts
on securing funding for assistance to women in areas like child care, education, and public
benefits; countering patriarchal messaging and sowing economic and social empowerment
generally. See Micchio, supra note 43, at 290 (noting that states channel domestic violence funds
nearly exclusively to law enforcement, leaving inadequate resources for other services to abuse
survivors).
101. Donna Coker describes the dilemma as follows: "The dilemma for feminists is to
develop strategies for controlling state actors-ensuring that the police come when called and
that prosecutors do not trivialize cases-without increasing state control of women." Coker,
supra note 99, at 807.
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drop policies, one can see that the domestic violence movement forged
ahead in embracing prosecutorial intervention. 10 2
This choice must be understood in light of the competing theoretical
forces reformers encountered. On the one hand, reformers were well aware
of the law's history of objectifying women and the state and criminal justice
system's complicity in denying women autonomy. On the other hand,
reformers were surrounded by a society bent on accepting the tough-on-
crime ideology of the victims' rights movement. The idea that victims were
helpless objects and defendants monstrous agents appealed to mainstream
sentiments, such that domestic violence reformers would be rewarded for
buying into this discourse. Perhaps the benefits of a philosophical alliance
with the victims' rights movement was enough to compel domestic violence
reformers to scale back on their adherence to feminist values. The next
section analyzes the competing forces, namely, the victims' rights movement
and the history of women's objectification, that underlay the domestic
violence reform movement's transformation from a grassroots progressive
movement to an ally of conservative criminology.
II. THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT
A. ORIGINS OF THE VICTIMS'RIGHTS MovEwNT
The victims' rights movement has a history and philosophy quite
distinct from that of the feminist legal reform movement. Rather than
beginning as a movement of resistance against the power elite, the crime
victims' rights movement has always been part of a larger, socially
conservative tough-on-crime ideology.103 Tough-on-crime ideals and rhetoric
gained prominence in the Reagan eighties 1°4 as a subset of a more general
libertarian shift toward individual responsibility and away from social
102. See supra note 90 (listing mandatory arrest and prosecution laws); see also Micchio,
supra note 43, at 239 n.2 (citing statutes); Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to
"Straighten Out" Criminal Law: What Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal
Law's Conventional Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 81, 93
(2003) ("Criminal law has moved to the center of efforts to prevent, intervene in, and end
domestic violence. Once efforts to enlist the law in the fight against domestic violence became
successful, I argue that the law essentially took over anti-domestic violence efforts." (internal
citation omitted)).
103. One of the key moments in the genesis of the victims' rights movement was Ronald
Reagan's establishment of the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime in 1982. The Task
Force found that the criminal justice system had lost "essential balance" and was doing a
disservice to victims. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114 (1982);
see also Jon Kyl et al., On The Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy
Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 581, 584
(2005) (discussing the importance of Reagan's Task Force in the victims' rights movement).
104. See David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the "Forgotten
Victim," 17 PEPP. L. REV. 35, 36 (1989) (discussing how the Reagan Administration's policies
marked a critical shift toward awareness of the victims' rights movement).
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welfare. 10 5 This discourse coincided with a larger program of slashing welfare
benefits10 6 and decreasing the role of government in healthcare, education,
transportation, and distribution of wealth. 0 7 In conservative ideology, each
105. Reagan's philosophy operatively redefined public sentiment toward social welfare:
Perhaps no other politician effectively, yet controversially, built public resentment
against social welfare programs like Ronald Reagan. During his bid for the 1976
presidential election, Reagan told a story about an African American woman from
Chicago who was arrested for welfare fraud. According to Reagan, the woman had
eighty aliases, thirty different addresses, twelve Social Security cards, four deceased
husbands, and collected benefits under each name along with Medicaid and food
stamps. The term "welfare queen" originated from Reagan's inaccurate portrayal
of welfare recipients as lazy African-American women with values and morals
contradicting those of working and middle class Americans.
Pearson Liddell, Jr. et al., Welfare Reform in Mississippi: TANF Policy and Its Implications, 11 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y& L. 1107, 1113 (2003).
106. See generally FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR:
REAGAN'S ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1982) (describing the
Reagan administration's assault on the welfare system).
107. President Reagan stated his philosophy as follows:
Th[e] rise in crime, caused by a hardened criminal class, was fostered partly from a
liberal social philosophy that too often called for lenient treatment of criminals.
Because this misguided social philosophy saw man as primarily the creature of his
material environment, it thought that through expensive government social
programs it could change that environment and usher in a great new egalitarian
utopia. And yet even while government was launching a rash of social engineering
schemes in a vain attempt to remake man and society, it wasn't dealing with the
most elementary social problems like rising crime. Individual wrongdoing, they
told us, was always caused by a lack of material goods, and underprivileged
background, or poor socioeconomic conditions. And somehow, and I know you've
heard it said-I heard it many times when I was Governor of California-it was
society, not the individual, that was at fault when an act of violence or a crime was
committed. Somehow, it wasn't the wrongdoer but all of us who were to blame. Is
it any wonder, then, that a new privileged class emerged in America, a class of
repeat offenders and career criminals who thought they had the right to victimize
their fellow citizens with impunity. And today we still pay the price for those years
of liberal leniency-I mean the growth in the ranks of career criminals, criminals
who are contemptuous of our way ofjustice, who do not believe they can be caught
and, if they are caught, are confident that once the cases against them enter our
legal system, the charges will be dropped, postponed, plea-bargained away, or lost
in a maze of legal technicalities that make a mockery of our society's longstanding
and commendable respect for civil liberties.
Ronald W. Reagan, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National Sheriffs Association in
Hartford, Connecticut (June 20, 1984), available at The Public Papers of President Ronald W.
Reagan, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/publicpapers.html; see also G.O.P.
Testimony on Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1968, at 20 (quoting then-governor Ronald Reagan as
stating: "It is time to restore the American precept that each individual is accountable for his
actions"). Reagan's emphasis on individual responsibility led to widespread policy reforms
outside the criminal arena. See Kenneth R. Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal
Medicaid Program, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (1983) (discussing Reagan-era cuts to healthcare
and other spending programs). During the 1980 presidential election, Ronald Reagan called
the Department of Education "President Carter's new bureaucratic boondoggle." Dan Lips,
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person was an island unto oneself, ultimately responsible for his or her own
failings and successes.'0s Equality of opportunity rather than equality of
outcome was the mantra, as conservative politicians decried the injustice of
welfare and affirmative-action programs.'0 9 Race scholar Angela Harris
explains, "Indeed, for many contemporary conservatives there is no 'society'
at all, only individuals, or at most local moral 'cultures' that must bear the
responsibility for their own moral uplift. In this discourse, questions relating
to crime and 'welfare,' for example, become personal moral issues rather
than social problems."
10
Tough-on-crime proponents characterized crime not as a social ill, but
rather as an independent force hostile to American society. Thus, the
government could declare "war" on crime and the criminal element,"'
cementing the notion that crime existed as an evil entity that could be
beaten with harsh enough criminal policy."' Mari Matsuda criticizes the law
for failing to consider the larger institutional mechanisms and social
attitudes that contribute to individual problems or injuries. She explains:
Reagan's ABC's, CATO INSTITUTE (2001), http://www.cato.org/research/edncation/
articles/reagan.html; see also DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: HOW THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION FAILED 8-9 (1986) (describing Reagan's trickle-down economic policies).
108. See Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, Converging on the Poles: Contemporary Punishment and
Democracy in Hemispheric Perspective, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 515, 529 (2005) (noting that after
the civil rights era, "conservatives called for a return to individual responsibility and a retreat
from the precipice of liberal permissiveness, reframing the crime issue from a question of
inadequate social welfare to one of insufficient social control").
109. Professor Harris describes the ideology as follows:
Ideologies stretching from the myth of meritocracy in higher education to the
bromides of New Age self-esteem and self-improvement place both blame and
responsibility on the individual. We succeed through our own individual merit and
hard work; however, the concomitant insistence is that we also fail as individuals or
because of a "culture" of poverty or fallen morality that we have failed to personally
transcend.
Angela P. Harris, Bad Subjects: The Practice of Theory and the Constitution of Identity in Legal Culture,
9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 515, 516 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
110. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the
SCT?: What Justice Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV.
931, 948 (2005) (describing conservative ideology as a belief in less government involvement in
social welfare and a greater emphasis on individual responsibility).
111. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the "War on
Drugs"was a "War on Blacks, "6J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 381, 387 (2002) (characterizing Reagan's
"war on drugs" as part of a "rhetorical strategy that sought to demonize drugs and ostracize
drug users"); Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 70 (1994)
(noting that the Reagan and Bush I Administrations waged several rhetorical wars on crime).
112. See Ren6e R6mkens, Law as a Trojan Horse: Unintended Consequences of Rights-Based
Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 265, 286 (2001) (noting the
current emphasis on criminalizing behaviors that were historically considered "social ills at
worst").
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If a woman is raped, we look to the rapist for recourse. He
is subject to the narrow criminal and civil sanctions of the law.
Others in a position to predict and prevent rape . . . are typically
absolved .... Immunity is also presumed for those who create an
ideological system that makes rape possible.
13
In this era, government and media portrayed criminals, not as products
of circumstances, but rather as defective creatures-a class of people wholly
114
different in comportment from average, law-abiding citizens.
Rehabilitation gave way to deterrence and incapacitation as politicians used
colorful rhetoric about criminality to support harsh policies, including
increasing sentences and eliminating parole.1 5 Crime-fighting policy
manifested solely as law enforcement and incarceration, rather than
programs targeted toward eliminating poverty or creating alternatives to
crime.' 6 Discretion in sentencing, the sole component of the criminal
process that took account of defendants' social backgrounds, was greatly
limited during this time period." 7 In the name of "uniformity," the federal
government and a majority of states turned to mandatory sentencing
guidelines, stripping judges of their discretion to sentence a defendant on
social factors rather than just the fact of guilt."8 While the post-guideline
113. Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2195, 2202-03 (2000) (footnotes
omitted).
114. See Otis B. Grant, Rational Choice or Wrongful Discrimination? The Law and Economics of
Jury Nullification, 14 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 145, 151-52 (2004) (describing the
conservative "free will" ideology that asserts criminals make rational choices regarding crime
and African Americans choose to promote a subculture of lawlessness). See generally David
Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032,
2074-75 (2004) (asserting that modern conservatives justify harsh criminal policies by
advancing a binary view of morality in which there are inherently good or bad people).
115. SeeJeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progression
Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 725 (2004) (observing how
politicians use retributive rhetoric and tough-on-crime proposals to gain popular support).
Perhaps the most effective use of tough-on-crime rhetoric for political purposes came from
George H.W. Bush during his presidential race against Michael Dukakis. Bush chastised
Dukakis for allowing murderers to be released from prison for short furloughs. He emphasized
in the media the horrific case of Willie Horton who committed rape and kidnapping while out
on a forty-eight-hour pass. Willie Horton became the very face of crime in America. See David
Lauter, Crime Issue Becoming Election Battleground, L.A. TIMES,June 13, 1988, at 1.
116. SeeJonathan Simon, From a Tight Place: Crime, Punishment, and American Liberalism, 17
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 853, 854 (1999) (asserting that crime control was one of the few
government actions Bush and Reagan found defensible under their political ideology); see also
supra note 107 (describing Reagan's ideology, which included increasing criminal sanctions
while simultaneously reducing government involvement in welfare and educational programs).
117. See Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1233, 1247 (2005) (stating that conservatives saw determinate sentencing as a way to
control lenient sentencingjudges and parole boards).
118. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using
the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 70 (2003) (observing
that "[e]conomic hardship, drug addiction, a history of physical or sexual abuse, or a lack of
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regime did not secure the uniformity desired by sentencing commissions, it
did uniformly increase sentences." 9 States and the federal government
turned to legislative sentencing, stripping judges of discretion to sentence
defendants on personal factors.2
Tough-on-crime ideology is the "perfect storm" fusion of incapacitation
theory 12 and retributivism. 2 Politicians moved the focus from context and
desert to dangerousness, as media illustrated a society plagued with crime
and in desperate need of crime control. Politicians emphasized harm and
guidance as a youth-for many, highly relevant to assessing an offender's culpability-are
ignored by the Guidelines and even actively discouraged as grounds for departure"); CharlesJ.
Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1938, 1957 (1988) (asserting that the federal sentencing guidelines virtually eliminated the
consideration of personal background as sentencing consideration).
119. See Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks of a "Tough on
Crime"Philosophy, 93 KY. L.J. 305, 318 (2004) ("[Sentencing guidelines] proved to be less about
correcting disparities than about radically altering sentencing standards, deemphasizing the
personal characteristics of offenders, substituting aggregated for individualized sentences,
enhancing the power of prosecutors, and increasing the severity of criminal penalties."
(quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the
Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003))); Ian Weinstein,
Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined
Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 106 (2003) (discussing the increase
in sentence lengths under the federal sentencing guidelines). Scholars describe two principal
failures of the federal-sentencing-guideline regime:
First, the federal sentencing rulemaking power has become a one-way upward
ratchet in which the sentences nominally required by the Guidelines are raised
easily and often and lowered only rarely and with the greatest difficulty. Second,
both judges and prosecutors have increasingly treated structured-sentencing rules
primarily as tools for inducing guilty pleas and cooperation with the government.
The consequence of these two failures operating in tandem has been unjustifiably
long sentences imposed in some significant if unquantifiable fraction of federal
cases ....
Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing
Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 246 (2005).
120. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000) (sweeping legislation
creating mandatory-minimum sentences in drug crimes); David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the
War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 212
(2004) (observing that guidelines and mandatory-minimum penalties have eviscerated
traditional notions of sentencing).
121. See Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical Criticisms of the
Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 460 (2004) (describing incapacitation
theory as "the concept that certain individuals should be removed from society to prevent them
from harming others");JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145 (rev. ed. 1983) (noting
that incapacitation deprives criminals of liberty so that they cannot harm society).
122. Retributivism is the idea that punishment "must in all cases be imposed on [the
offender] only on the ground that he committed a crime." IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE 100 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797).
123. One scholar links selective media coverage to the conservative agenda:
The absence of reporting about context reinforces the interpretation of crime
favored by conservatives. This happens because the missing context gives the
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victimhood, instead of individual culpability, and thus advocated longer
sentences in the name of safety.
124
Once this tough-on-crime ideology scared the public into accepting
high sentences, the rhetoric of retributivism, minus proportionality, proved
a useful tool for making the public comfortable with high sentences. 
15
Retributivism was fused with incapacitation theory to say that all criminals
were dangerous and should be incapacitated, and indeed deserved whatever
punishment they got. 126 As one expert has asserted, "The language of blame
tends to call forth feelings of disgust in most human beings. Such feelings
can be very successfully stirred up by any skilled tough-on-crime politician,
and politicians frequently do exactly that."127 Retributivism, as articulated
during the war on crime, stood for the principle that the general,
undifferentiated criminal element was constantly culpable to the highest
impression that violent crime is exclusively attributable to individual offenders'
bad choices rather than to structural features. Because news coverage does not
attend to the reality of crime rates and trends, it fails to provide sufficient context
for the public to make reasoned judgments about crime and criminal justice
policies. News media coverage of criminal justice administration typically
emphasizes the "failures"-defendants freed on legal "technicalities" and by
lenient judges-and presents advocates for more severe punishment as the
remedy.
Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative "Backlash, "87
MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1532 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
124. See Dubber, supra note 34, at 9; Gruber, supra note 37, at 663-64 (noting that sympathy
for the plight of the victim was accompanied by a general disdain for consideration of
defendant's background).
125. Generally, retributivism counsels not only that the deserving ought to be punished but
also that the punishment must be fair. Retributivism thus limits the state from punishing an
offender more than she deserves. See Gruber, supra note 121, at 452-53 (describing the
"limiting principles" that flow from retributivism). Retributivism, as set forth by tough-on-crime
reformers, includes the idea that the guilty deserve punishment but excludes the concept that
such punishment must be proportional to wrong-doing. SeeJames Q. Whitman, A Plea Against
Retributivism, 7 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 101 (2003) (criticizing the "virulence of retributivist
rhetoric in our highly politicized criminal justice system"); see also infra text accompanying note
127.
126. See Whitman, supra note 125, at 88-89 (questioning the claim that "retributivism
logically entails proportionality," given the use of blame discourse in modem American
politics). Stephen P. Garvey analogizes retribution theory to "dynamite, which in the wrong
hands can do more harm than good," explaining that the "widespread embrace of the rhetoric
of retributivism-of just deserts and righteous indignation-has tended to sponsor extreme
policies and practices that thoughtful retributivists themselves might well renounce." Erik Luna,
Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV.
205, 255-56 (quoting Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1839
(1999)); see also Guyora Binder & NicholasJ. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the
Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 118 (2000) (noting that "the public effect of retributivist rhetoric
was to increase punishment").
127. Whitman, supra note 125, at 101.
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degree, such that no amount of punishment was unjustified.12 Jonathan
Simon, criminologist, explains the ideological shift:
For much of the twentieth century crime was perceived as a
symptom of social pathologies that required community reform.
Today the dominant view characterizes crime as an expression of
willful aggression or evil. The dominant theory of how to respond
to crime has returned to nineteenth-century notions of simple
deterrence and elimination through exclusion or execution.
Likewise, the related concept of individualized justice embodied in
expert judges, and supported by a panoply of normalizing
professionals (psychologists, social workers, probation officers, and
so on), has been rejected in favor of mandatory sentences and zero-
tolerance policies." 9
While this ideology of incapacitation/retributivism was constantly fed to
the public, the tough-on-crime movement's basic premise-that certain
people are irredeemable and deserving of the highest amounts of pain-is
not an easy thing to stomach.13 0 Society in general had to shift from a belief
in redemption and compassion"' to feelings of vengeance and hatred.
Perhaps, the mere false fear of crime and rhetoric of desert could not alone
effectuate such a widespread shift in social psychology.
132
Enter the victims' rights movement. The publicizing, not only of the
heinous nature of crime (to instill fear) but also the tragedy of the victim (to
128. See Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REV.
811, 812 (2002) (describing how "retributive rhetoric" has justified a criminal law "system of
quarantine" in which desert and proportionality are ignored); see also infta notes 134-35
(discussing such rhetoric).
129. Jonathan Simon, Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1418
(2002).
130. Brenda V. Smith describes the deep religious roots of beliefs in redemption:
[T]he precepts of many religious and psychological principles are based on
forgiveness and redemption. These principles are premised on the belief that
forgiveness is good in and of itself, that it is strengthening, and importantly, that it
is necessary for the salvation and healing of the injured person. These principles,
of both religion and psychology, leave open the possibility of redemption no
matter what the individual has done. Both religious leaders and psychologists
believe that without the possibility of forgiveness and redemption, individuals lose
hope and motivation to change their lives.
Brenda V. Smith, Battering, Forgiveness and Redemption, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y& L. 921,
923 (2003).
131. See Symposium, The Role of Forgiveness in the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1351, 1364-68
(2000) (discussing forgiveness and redemption as part of a Christian tradition).
132. Cf KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICs 8 (1997) ("[T]he trend toward greater public punitiveness did not precede
the adoption and implementation of tough anticrime policies; officials have played a crucial
role in framing the crime and drug issues in ways that imply the need for them.").
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instill hatred), was the boost required by tough-on-crime proponents.1 33 The
media focus on crimes against women and children allowed society to see
criminals as true irredeemable villains worthy of nothing but pain and
death. 34 Such monsters deserve neither process, constitutional protection,
nor mercy.135 This belief easily translated to the yet-unknown criminal who,
no doubt, must also be internally evil. As one expert noted, "[t]he victim
became increasingly pitted against the offender, and only long sentences
appeared to validate her pain and suffering."
136
Although victims' rights seem naturally adverse to defendants, many
would consider with skepticism the assertion that victims' rights reforms
133. See Gruber, supra note 121, at 461 ("When phrased in terms of 'the safety of your
children,' people's retributive intuitions move quickly to the side. Successful tough-on-crime
and victim-centered narratives have moved even the highest court to embrace prevention as a
goal of punishment."); DUBBER, supra note 39, at 192 ("To maintain its fever pitch of hatred,
the war on crime needs ever more, and ever more sympathetic, victims.").
134. Nora Demleimer explains how the publicity of such cases elevated crime against
women and children to the status of a "national cris[i]s." Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First
Principles: The Sentencing Commission's Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA
L. REv. 563, 568 (2002); see also Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Modern
America, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1111, 1135 (2000) (explaining the "moral panic" surrounding
such cases). Representative James Sensenbrenner supported the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, stating:
Adam Walsh, Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, Pam Lychner, Jetseta Gage,
Dru Sjodin, Jessica Lunsford, Sarah Lunde, Amie Zyla, Christy Fornoff, Alexandra
Nicole Zapp, Polly Klaas, Jimmy Ryce, Carlie Brucia, Amanda Brown, Molly Bish,
Elizabeth Smart, Samantha Runnion. The names of these innocent victims are
seared into the national consciousness but only represent a fraction of children
victimized by violent sexual offenders. Their names comprise a roll call of
insufferable loss and a call to national action-the injustice of each assault
compounded by the cruel recognition that it might have been prevented. The
continued vulnerability of America's children to sexual predators is a national
tragedy demanding strong congressional action.
152 CONG. REC. H5, 722 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
135. In support of a federal bill that would make it a life offense to commit a second sexual
assault on a minor, Representative Mark Green of Wisconsin remarked about the "Two Strikes
and You're Out" Child Protection Act:
This bill is not about deterrence. This bill .. .is simply about taking these sick
monsters off the streets, away from schools, away from our children, to protect our
children, to protect our families, to try to end the cycle of horrific violence that is
every parent's nightmare.
148 CONG. REc. H916 (2002) (remarks of Rep. Green). Experts note that
the war on crime is fueled by images of the relatives of horrific crimes calling for
swift and harsh punishment of "their" offender. Apart from living out vengeance
fantasies borne of the powerlessness inherent in victimhood, these measures are
said to prevent future violent crime by taking criminal predators off the street.
Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 841 (2002).
136. Demleitner, supra note 134, at 568.
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actually disadvantage victims. One reason is that the movement widely uses
the rhetoric of rights. When one thinks of a grant of "victims' rights," one
naturally envisions that the victim is empowered by entitlements or abilities
she did not before possess. 37 It is important, however, to look past the
rhetoric of rights to the substance of the reforms involved in the victims'
rights movement.
The victims' rights movement, I assert, is not now and really never was
about securing individuals' rights against or benefits from the
government. 131 If the movement were about rights, it would seek to secure
victim autonomy, as it is generally understood that rights bearers control the
exercise of their rights. 139 When rights bearers cannot control the exercise of
137. Victims' rights advocates compare victims' rights to constitutionally mandated civil
liberties. See John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights
Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 691 (2002)
(characterizing victims' rights as "[e]nacted civil liberties for crime victims").
138. Many theorists divide rights into two distinct categories: negative rights and positive
rights. Isaiah Berlin introduced the concept of negative and positive liberty and described
negative liberty as freedom from interference by other persons and positive liberty as the real
ability to achieve self-direction. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR EssAYs ON LIBERTY 122-45 (1969). Over
time, the negative/positive distinction has come to mean the difference between liberal
protection of "natural rights" against government dispossession, see JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (MacPherson ed., 1980) (1690), and distributive justice, see HERBERT
CROLY, PROGREssIvE DEMOCRACY (1914). A negative right denotes that the rights bearer has
certain protections against state interference, and thus the state may not disturb her in
particular ways. The Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures is a good example. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Positive rights, on the other hand, require
the government to do more than merely refrain from disturbing citizens and to actively provide
basic entitlements. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997) (finding the North
Carolina Constitution provided a substantive right to education).
Although the Supreme Court has characterized the Bill of Rights as a negative rights
document, see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989)
(holding that the Due Process Clause "forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life,
liberty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be extended to
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to
harm through other means"), scholars often criticize the prioritization of negative rights over
positive rights, arguing that government has as much obligation to create the conditions under
which citizens may enjoy a good life as refraining from interfering with the liberty of citizens.
See Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 858 (2001) (noting that
positive rights advocates "urge that the U.S. Constitution explicitly recognizes a right to a
minimally adequate material standard of living, a clean environment, or other conditions that
require affirmative government action"). I assert that the victims' rights movement is not
actually about securing negative or positive rights for victims.
139. If the exercise of a right is made mandatory, it is no longer simply a right, but rather
an obligation, that imposes burdens on the bearer. For example, citizens have the "right to
vote." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (stating that voting rights may not be abridged on account of
race, sex, or age). Commonly, this means that the government may not prevent a citizen, either
purposely or indirectly, from voting. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-65 (1944); Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274-75 (1939) (invalidating racially restricted voting under the 15th
Amendment); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347, 361 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 379 (1915); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,
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their rights, the "rights" are actually "obligations." The only situations in
which rights bearers are stripped of their ability to manage their rights is
when they are incapacitated 
4 or the right is too fundamental to waive. 
4
1
The victims' rights movement, however, is simply not concerned with victim
autonomy. The victims' rights movement does not seek equal distribution of.... 142
rights to minority victims.
As a tool of tough-on-crime penological goals, the victim must occupy a
specific, predefined legal space, such that granting her "rights" will
necessarily lead to more incarceration for the defendant. The movement's
seemingly "negative rights" against the government are not rights against
unfair government intrusion but rather grants of power to the victim to
388 (1880); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875). It also means that the government
has the obligation to make access to voting universal and fair. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). If
the government were to go further, however, and mandate that one must vote or go to jail, then
having the "right" to vote might not be so appealing. Rather, people would consider it a
burdensome obligation, which infringes on liberty and privacy "rights." See Sean Matsler, Note,
Compulsory Voting in America, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 962 (2003) (noting that countries that
mandate voting describe voting as a "duty" or "obligation").
140. By incapacity, I mean situations in which an individual is stripped of autonomy over
exercise and waiver because of a legally relevant condition that renders him unable to manage
his own rights. A person so incapacitated needs a fiduciary to secure his interests, whether those
interests are best served by exercise or waiver. See FLA. STAT. § 744.3215(2) (2005) ("Rights ...
may be removed from a person by an order determining incapacity and... may be delegated to
the guardian . . . . "). Incapacity is, however, a touchy subject. Critics assert that the incapacity
category is easily manipulated by those who seek to strip subordinated individuals of autonomy.
See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist
Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 983, 987-99 (1993) (criticizing the
characterization of children as incapable of being rights bearers).
141. For example, it is commonly accepted that the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment and the right not to be enslaved are not waivable. See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1387-89
(1984). The idea that some rights are unwaivable has prompted many scholars and jurists to
hold that death-eligible convicts may not waive the right to appeal an illegal sentence. Justice
Marshall quoted the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, stating:
"[T]he waiver concept was never intended as a means of allowing a criminal
defendant to choose his own sentence .... The waiver rule cannot be exalted to a
position so lofty as to require this Court to blind itself to the real issue-the
propriety of allowing the state to conduct an illegal execution of a citizen."
Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 812 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth
v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 181 (Pa. 1978)).
142. There is an intimate relationship between rights and equality. The granting,
recognition, or enforcement of rights is not morally legitimate unless it is done in a fair
manner. This means that fundamental rights, whether negative or positive, should apply to all
persons. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1 ("Equality of rights and responsibility under the law
shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex."). When rights or abilities attach to certain
statuses, the need for differentiation between statuses should be compelling and the criteria for
membership fair. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003) (holding state
university's compelling interest in student diversity justified race-conscious admissions policies).
The victims' rights movement, however, supports even racially disparate pro-prosecution
policies, so long as they are tough on crime. See infra note 161.
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overrule lenient prosecutors.1 43 Moreover, while some victims' rights policies
have a welfare bent in that laws require the state to provide crime victims
with monetary compensation, and thus, could be seen as positive rights, such
assistance is often tied intimately to furthering the prosecution's case. 144 In
truth, the victims' rights movement has always been about changing the
procedural balance in the system so that it leans even more toward
conviction and incarceration. 4 5 Scholars have observed that victims' rights
were always intended to counter defendants' constitutional protections.
4 6
The movement has no tolerance for victims' desires that conflict with
state prosecutorial goals.147 The movement does not support victim-
witnesses' rights to be free from the coercive power of state subpoena
process. It does not weigh-in against the detention of victim "material
witnesses. 14a The movement does not advocate reform of cross-examination
143. For example, in certain jurisdictions, prosecutors are obligated by statute to consult
with victims before entering into a plea bargain, dismissing a case, or ordering the defendant
into diversion. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-832(f) (2005). The statute reads:
Prior to the disposition of the case, the district attorney's office shall offer the
victim the opportunity to consult with the prosecuting attorney to obtain the views
of the victim about the disposition of the case, including the victim's views about
dismissal, plea or negotiations, sentencing, and any pretrial diversion programs.
Id.
144. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.2-105 (2006) (enacting a victim-witness assistance
program). In my experience as a public defender, victim compensation was often awarded, not
to the victim most damaged by the crime, but rather to victim-witnesses most willing to testify
for the prosecution or become informants, or those who were the most tenacious about
demanding compensation. See Gruber, supra note 37, at 657-58.
145. For example, Florida governor Jeb Bush used victims' rights rhetoric in the quest to
truncate death-penalty appeals. He argued that victims' families suffered because of the lengthy
amount of time inmates spent on death row. See Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure:
Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1605 (1999-2000)
(quotingJim Yardley, A Role Model for Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,2000, at 5).
146. Scholars note:
Several historical events probably stimulated the increased support of the victims'
rights movement in the United States. The increase in crime rates during the
1960s and 1970s produced fear in the general public and encouraged a popular
belief that the criminal justice system should be used to rectify the problem. Also,
during the 1960s a series of Supreme Court decisions dramatically expanded the
rights of the criminally accused .... These famous decisions helped heighten the
public's perception that the "system" was more concerned with mechanically
following procedures, thereby releasing criminals for reasons they perceived as
technicalities, than administeringjustice.
Westbrook, supra note 33, at 579-80 (internal footnotes omitted).
147. As a consequence, the movement does not support the right of victims to advocate
against the death penalty or to express forgiveness and mercy. See infra notes 166-68 and
accompanying text.
148. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1353, 1365 (2005) (noting the
disconnect between the prosecutorial aims of the victims' rights movement and the interest of
an uncooperative victim jailed on a material-witness warrant).
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rules that would make the trial less arduous for all witnesses, including
victims, because doing so might disadvantage prosecutors. 49 Experts explain
that, in the war on crime, the rhetoric of victims' rights has proven
extremely successful in enhancing state power, but not in empowering
victims:
The war on crime, though ostensibly fought on behalf of
victims, has very little to do with victims, and everything to do
with the state. . . . And it treats victims as mere nuisances
themselves, annoying sources of inefficiency in a system built to
incapacitate the greatest number of source individuals for the
longest possible time with the least effort .... In the war on crime,
offenders and victims alike are irrelevant nuisances, grains of sand
in the great machine of state risk management.
5
0
B. ESSENTIALISM AND OBJECT/AGENT CHARACTERIZATIONS IN THE
VICTIMS'RIGHTS MovEMNT
To achieve support for its zero-tolerance philosophy, the victims' rights
movement engages essentialist and subtly racist characterizations of victims
and defendants. Essentialism, in a nutshell, is the practice of treating
members of certain "groups," whether racial, gender, socio-economic, or
ethnic, as though they all share the same beliefs, traits, goals, and desires.'
5'
149. Tom Lininger explains why the victims' rights movement does not seek to lessen the
harsh impact of cross-examination:
Because prosecutors undervalue victims' privacy and wish to preserve their own
option to impeach victims, they steer the victims' rights movement away from a
divisive agenda that would ameliorate the hardship of cross-examination. Instead,
the victims' rights movement frequently addresses other legislative priorities on
which prosecutors and victims can agree: longer sentences and fewer procedural
protections for defendants.
Id. at 1396.
150. DUBBER, supra note 39, at 26. Mandating participation in domestic violence cases also
constitutes government interference in the lives of victims. Christine O'Connor explains, "In
taking control of the victim's life, the state substitutes itself for the abuser as a coercive entity in
the victim's life." O'Connor, supra note 65, at 961.
151. Critical scholars explain:
Generally, "essentialism" is a label applied to claims that a particular perspective
reflects the common experiences and interests of a broader group, as when
working class men purport to define the class interests of "workers," or white
women purport to define the interests of all "women," without acknowledging
intragroup differences of position and perspective. Indeed, essentialist categories
are routinely invoked precisely in order to suppress attention to intragroup
differences, and thereby to consolidate a group's agenda around the preferences
of the group's internal elites.
Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, LatCrit at V Institutionalizing a PostSubordination Future,
78 DENV. U. L. REv. 1249, 1265 n.39 (2001).
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Furthermore, the movement employs the problematic tactic of treating
certain individuals as pure objects and others as pure agents in an effort to
disengage crime from its social moorings. Victims' rights rhetoric
characterizes victims in such a way that society will sympathize with them and
move toward harsher penalties against defendants. According to the victims'
rights movement, victims are perpetual objects of their victimhood: they are
weak, innocent, and helpless. By contrast, defendants are autonomous,
irredeemable, powerful, and evil. Victim and perpetrator characterizations
also feed off of deeply entrenched racial, socio-economic, and gender biases:
"Defendants are subhuman; they are monsters. The criminal is Ted Bundy,
Lawrence Singleton, Richard Allen Davis, Willie Horton-criminals who
seem to be the very embodiment of evil. Alternatively, the image of the
criminal is the ominous, if undifferentiated, poor, angry, violent, Black, or
Latino male."
5 2
The victims' rights movement has thus created narratives illustrating
prototypical victims and defendants. This essentialism is particularly
pernicious because it is not about marginalized groups using identity politicsto fiht •153
to fight oppression or even about differently subordinated groups fighting
each other for advancement within institutions that subordinate both of
154them. Rather, it is about powerful privileged groups using stereotypes to
affect policy in a way that expressly decreases the rights of the worst-off and
legitimizes, rather than challenges, subordinating institutions.
5 5
152. Henderson, supra note 33, at 586-87 (footnote omitted); see Elayne Rapping,
Television, Melodrama, and the Rise of the Victims' Rights Movement, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 665, 675-
76 (1999-2000) (discussing how the television series America's Most Wanted "pit[s] victims of
traditional nuclear families against the harrowing images of criminals as antisocial loners and
lunatics preying on women and especially children" (citing Anna Williams, Domestic Violence and
the Aetiology of Crime in America's Most Wanted, 8 CAMERA OBSCURA 97, 115-16 (1993); Van
Gordon Sauter, Rating the Reality Shows-and Keeping Tabs on the Tabloids, TV GUIDE, May 2, 1992,
at 18)).
153. Essentialism in its most benign form, namely, when members of marginalized groups
engage in identity politics to achieve group justice, is criticized by progressive scholars because
it ignores intra-group differences and can lead to the problem of differently subordinated
groups fighting against each other for the crumbs left by privileged groups. See Daria
Roithmayr, A Bad Subject, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 501, 501 (2003) (asserting that for
minorities, "playing identity politics is a war of position, in which we are forced to resist on the
oppressor's terms by mobilizing identity politics on behalf of our political commitments, to
counteract the ways in which identity is used against us").
154. Anti-essentialism, which is often advocated by LatCrit scholars, employs "analyses that
recognize and target the interlocking nature of different forms of oppression and privilege
based on different axes of social position and group identity, whether race, ethnicity, sex,
gender, class, sexual orientation, religion, ability, nationality or other similar constructs."
Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 151, at 1322; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis:
"Intersectionality," "Multidimensionality," and the Development of An Adequate Theory of Subordination,
6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 289 (2001) (asserting that progressive social movements suffer
because of a singular, essentialist focus).
155. Essentialism in its most malignant form includes racial, gender, or other stereotyping
of subordinated groups in an effort to justify their continued oppression. SeeLinda L. Ammons,
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One may counter that victims, like other subordinated groups, use
essentialism as a tool to achieve justice for their group.1 6 The group,
"victims," as represented by the victims' rights movement, however, is simply
not a group that has been systematically subordinated by society. 57 Victims
consist of individuals of different races, socio-economic levels, and social
statuses who have been affected to varying degrees by crime. Not all victims
are mistreated by the system, other than the claimed mistreatment of the
system being too easy on crime. In addition, the victims who are mistreated
by the system, generally members of other subordinated groups that have
been unfairly excluded from access to government resources (e.g.,
minorities, drug users, ex-cons, poor women), are precisely not the victims
publicized and represented by the victims' rights movement.15 9 For example,
the movement, does not ask prosecutors to treat drug-addicts with care.160
Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and
the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1020 (chronicling a specific situation of
stereotyping of an African American woman); Sheila A. Bedi, The Constructed Identities of Asian
and African Americans: A Story of Two Races and the Criminal Justice System, 19 HARv. BLACKLETrER
LJ. 181, 181 (2003) ("An essentialist approach to race is one based on stereotypes and
generalizations. For example, slavery was justified by assertions that Africans were an inferior
race."); Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal Construction of Latino Criminality:
From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1081, 1117 (2001) (discussing the popular
construction of "the Latino criminal as an inner-city super-predator" to justify harsh
criminalization policies).
156. See, e.g., Kyl et al., supra note 103, at 584 (describing victims as a marginalized group).
157. See Dubber supra note 34, at 6 (characterizing the victims' rights movement as a
"political movement, fueled by grassroots campaigns of concerned citizens backed by politicians
eager to outdo their opponents in the tough-on-crime competition").
158. See Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420,
428-29 (1988) (noting that Bernard Goetz was seen as a "victim" and the persons he shot as
"transgressors" because of society's racial construct of victims and criminals).
159. See Paul Colomy & Laura Ross Greiner, Making Youth Violence Visible: The News Media
and the Summer of Violence, 77 DENV. U. L. REv. 661, 680-81 (2000) (asserting that society
constructs "ideal victims" as white, whereas defendants are "outsiders, strangers, foreigners,
[and] aliens" (citing Nils Christie, The Ideal Victim, in FROM CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM POLICY:
REORIENTING THEJUSTICE SYSTEM 26 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1986))); Terry A. Maroney, Note, The
Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 577 (1998) ("Though
African Americans, for example, are more likely to be crime victims than whites, it is the latter
group that has dominated the discourse on victims' rights.") (footnote omitted); William J.
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 806-07 (2006)
(observing that black crime victims are less politically visible than black criminals).
160. President Clinton articulated this ideology, stating, "We sure don't want to give
criminals like gang members, who may be victims of their associates [any rights]." Henderson,
supra note 33, at 585 (alteration in original) (quoting President Bill Clinton, Announcement in
Support of a Victims' Rights Amendment, in ONLINE NEWS HOUR, June 25, 1996,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/june96/victim announcement_6-25.html). One expert
has asserted that the victims' rights movement hides the reality of victimhood:
The public face of the Victims' Rights Movement hides the most severely affected
victims of violent crime, sexism and racism (e.g., prostitutes or teenage black males
in the juvenile justice system) who are implicitly disqualified as "genuine" victims
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Neither does it lobby for abolition of the death penalty, given the capital-
punishment system's systemic bias against black victims.16 ' The victims' rights
movement involves a non-subordinated group, backed by powerful,
politically privileged actors, engaging in essentialism in order to strip a
subordinated group (defendants) of the few rights that group retains.
162
In addition to essentializing both victims and defendants, the victims'
rights movement seeks to deny the larger social context of crime by treating
victims as the passive objects of crime committed by socially abnormal
perpetrators. Victims must perpetually be objects of their victimhood,
bearing no responsibility for crime and exhibiting righteous anger at every
turn.' 63 Victims must necessarily desire tougher crime policy' 64 and may not
in Victims' Rights rhetoric. Therefore, laws are named after prominent
sentimentalized victims-white female children as in "Megan's Law"-who
constitute the public's preferred image of a "victim" and consequently determine
the expressive function of this victim-centered legislation.
Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment as "Closure": The Limits of a Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 231-32 (2001-2002) (footnote omitted).
161. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Baldus study); Jeffrey Abramson,
Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. CRIM. L.J. 117, 134 (2004)
(noting "statistical studies showing that a victim's high socio-economic status seems to touch off
an 'invisible bias' in sentencing authorities"). Victims' rights advocates have been particularly
vocal in support of the death penalty. One such group, Justice for All, a Houston-based victims'
fights organization, filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, supporting
juvenile executions. Brief for Justice for All Alliance as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 865269. After the ruling came
down, outlawing juvenile executions, the group's president, Diane Clements, stated, "'I think
it's disgraceful and outrageous for the Supreme Court to say that 16- and 17-year-olds are
somehow different and somehow less culpable than adults when you see the horrific types of
crimes these people commit .... Even a 5-year-old knows right from wrong.'" Mark Hansen,
Ruling May Spur New Death Penalty Challenges, 3 NO. 9 A.B.A.J. E-REP. 1 (Mar. 4, 2005) (quoting
Diane Clements, President for Justice for All Alliance); see also Kanwar, supra note 160, at 229
("[V] ictims' families and their supporters typically lobby for swifter executions or longer prison
terms.").
162. As a group, defendants suffer the disabilities and stigma of having been involved in the
criminal system. Once someone is branded a "criminal," that individual will suffer personally,
socially, and economically. Social, professional, and governmental institutions openly and
explicitly bar those who have been involved in the criminal justice system from participation.
Others discriminate against defendants in a more covert manner. See Smyth, infra note 396, at
480; Thompson, infra note 397, at 258 (describing the disabilities imposed by a criminal
conviction). Moreover, defendants, as a group, consist primarily of the most marginalized
members of society. The vast majority of defendants are minorities, poor, immigrants, or some
combination of all three groups. See Aya Gruber, Navigating Diverse Identities: Building Coalitions
Through Redistribution of Academic Capital, an Exercise in Praxis, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1201
(2005) (describing criminal defendants as a subordinated group). Considering the prevailing
social disposition regarding the "criminal element," the defendant group would likely be totally
bereft of any legal protections were such protections not explicitly laid out in the Bill of Rights.
See Westbrook, supra note 33, at 579-80 (noting that the victims' rights movement was a
response to the Warren Court's constitutional guarantees).
163. See DUBBER, supra note 39, at 194 (asserting that the victims' rights movement
embraces the characterization of the essentially helpless victim).
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act autonomously when it conflicts with the state's punitive aims. 1 5 As a
consequence, the movement supports victim choice only when the victim
vigorously pursues charges or advocates for high sentences, but not when
the victim wishes to remain silent or exercise mercy.' 66 A compelling
example of this is the difference in jurisprudential significance of victim-
impact statements expressing pain and anger and those exhorting mercy.
In 1991, the victims' rights movement secured a major victory when the
Supreme Court approved the admission of victim-impact evidence into a
capital sentencing hearing in Payne v. Tennessee. Overruling prior
precedent, the Court relied on "victim-dignity" arguments to permit the
introduction of impact evidence at death penalty hearings.)6 Since Payne,
courts have routinely allowed victims and their family members to describe
in graphic detail their feelings of pain and anger. 69 Such statements of hurt
164. See id. at 194-209 (noting that the state uses victims' so-called interests to enhance its
own coercive power).
165. Dubber argues that victims' rights and the sympathetic figure of the victim are used to
obfuscate the power of the state:
Most prosecutors spend most, if not all, of their time processing more or less
unconditional surrenders. Like a chess master, they play several games against a
group of vastly inferior opponents at a time. The full extent of their righteous ire is
reserved for those opponents who dare to interfere with the quick disposal of their
pathetic attacks against the grandmaster. These few obstreperous ones must be
stamped out and put in their place. Rather than admit that the authority of the
prosecutor, and therefore the state, is at stake, it is far more convenient to invoke
the rights of the victim, who all too often is all too willing to play the part of the
discombobulated heap of helplessness in need of state protection from the forces
of evil.
Id. at 202.
166. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem with Victim Impact Statements, 10 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. LJ. 17, 17 (2000) (noting that "neither the victims' rights community nor the
Supreme Court generates or tolerates narratives in which victims' families can exercise mercy,
kindness, or forgiveness towards defendants").
167. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Justice Scalia specifically noted that the
Court's decision was driven, in part, by the growing victims' rights movement. Id. at 834 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
168. Prior Supreme Court rulings prevented family members of victims in death-penalty
cases from testifying or presenting impact evidence at sentencing because of concerns over
cruel and unusual punishment. In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), the Court held
that introduction of such evidence would be cruel and unusual punishment. The Court opined
that the introduction of impact evidence, which often includes factors about which the
defendant had neither intent nor knowledge, would move the jury to impose death, not based
on aggravating and mitigating factors that spoke to the defendant's culpability, but rather on
arbitrary factors that had more to do with luck than choice. Id. at 507. Also relevant was the
disparate impact that such a regime would create for differently situated victims. Id. at 505.
169. See, e.g., Willingham v. State, 947 P.2d 1074 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Hain v. State, 919
P.2d 1130 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996); Bennett v. State, 831 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. App. 1992)
(admitting graphic descriptions of death); see also Kemp v. State, 919 S.W.2d 943 (Ark. 1996)
(admitting statements about family's anger); McClain v. State, 477 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. 1996)
(admitting neighbor's testimony about community anger over murder); Evans v. State, 637 A.2d
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and rage have proven very powerful in helping prosecutors achieve high
sentences. The victim's right to allocute at sentencing, however, has not
empowered victims who wish to advocate for forgiveness and mercy. Judges
routinely deny victims the right to express forgiveness and mercy, without
outcry from the victims' rights movement.
170
Moreover, the movement does not support victim participation in
alternative dispute resolution because of its tendency to be "weak" on
crime. 7  If, in fact, the movement were primarily concerned with victims
having a "voice" in the criminal process, it would probably regard restorative
justice highly. In the past five years, prominent criminal law scholars have
advocated a system in which victims have an opportunity to dictate the
destiny of their own cases through innovations like victim-offender
mediation. 72 The victims' rights movement, however, has not accepted
alternate criminal law systems and often rejects mediation.'
v
7
117 (Md. 1994) (allowing statement that family member's death was a "living nightmare"). See
generally Joan T. Buckley, Annotation, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing Hearings--Post-
Payne v. Tennessee, 79 A.L.R. 5th 33 (2000).
170. See, e.g, Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1503-05 (10th Cir. 1987); Greene v. State,
37 S.W.3d 579, 583-84 (Ark. 2001); Ware v. State, 759 A.2d 764, 783-86 (Md. 2000); State v.
Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 176-77 (N.J. 2000); State v. Clark, 990 P,2d 793, 805-06 (N.M. 1999);
Barbour v. State, 673 So. 2d 461, 468-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); Taylor v. State, 666 So. 2d 36,
51-53 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (finding victim's statements opposing the death penalty
inadmissible).
Compare State v. Williams, 708 So.2d 703, 721 (La. 1998) (admitting family member's statement
that she had no sympathy for the defendant), with State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 245, 271 (Wash.
1995) (refusing to admit victim's statement of opposition to a death sentence).
171. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A
Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1273-81 (1994) (critiquing mediation on the grounds
that it undervalues victims' desire to express anger and overemphasizes forgiveness).
172. See C. Quince Hopkins et al., Applying Restorative Justice to Ongoing Intimate Violence:
Problems and Possibilities, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 289 (2004) (discussing restorative justice in
the domestic violence context); Erik Luna, Introduction: The Restorative Justice Conference, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 1 (discussing various definitions of restorative justice). See generally Symposium,
Restorative Justice in Action, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 247 (2005).
173. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 171, at 1273-81 (criticizing victim-offender mediation
because, among other things, it does not allow the victim to express anger adequately and
overemphasizes forgiveness). Professor Dubber explains:
In the punitive climate of the past decades, so-called restorative justice programs
have operated quietly on a small scale, even if the results have often been
encouraging .... Most important, they have not been embraced by the victims'
rights movement, whose attention has concentrated on converting defendants'
right into victims' right in the formal criminal justice process and in what is
generally considered to be a related objective, increasing criminal punishment,
including the more frequent use of the death penalty.
DUBBER, supra note 39, at 167; see also Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United
States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235, 266 (2000) ("Restorative justice respects equally victims and
offenders, and this is why it cannot be seen as part of the victims rights' movement."); Robert P.
Mosteller, New Dimensions in Sentencing Reform in the Twenty-First Century, 82 OR. L. REV. 1, 23
92 IOWA LA WRE VIEW
Interestingly, while the victims' rights movement characterizes victims as
total objects, it treats defendants as unconditional agents. Defendants are
never objects who merely exhibit pre-determined reactions to their
surroundings. Rather, they are autonomously responsible for their actions
and exercise ultimate free will at every turn. Characterizing members of
subordinated groups as agents in their own subordination has proven a
successful tool in reinforcing inequality in society. Conservatives often use
agency assertions to counter progressive discourse challenging the structure
of society. 17 4 Progressives characterize crime, inequality, poverty, and other
problems as created by institutional discrimination and unfair privilege and
seek to overthrow the structures that keep dominant groups in unfair
positions of power. In response, conservatives argue that, in fact, society's ills
are not created by an unfair social structure but rather by the individual
culpable behavior of those who suffer from such ills. 175 Agency
characterizations are essential to the preservation of unfair privilege
precisely because they provide normative justification for inequality. 176 By
cementing notions of defendant autonomy, tough-on-crime supporters
dispel social responsibility for crime and justify increasingly harsh
penalties.
177
In the past several years, the criminal law has shifted from considering
circumstances to considering criminal acts in a vacuum. This reinforces the
notion that crime occurs because of flawed individuals who are fully
(2003) ("[R]estorative justice does not fit within the victims' rights movement, which often
advocates for punishment and retribution.").
174. Sharon Rush observes that the argument that blacks are agents in their subordination
by failing to "pull themselves up by their bootstraps" developed as a response to the civil rights
movement's efforts to dismantle white racism. Sharon E. Rush, Emotional Segregation: Huckleberry
Finn in the Modern Classroom, 36 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 305, 345 (2003). She states, "Not even one
generation had a chance to dismantle institutional racism before the focus shifted. From this
view, Blacks during the post-Jim Crow era, like the Plessy era, have only themselves to blame if
they continue to lag behind Whites. . . ." Id.
175. According to theoristJohn 0. Calmore, the fallacy of this argument is easily exposed
by looking at a simple example like the Cosby Show. In order to for blacks to "pull themselves
up" to the level of whites, they must be truly extraordinary.John 0. Calmore, Random Notes of an
Integration Warrior, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1441, 1446 (1997). As a consequence, blacks' operation as
ordinary reasonable people in society is alone sufficient to make them culpable for any negative
conditions they may suffer. Id. He states, "The unstated norm of whiteness requires that which is
extraordinary from blacks to meet that norm, even though whites associate that norm with
merely an ordinary (white) family." Id.
176. In the immigration context, those opposed to immigration justify poor conditions of
immigrant communities on immigrants' unreasonable refusal to assimilate. See Kevin R.
Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire?": Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1259, 1280 (1997) ("[C]urrent anti-immigration advocates accuse today's immigrants,
particularly those from Latin America, of refusing to assimilate by maintaining their language
and culture.").
177. See infra note 187.
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autonomous in their actions.'7 8 As mentioned before, the tough-on-crime
era all but eviscerated leeway in sentencing, the one arena for
contextualizing crime. In the substantive criminal law, defenses that
explicitly take into account defendants' backgrounds have become
increasingly disparaged as "abuse excuses." 179 The deeply historically rooted
insanity defense, for example, has been severely limited in recent years.180
Juries are frequently unwilling to acquit on the basis of insanity, unless the
defendant acted like an automaton and exhibited no ability to exercise
judgment. 8 ' Some legislatures have allowed insanity as a defense only if it
completely negates all mens rea of the crime, but not otherwise. 8 2 As a
consequence, schizophrenic and psychotic defendants who act under the
influence of their diseases are routinely characterized as culpable,
autonomous agents of crime. 18 Perhaps even more disturbing is the trend
178. See supra notes 105-19. The stereotypical characterizations of victims and defendants
by the victims' rights movement supports this idea. See supra notes 133-36, 152.
179. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB
STORIES, AND EvASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994); JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES
THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997). Victoria Nourse observes:
Three short decades ago, Professor Herbert Packer reported that large-circulation
magazines eagerly embraced as "standard fare" the slogans of a culturally popular
behaviorism: "treat the criminal, not the crime," "punishment is obsolete," and
"criminals are sick." Today, cultural fears of moral relativism and victimology have
led to new and different slogans: "personal responsibility," "self-control not sob-
stories," and the "abuse excuse."
Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the
Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1435, 1451 (1998) (quoting HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 12 (1968)).
180. See Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 59, 61-62
(2005) (observing that in 1980, thirty states allowed for an insanity defense when the defendant
was unaware of the nature of his act or when the defendant could not distinguish right from
wrong (two-pronged test), while eighteen allowed for the defense only when the defendant was
unaware of the nature of his act (one-pronged test); whereas, in 2004, only fifteen states
retained the two-pronged test while thirty had adopted the one-prong test).
181. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 614 P.2d 300 (Alaska 1980) (rejecting insanity claim because
the schizophrenic defendant exhibited some rational behavior). In the Andrea Yates case, the
jury convicted the defendant of murdering her children, even though she was clearly
schizophrenic and delusional at the time. See Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App. 2005)
(overturning Yates's conviction on evidentiary grounds and discussing history of case). The jury,
interpreting the M'Naughten rule, which is far more prosecution friendly than the modern ALl
rule, believed that Yates knew her actions were wrong. One juror remarked, "[S]he knew
exactly what she was doing, and she knew it was wrong ... " 4 YatesJurors: Confession, Photos Key
to Verdict, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2002, at Al8.
182. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1)(a)-(b) (2003) ("It is a defense to a
prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental illness,
lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. Mental illness is not
otherwise a defense .... ").
183. Similarly, courts and politicians are more than happy to describe pedophiles as objects
of their condition when seeking increased incarceration. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358
(1997) (approving indefinite civil commitment on the ground that it is limited to "to those who
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toward treating juvenile defendants as fully culpable agents of crime.1i 4 The
youth and inexperience of juvenile defendants are no longer considered
culpability factors in the face of overwhelming support for treating "bad"
juveniles as adults.185 The government has successfully perpetuated a
discourse of individual accountability186 and has avoided responsibility for
suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control"). When
objectification might give a defendant grounds for reducing culpability, such individuals
suddenly become fully responsible agents. See, e.g., U.S. v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 201 (7th Cir.
1997) (rejecting the notion that the defendant's diagnosed pedophilia made his accessing child
pornography involuntary because, among other things, the defendant "confined his computer
access to child pornography to periods when his roommate was away from the apartment");
U.S. v. Long, 185 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that the fact that a pedophile
abused victims while alone in his house rendered his acts volitional, despite a doctor's testimony
that the "defendant's efforts to conceal the abuse [were] 'symptoms of the disorder' that only
reveal defendant's lack of volitional control"). In fact, civil commitment and registration laws,
which courts justify by noting pedophiles' lack of control, came into effect because of rhetoric
that distinctly characterized sex offenders as unrestrained agents. Daniel M. Filler, Making the
Case for Megan's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 339 (2001) (describing
politicians' use of the predator "metaphor, comparing the actions of animals that hunt and kill
other animals to sexual offenders' pursuit and sexual victimization of children"). Rather than
calling for legislation to help "poor, sick, pedophiles who are unable to help themselves,"
politicians justified commitment laws by painting a gruesome picture of the predator-
pedophile. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. 10,312 (1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer) ("No matter
what we do, the minute they get back on the street, many of them resume their hunt for victims,
beginning a restless and unrelenting prowl for children, innocent children to molest, abuse,
and in the worst cases to kill.").
184. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3) (a) (2004) (allowing thirteen-year-olds to be
transferred to adult court); IND. CODE § 31-30-3-4(3) (West 1997) (allowing ten-year-olds to be
transferred to adult court under special circumstances); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1636(a)(2)
(2000) (permitting fourteen year-old to be transferred to adult court); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
712A.4(1) (1981) (permitting fourteen-year-old to be transferred to adult court); MINN. STAT. §
260B.125(1) (2004) (permitting fourteen-year-old to be transferred to adult court); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 43-21-151(3) (2004) (allowing thirteen-year-olds to be transferred to adult court);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(b)(ii) (2005) (allowing twelve-year-olds to be transferred to
adult court); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (2004) (allowing thirteen-year-olds to be transferred to
adult court); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1) (c) (1) (1996) (permitting fourteen-year-old to be
transferred to adult court); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §54.02(j)(2)(a) (Vernon 2002) (permitting
fourteen-year-old to be transferred to adult court); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506(a) (2001)
(allowing ten-year-olds to be transferred to adult court under special circumstances); WiS. STAT.
§ 938.18(1) (a) (1) (2004) (permitting fourteen-year-old to be transferred to adult court).
185. See Jane Rutherford, Juvenile Justice Caught Between The Exorcist and A Clockwork
Orange, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 715, 740-41 (2002) ("The current get tough on crime approach has
been to inject more punishment into the juvenile jails and harsh boot camps, while sending
more and more juveniles over to adult courts to be treated as adults." (footnote omitted)).
186. See Feld, supra note 123, at 1522 (discussing how "conservative politicians . . .
demonized young people to muster support for 'wars' on crime and drugs"). For example,
responding to Democratic criticism of a bill that would allow sixteen-year-olds to be prosecuted
as adults and registered as sex offenders, Republican Representative Mark Green of Wisconsin
told the story of a juvenile offender who was released at eighteen and later "preyed upon a
number of children, destroyed lives, damaging families and causing so much terror." 151 CONG.
REC. H7889 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Green). Similarly, Representative
Gingrey supported juvenile transfer provisions of a gang bill stating, "16- and 17-year-olds are
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providing the educational, social, psychological, and economic support that
put youth in a position to avoid criminal behavior.
n ' 87
In sum, the victims' rights movement, in order to further a conservative
ideology of criminalization and individual accountability, objectifies and
essentializes victims and treats defendants as wholly culpable agents. This
tactic has proven successful in gaining public support for tough criminal
policies. By projecting onto defendants the character of totally autonomous
individuals and onto victims the character of perpetual victimhood, society
can distance itself from responsibility for crime. Society members can then
identify with victims at the expense of offenders and deny any accountability
for actions of the deviant criminal element.
18
III. WOMEN'S HIsToRicAL OBJECTIFICATION
Given the persuasiveness of the victims' rights movement's
object/agency rhetoric, it is understandable that domestic violence
reformers were tempted to buy into such discourse. If they characterized
battered women as perpetually helpless, innocent victims and batterers as
autonomous monsters, then society would be more willing to accept
aggressive criminalization of domestic violence. Feminists could thus achieve
their goal of society taking domestic abuse "seriously." Militating against this
force, however, was a disturbing history of objectification of women. To
support domestic violence criminalization in the face of victim reluctance,
reformers would have to use the very methodology that had been so
instrumental in the ongoing oppression of women.
making adult, criminal decisions that equal tragedy for our neighbors and our friends." 151
CONG. REC. H3121 (daily ed. May 11, 2005) (statement of Rep. Gingrey).
187. Barry C. Feld notes:
[D]e-emphasize[d] rehabilitation and the circumstances of the offender [and]
stress[ing] personal and justice system accountability and punishment... reflect a
fundamental inversion of juvenile justice jurisprudence and sentencing policies-
from rehabilitation to retribution, from an emphasis on the offender to the
seriousness of the offense, from a focus on a youth's "amenability to treatment" to
punishment, and a transfer of sentencing discretion from the judicial to the
legislative and executive branches.
Feld, supra note 123, at 1506.
188. As one expert noted:
The identification with the victim at the expense of identifying with the offender
provides an additional benefit to the onlooker, which may well have contributed to
the success of the victims' rights movement. By denying any similarities with the
offender upon which identification could be based, the onlooker transforms the
essentially ethical question of punishment into one of nuisance control. An ethical
judgment is no longer necessary. . . .Once the offender is excluded from the
realm of identification, the question "how could someone like us (or, stronger, like
me) have done something like this" no longer arises.
Dubber, supra note 34, at 9.
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The tactic of treating disfavored individuals as objects has been effective
in the historical maintenance of power inequities. 89 The characterization of
minorities as objects of the social structure, particular events in their pasts,
or even biology, has been used to justify denying such individuals certain
rights and/or participation as equals in society.'90 Biological objectification,
in particular, rears its ugly head in the subordination of women,' 9' and the
legacy of gender discrimination bears out the efficacy of this tactic.'
9 2
189. Michelle Goodwin describes the persistence of objectification in the maintenance of
American racial domination:
Prejudice in this context is heaped upon an objectified and powerless "safe object"
just as younger siblings are attacked in place of the feared parent. The historical
affects of hatred and moralism that flowed from race fantasies (about "nigger")
can be found in socio-legal culture. Black Codes, Jim Crow segregationist policies,
eugenics, and Dixiecratism powerfully illustrate the dominance of racial fantasies
about blacks or the "nigger image." These images are contemporarily viewed in
media representations of welfare moms, teen drug use, and racial violence.
Michelle Goodwin, Nigger and the Construction of Citizenship, 76 TEMP. L. REv. 129, 152 (2003)
(footnote omitted).
190. For example, "[b]y making race determinant and the product of rationality and
science, dominant and subordinate positions within the racial hierarchy were disguised as the
product of natural law and biology rather than as naked preferences." Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1738 (1993) (footnote omitted).
191. Asserted biological differences are a popular way to distinguish men's and women's
social roles. James Dobson, founder of the powerful political ministry, Focus on the Family, lays
out the biological differences between men and women:
In functions, women have several very important ones totally lacking in man-
menstruation, pregnancy, lactation. All of these influence behavior and feelings.
The same gland behaves differently in the two sexes-thus woman's thyroid is
larger and more active; it enlarges during pregnancy but also during menstruation;
it makes her more prone to goiter, provides resistance to cold, and is associated
with the smooth skin, relatively hairless body, and thin layer of subcutaneous fat,
which are important elements in the concept of personal beauty. It also
contributes to emotional instability-she laughs and cries more easily.
James Dobson, Understanding and Accepting Your Mate's Differences: The Gender Gap,
http://www.family.org/marriage/A000000990.cfm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). In response to a
question about differences between men and women, the website further states:
Radical feminists in the '60s and '70s tried to sell the notion that males and
females are identical except for the ability to bear children. That is nonsense. ...
[D)ifferences between the sexes ... appear to be determined, at least in part, by
genetics.
... He likes excitement, change, challenge, uncertainty and the potential for huge
returns on a risky investment. She likes predictability, continuity, safety, roots,
relationships and a smaller return on a more secure investment .... She tempers
his impulsive, foolish tendencies, and he nudges her out of apathy and excessive
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Throughout history, women have been subjects of biological
objectification both in explicitly negative manners and in seemingly positive
ways in order to reinforce the distribution of power among the genders. '9 3 In
terms of negative objectification, women have been characterized as objects
of a biology that causes them to be overly emotional, weak, and timid, and
thus ill-fitted for positions of power. In 1872, the Supreme Court rejected
Myra Bradwell's assertion that legislation barring women from practicing law
was unconstitutional, observing:
[T] he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
caution. These genetic tendencies have far-reaching implications. Medical science
has not begun to identify all the ramifications of sexual uniqueness. We see the
wisdom of the Creator in the way the sexes interrelate at this point.
How Do Men and Women Differ Emotionally?, http://family.custhelp.com/ (search for "how
do men and women differ emotionally") (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
192. In addition, proponents of racial discrimination have appealed to asserted biological
predispositions and inabilities of racial minorities. Cf Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution Is Color Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1991) (asserting that the construction of
immutable biological racial categories gained prominence in the United States as a result of the
popularity of African slavery). Such disturbing and pernicious thinking unfortunately still exists
in this country. Conservatives, while refraining from explicitly stating that there is a biological
link between race and crime, indicate such a connection in their pro-criminalization
sentiments. Former high-level Reagan and Bush appointee William Bennett, for example,
recently stated, "If you wanted to reduce crime, you could-if that were your sole purpose-you
could abort every black baby in this country and your crime rate would go down." Bennett Under
Fire for Remarks on Blacks, Crime, CNN.COM, Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
POLITICS/09/30/bennett.comments/.
193. While most people reject overtly negative objectification, they are often more willing
to believe that positive objectification is acceptable. See Kimberly Blanton, The Pressures of "Good"
Cultural Stereotypes, BOSTON GLOBE, May 8, 2005, at C2, available at http://www.boston.com/
business/ globe/articles/2005/05/08/ thepressuresofgoodcultural stereotype (recognizing
stereotypes the white world holds of Asian-Americans as industrious, smart, assimilated"). For
example, the statement, "Blacks are criminal," would likely garner much more criticism than
the statement, "Asians are good at math," at least on the surface. But see Dorothy E. Roberts,
Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1945, 1948 (1993) (observing that "[p]opular
images of black criminality are ... sometimes buried beneath the surface, [but they] erupt
when prodded"). While perhaps not as destructive as negative objectification, positive
objectification is nonetheless also a tool of subordination. First, benign objectification
delegitimizes the minority groups' claims of racial injustice and serves as rhetorical
chastisement to subordinated groups that have not "made it." See FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE
IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 49 (2002) (explaining that the model minority myth
"conceals within it an invidious statement about African Americans along the lines of the
inflammatory taunt: 'They made it; why can't you?'"). Moreover, "model minorities," although
not considered objects of a negative biology, are characterized as objects of a type of biology
that does not challenge the power structure of privileged groups. See Chris K. lijima, Reparations
and the "Model Minority" Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return to Original
Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REV. 385, 410-13 (1998) (explaining that "model minority" status is used
as a "carrot" to encourage Asians to acquiesce to the dominant racial hierarchy in exchange for
an incremental increase in status).
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woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life .... The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is
repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and
independent career from that of her husband.
194
While this case may seem incredibly antiquated, the Supreme Court
reiterated its acceptance of formal inequality as recently as 1948 in Goesaert v.
Cleary195 and 1961 in Hoyt v. Florida.196 The Court observed in Hoyt
[W] oman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. We
cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a State,
acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a woman
should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she
herself determines that such service is consistent with her own
special responsibilities.' 97
Although in more recent times, the Court seems to have rejected these
holdings, 19 in 1996, Justice Scalia, dissenting in United States v. Virgina,
explicitly relied on Bradwell and Hoyt as support for the proposition that
gender classifications should be subject to rational review. 99
Nonetheless, today negative objectification is fairly easily dismissed as
mere chauvinism. In response, those who consciously or unconsciously seek
to perpetuate gender imbalances have learned to switch to benign
194. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
195. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). The Court held:
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a
bar .... The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have
long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long
practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the
sexes, certainly in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic. The
Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting
social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest
scientific standards.
Id. at 465-66 (citation omitted).
196. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
197. Id. at 62.
198. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896-97 (1992) (stating that
Bradwell and Hoyt "of course, are no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the
individual, or the Constitution").
199. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574-75 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (relying on Hoyt
and Goesaert for the proposition that "if the question of the applicable standard of review for
sex-based classifications were to be regarded as an appropriate subject for reconsideration, the
stronger argument would be not for elevating the standard to strict scrutiny, but for reducing it
to rational-basis review").
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200objectification to reach their goals. Women are now often characterized as
objects of a biology that makes them nurturing, good mothers, and gentle.
20
Sexists have learned to argue that they are not discriminating against
women, but rather "revering" and "honoring" them for who they are and
202what they do. Such arguments place women on a social rung that,
although "respected," has considerably less power than the rungs reserved
for men and restrains women to the gilded cage of their "revered" social
role.203
200. This is not to say that negative biological objectification no longer exists. Recently, the
President of Harvard University, Lawrence H. Summers, set forth decidedly grandiloquent, yet
undoubtedly outdated arguments for why women are seriously underrepresented among top
scientists. The president said that "many different human attributes-height, weight, propensity
for criminality, overall Q, mathematical ability, scientific ability," may contribute to the
disparity between top men and women scientists. Moreover, Summers pointed to "taste
differences between little girls and little boys that are not easy to attribute to socialization" as
a reason for the disparity. Lawrence H. Summers, Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying
the Science & Engineering Workforce (Jan. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2005/nber.html.
201. The FamilyLife ministry, a religious organization that puts on meetings throughout
the year and claims that over 1.5 million people have attended its conferences, is dedicated to
instilling so-called family values. Our Roots-Providing the Blueprints for Marriage,
http://www.familylife.com/about/who-weare.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). Its website sets
forth the basic premises of its "Family Manifesto." The Manifesto is an example of seemingly
benign objectification. It states:
We believe God has uniquely designed women to be mothers. We believe the
greatest way a mother can love her children is to love their father. We also believe
God has created a woman with an innate and special ability to nurture and care for
her children. Therefore, we believe mothers are the primary people who execute
the vital responsibilities of loving, nurturing, and mentoring children. We believe
these responsibilities should be met before a mother contemplates any other
duties. We believe our culture has devalued the role of a mother by placing greater
significance on activities outside the home than on those inside the home.
Family Manifesto, http://www.familylife.com/about/whatwere-about.asp (last visited Jan. 14,
2007).
202. W. Bradford Wilcox, a sociology professor at the University of Virginia, writes in
Touchstone Magazine, a Christian publication, "[almong the many distinctive talents that
mothers bring to the parenting enterprise, three stand out: their capacity to breastfeed, their
ability to understand infants and children, and their ability to offer nurture and comfort to
their children." W. Bradford Wilcox, Reconcilable Differences: What Social Sciences Show About the
Complementarity of the Sexes & Parenting, Nov. 2005, available at http://www.touchstonemag.com/
archives/article.php?id=18-09-032-f.
203. Feminist Naomi Cahn observes:
Throughout the nineteenth century, women claimed a special set of virtues lacking
in men to explain their limited activism outside the domestic sphere, activism that
encompassed "women's issues." The Cult of True Womanhood urged them to
perform domestic activities both within and outside of their homes. The gendered
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Even benign biological objectification is subject to obvious and frequent
criticism. Consequently, power elites have added another level of abstraction
to their objectification claims. Rather than characterizing subordinated
groups as objects of their biology, they characterize them as objects of their
circumstances or "culture."20 4 Members of subordinated groups are excluded
from participation in institutions of power, not because of biological
predisposition, but rather because of their typical conditions. The
argument that women are biologically predisposed against positions of
power has largely given way to the argument that women are ill-fitted for
positions of power due to social pressures.0 6 Women are simply incapable of
exercising autonomy in the face of an environment that rewards them for
acting in an expected stereotypical fashion and stigmatizes them for
207breaking stereotype and seeking power positions.
appeal to morality serves both to empower and confine. Indeed, reliance on
women's special morality is, of course, potentially both beneficial and dangerous
and is a vibrant topic in feministjurisprudence.
Cahn, supra note 78, at 822 (internal citations omitted).
204. See Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 1573, 1601 (1996) (observing the shift from "biological to cultural
explanations for racial subordination").
205. See id. at 1600-01 (criticizing the claim "that black culture's supposed inferiority and
difference from a 'unified national culture' explained the fact of black racial subordination");
R6mkens, supra note 112, at 286-87 (noting that the government has embraced "a rhetoric that
associates poverty with criminality and in effect monitors and controls people living in lower
class neighborhoods").
206. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Women in Science: Biological Factors Should not be Ignored, 11
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 509, 512 (2005) ("For a variety of reasons, both biological and social,
women tend to be less willing than men to subordinate everything else in their lives to careers,
which affects women's representation not only in all-consuming science careers but also in
similarly demanding positions in corporations and in law firms."); Summers, supra note 200.
Not to belabor the issue, but the problem with Summers's and Browne's contention is multi-
faced. First, the science is suspect. No experiment can control for the myriad factors that lead to
women's under-representation in science in order to isolate the biological factor that pre-
determines that women are bad at science. As for the contention that both biology and social
factors lead to underrepresentation, Summers's and Browne's arguments completely ignore a
hundred years of post-modem thought. One could say that it is not so much that women's
social pressures make them ill-fit for power positions, so much as the power positions have been
constructed distinctly in a manner that excludes women. Not only is any objective justification
of current structure suspect, but Browne and Summers never even endeavored to set forth a
normative basis for the current structure of scientific education and employment. See generally,
Ellen M. Bublick, Summers' Personal as Political: Reasoning without Effort from Stereotypes, 11
CARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 529 (2005) (criticizing Summers's reasoning).
207. The Supreme Court hinted at this particular argument when it recognized that
employment policy could be based on evidence that a woman's job performance is affected by
the pressures of having pre-school aged children. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
542, 544 (1971). It stated:
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in ...permitting one hiring policy for
women and another for men-each having pre-school-age children. The existence
of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job
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As a subordinated group, women have also felt the sting of being
characterized as pure agents when society wants to immunize itself from
responsibility for their well-being. As agents, women are unequal, not
because of institutional discrimination, but rather because they have madeS• 208 ,
poor choices. When society and government seek justification for ignoring
the problem of domestic violence, they assert that women "choose" to stay in
abusive relationships. 209  Women are thus complicit in their own
subordination. l °
performance for a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for distinction
under § 703(e) of the Act. But that is a matter of evidence tending to show that the
condition in question is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Justice Marshall disagreed, stating,
I cannot agree with the Court's indication that a "bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of" Martin Marietta's
business could be established by a showing that some women, even the vast
majority, with pre-school-age children have family responsibilities that interfere
with job performance and that men do not usually have such responsibilities.
Id. (Marshall,J., concurring).
208. This argument:
[Elncourages individual achievement that does not contest unfair foundational
rules and requires social groups to meet imposed standards that are sometimes
unjust. Because these standards are viewed as "the basis of ordered liberty" they are
hard to critique and overcome; to many, these standards appear to be neutral and
objective, rather than merely a form of racial power.
George A. Martinez, Latinos, Assimilation and the Law: A Philosophical Perspective, 20 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REv. 1, 7 (1999) (footnotes omitted). In the race context, agency arguments have
proven important in maintaining the fallacy that society is not responsible for the condition of
African Americans. See Vincent D. Rougeau, A Crisis of Caring: A Catholic Critique of American
Welfare Reform, 27 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 111-12 (2003) ("Because a large percentage of
white Americans believe blacks are lazy, the identification of blacks with poverty becomes a way
of releasing mainstream society from any moral responsibility or communal obligation for the
poor and their circumstances .... ").
209. Prosecutors choose between objectification and agency characterizations of women
victims to fit prosecutorial goals. They objectify battered women as wholly controlled by their
batterers when justifying proceeding with prosecutions against victims' wills. When a battered
woman is herself a defendant, however, prosecutors appeal to the "she could have left"
argument to show that that the woman was in fact complicit in her own subordination by
"choosing" to remain in the battering relationship. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 75-77.
210. In a similar vein, conservatives characterize blacks as responsible for maintaining their
conditions of inferiority. They argue that African American subordination is due to their
"choices":
The high rates of nonmarital births and family breakdown in many poor black
communities, for example, involve choices to engage in unprotected sexual
intercourse and to abandon family responsibilities. High crime rates can be
explained in part by decisions to join gangs, to sell drugs, and to kill. Low voter
turnout in black communities reflects in part decisions not to participate in the
political process. Disparities in educational achievement between blacks and whites
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This "pure agent" characterization is also seen in the debate over
women in the workplace. In the face of biological arguments about women,
child-bearing, and incapacity to hold positions of power, feminists forged
counterarguments, advancing the nuanced view that women operate as
constrained agents. 21 Accepting that women are, in fact, influenced by their
biological ability to have children and the social pressure to be the primary
caretaker of those children, feminists called for reform within the workplace
to accommodate women (and men) who wanted a higher valuation of
"domestic" work and to fully participate in both domestic and business
life.2 12 In response, conservatives argued that women should not be able to
force widespread childcare reform because it was their "choice" to have
children rather than participate as productive members of the work force.2
3
are due in part to black parents' lack of support for or interest in their children's
education.
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and
Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 728 (2004).
211. See supra notes 200-06 (discussing the debate over why women are tinder-represented
in power positions).
212. Experts explain:
[TIhe American workplace today remains structured around the life patterns of
the traditional patriarchal man who has no childcare responsibilities. As explained
in Part I, this structure essentially ignores the life patterns of mothers, who are
primarily responsible for childcare. Therefore, simply permitting women (as well
as men with childcare responsibilities) to enter the workplace as it is currendy
structured will not provide true equality for working parents. Many excellent
employees with caregiving responsibilities are simply unable to work the long
inflexible hours required by many of the best jobs.
Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the
Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 334 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see also Nancy E. Dowd, Work
and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 431, 451 & Part IV (1990) (recognizing
that "women are viewed, and feel, that they take on family responsibilities automatically,
'naturally'" and advocating structural work-place reform as a response); Naomi S. Stern, The
Challenges of Parental Leave Reforms for French and American Women: A Call for a Revived Feminist-
Socialist Theory, 28 VT. L. REV. 321, 337 (2004) (criticizing the Family and Medical Leave Act's
"miserliness towards caregiving women").
213. See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
371, 375 (2001) (- [T] he oversimplified strain of neoclassical economic theory that has come to
pervade our country's political and legal discourse, and the influence of rational choice theory
in particular, have served to construct women's caregiving as a freely chosen endeavor that is
undeserving of protection from discrimination within the workplace."). The discourse of choice
has often been used by conservatives as ajustification for denying poor minority women welfare
benefits. Conservatives revive agency discourse to cement patriarchal family values while
simultaneously undermining the welfare state. See generally Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn,
Caretaking and the Contradictions of Contemporary Policy, 55 ME. L. REv. 289 (2003) (discussing how
contemporary conservatives tout marriage as much as work as the solution to the problem of
"welfare mothers"). This discourse of "choice" has proven persuasive to courts. See, e.g., Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (affirming the denial of disability benefits to
pregnant women in part on the ground that pregnancy is a "voluntarily undertaken and desired
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It is precisely this objectification and agency discourse that feminism
has historically countered. Consequently, hopping on the criminalization
bandwagon is not a logical "next step" in the feminist movement or an
unimportant choice. In accepting criminalization discourse, domestic
violence reformers must prepare to accept the pernicious objectification
tactics that have been so fundamental to the historical subordination of
women. Furthermore, they must also accept the agency characterizations
that keep society free from responsibility for crime-a practice that has also
been used to subordinate women in the past.
This section has provided a philosophical backdrop to the critical
choice feminists faced regarding mandatory domestic violence policies.
Domestic violence reformers found themselves in the middle of a vortex
between the persuasive victims' rights movement and feminist voices
sensitive to the history of minority objectification. Domestic violence
reformers, however, made their choice. Today, many domestic violence
reformers vehemently support harsh criminalization and are willing to use
the very rhetorical tools that serve to oppress all women.1 4 The next section
explores how domestic violence reform embraced victims' rights over equal
rights and allowed objectification discourse to become part of the feminist
vocabulary.
IV. FEMINISTS GET TOUGH ON CRIME
Feminist Renre R6mkens asks, "Is the feminist social movement to be
remembered for its influence on criminal law . . . ?,,215 Is much of today's
feminism nothing more than a subset of the crime victims' rights movement
and its tough-on-crime goals? It seems, unfortunately, that the answer is
"yes."216 The domestic violence reform movement has largely shifted from
condition"); E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 320 (1988) (finding that Sears did
not discriminate by failing to hire women for high-paid commission sales jobs because women
preferred the lower paying sales jobs due to, among other things, "a fear or dislike of what they
perceived as cut-throat competition, and increased pressure and risk associated with
commission sales").
214. See infra notes 314-34 and accompanying text (discussing how some domestic violence
reformers infantilize and pathologize women in order to justify mandatory policies).
215. Battered Women Symposium, supra note 96, at 344.
216. Again, not all feminists support domestic violence criminalization, yet criminalization
has undeniably become a large part of the domestic violence movement and feminism in
general. As Professor Maguigan states:
Sue Osthoff, the Director of the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of
Battered Women ("NCDBW"), has noted that "'unintended consequences are
surfacing from over-reliance on the criminal legal system .... Twenty-five years
ago, women of color were saying that we should not turn to the criminal legal
system. But we put all our eggs in one basket without seeking other creative ways of
community intervention.'"
MaGuigan, supra note 99, at 432-33 (citing ANANNTYA BHATTACHARJEE, AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, WHOSE SAFETY? WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE VIOLENCE OF LAW
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implementing progressive strategies of resistance to accepting conservative
ideologies that support prevailing institutional structures and power
217distributions. There are two very striking parallels between the victims'
rights movement and domestic violence reform. First, conservatives have
appropriated domestic violence discourse and made it part of the larger
conservative effort to be tough on crime. Second, in defense of mandatory
policies, domestic violence reformers have adopted the essentialist discourse
of objectification and agency. The most devolutionary moment in domestic
violence reform was when reformers embraced or at least accepted the
practice of treating abuse victims as objects and defendants as pure agents,
despite the criticisms of many feminist, minority, and progressive scholars.
A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE CONSERVATIVE AGENDA
In the traditional conservative mindset, domestic violence was at best an
acceptable method of retaining domestic control and at worst a "private"
problem not subject to public debate or censure. 8 Several factors
contributed to the government taking notice of domestic violence as a social
ENFORCEMENT 26 (2001), available at http://www.afsc.org/community/WhoseSafety.pdf
(quoting Sue Osthoff)).
217. Elizabeth Schneider states:
Domestic violence was a moment, a part of a broader problem of gender
inequality. But now domestic violence has become unmoored from those issues of
gender, for a whole variety of reasons, which I develop in [Feminist Law Making].
The book argues that it is necessary to reaffirm the original impetus of activism
and advocacy on domestic violence, the inextricable link between violence and
equality.
Battered Women Symposium, supra note 96, at 322-23.
218. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional view of
domestic violence as a "private issue"). Even today, certain right-wingers espouse the
"breakdown of the family" and reversal of traditional roles as the source of domestic violence.
See, e.g., PATRICK F. FAGAN, THE BREAKDOWN OF THE FAMILY: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR CHILDREN
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1999), available at http://www.heartland.org/pdf/24005i.pdf (blaming
out-of-wedlock pregnancy, pre-marital sex, and abortion for domestic violence). Certainly, such
right-wing voices are at odds with the domestic violence reform movement, as evidenced by
their intense opposition to the federal Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"). The Facts
About Spousal Conflict: Personal Responsibility Must Be Expected in Public Policy,
http://www.dadsnow.org/vawa/vawa2.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2007) ("VAWA is
predominantly about creating a tremendous welfare state, enacting socialized health care,
entitling women's employment, guaranteeing unemployment benefits and free housing for
women, raiding husbands' retirement savings, and getting immigrant status for illegal
immigrants."). The domestic violence reform movement, however, is also at odds with groups
primarily concerned with the welfare of the poor, minorities, and immigrants, as evidenced by
the growing number of women of color scholars opposed to criminalization reform. Hence, by
.conservative," I mean those individuals and groups who embrace criminalization, not just as a
response to the particular problem of domestic violence, but as a response to most, if not all, of
the problems afflicting disempowered members of society. The conservative position is that
particular individuals are wholly responsible for wrong-doing regardless of the context in which
that wrongdoing occurs.
[2007]
THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME
problem. Feminists were vocal, organized, and effective in their efforts to
persuade the government that domestic violence was not acceptable. In
addition, the government began to gain awareness of the social impacts and
significant economic costs of domestic violence. 9 At the same time, the
increasingly popular victims' rights movement included in its agenda
increased criminalization of domestic violence. To cement its appeal, the
victims' rights movement emphasized particularly vulnerable victims, such as
young children. 2 0 Among their list of "helpless" victims was the powerless,
pure-of-heart battered woman. 2 2 Nicole Brown Simpson was the poster child
for the convergence of the anti-domestic violence agenda and victims' rights
movement. 222 Once the public embraced Ms. Simpson as the "ultimate"
victim, 223 society could more easily categorize domestic abusers as among the
ranks of indisputably criminal monsters worthy of utmost reproach.2 4
219. During the Reagan and Bush I Administrations, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop was
very vocal about the medical impact of domestic violence. See Doctors Begin Campaign to Help
Battered Women, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1989, § 1, at 17 (attributing to Surgeon General C. Everett
Koop the belief that "doctors must become part of the crusade against [domestic] violence");
Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES MAC., Feb. 16, 1992, § 6 (explaining that C.
Everett Koop, the former Surgeon General, "has identified domestic violence as the No. 1
health problem for American women, causing more injuries than automobile accidents,
muggings and rapes combined"); Mary S. Hood & Julie Kunce Field, Domestic Abuse Injunction
Law and Practice: Will Michigan Ever Catch Up to the Rest of the Country?, 73 MICH. B.J. 902, 906 n.1
(1994) ("In 1985, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop told health professionals that domestic
violence was a 'public health menace.'").
220. See supra notes 133-36, 152 and accompanying text (describing the victims' rights
movement characterizations of vulnerable victims and evil defendants).
221. Victims' rights advocates saw the movement as "a national movement to reform the
legal system by recognizing that crime victims, especially women and young victims of sexual
and domestic violence, were a discrete and unserved minority that deserved equal justice under
law." Kyl et al., supra note 103, at 584.
222. See Suzanne J. Groisser, Elizabeth M. Schneider's Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking,
10 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 385, 391 (2001) (noting that Simpson gave a "face" to the problem of
domestic violence); Micchio, supra note 43, at 238 ("With the death of Nicole Brown, politicians
raced to the state house to invoke domestic violence laws, jumping on the "zero tolerance"
bandwagon."). The Simpson case resulted in significant legal changes. CAL EVID. CODE §
1109(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2006), known as the "Nicole Brown Simpson Law," reformed the
evidence code to allow propensity evidence specifically in domestic violence cases. See also 140
CONG. REC. 15,431 (1994) (statement of Rep. Meehan) (referring to murder of Nicole Brown
Simpson and urging passage of VAWA).
223. See Laurie L. Levenson, Stereotypes of Women in the O.J. Simpson Case, 1994 WL 681370
(O.J. Commentaries) ("The name Nicole Brown Simpson has now become synonymous with
the image of the battered wife-a young, beautiful woman, unable to escape her abuser, and
unable to get the criminal justice system to respond to her pleas.").
224. The outrage expressed at the Simpson verdict and the use of evidentiary rules to
exclude particular evidence of domestic abuse was distinctly racial. MichelleJacobs explains:
When the O.J. Simpson verdict of not guilty was rendered by the jury comprised of
eight black women, two black men and two others, many in the white community
were outraged. White feminists attacked the intelligence of the black women on
the jury, claiming the black women did not understand what the case was about.
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As early as 1984, conservatives took up the domestic violence issue. The
Reagan Administration published the Final Report of the Attorney General's
Task Force on Family Violence. 22 The Final Report was an important
milestone for the domestic violence movement because mainstream
government officials, like conservatives former Detroit Police Chief William
Hart and John Ashcroft, rejected the idea that domestic violence was simply
a "private" family matter. 226 The Final Report characterizes the problem of
domestic violence in a distinctly criminal rather than social or economic
context.
22 7
White feminists could not understand that the black women on the jury could hear
an additional narrative besides the white women's narrative about domestic
violence. The possibility that law enforcement was targeting a successful black man
was credible and real to them. It was not that the black women did not understand
domestic violence.
Michelle S. Jacobs, Piercing the Prison Uniform of Invisibility for Black Female Inmates, 94J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 795, 808 n.17 (2004) (footnotes omitted). See generally Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic
Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM.J. GENDER & L.
1, 37 (1998) (describing stereotypes in the wake of the Simpson trial); Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of
Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith-Spectacles of Our Times, 35
WASHBURN L.J. 225 (1996) (discussing racial and gender dimensions of the Simpson case).
225. U.S. ATr'y GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REP. (1984)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
226. While John Ashcroft denies that domestic violence is inappropriate for public
concern, he appears concerned with domestic violence only because he believes it affects
"family values." Thus, consistent with conservative ideology, Ashcroft uses the domestic violence
issue to carve out a role for the government in dictating the structure of domestic relationships.
See id. at 2-5. Moreover, Ashcroft's record on gender issues is less than stellar. Ashcroft's actions
in a Guatemalan woman's asylum claim based on domestic violence are particularly telling:
[I]n 1999 the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected a domestic violence-based
asylum claim by Rodi Alvarado, a Guatemalan woman. Although former Attorney
General Janet Reno vacated the Board's decision in the Alvarado case, Attorney
General John Ashcroft subsequently dismissed several members of the Board of
Immigration Appeals who had been appointed by the Clinton Administration,
including three of the five members who had dissented in the Alvarado case. He
then declined to render a decision for two years in her case, and only in January of
2005 did he remand the case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals for a re-
hearing.
Audrey Macklin, Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-US. Safe Third Country Agreement,
36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 365, 406-07 (2005) (citing In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G.
2001, BIA 1999) and In re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005)). Moreover, Ashcroft did not
seek to revive the civil remedies portions of VAWA after the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining
Why Senate Democrats Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making But Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1307, 1314 (2002). Perhaps even more disturbing was Ashcroft's subpoenaing of
thousands of women's medical records in an attempt to gain information to support anti-
abortion legislation. See Eric Lichtblau, Defending '03 Law, Justice Dept. Seeks Hospitals' Records of
Some Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at Al.
227. SeeJo Dixon, The Nexus of Sex, Spousal Violence, and the State, 29 L. & SOC'Y REv. 359, 362
(1995) (noting that the Final Report stresses criminal rather than civil remedies).
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The bulk of the Final Report's recommendations involve subjecting
domestic abusers to greater criminal intervention and sanction. While the
Final Report limitedly discusses education and social welfare, most of the
prescribed reforms are tougher on domestic violence. The Final Report
stresses the decontextualization of domestic violence stating, "the legal
response to family violence must be guided primarily by the nature of the abusive act,
not the relationship between the victim and the abuser."28 The Final Report limits
victim participation, noting, "it is the prosecutor, on behalf of the state, and
not the victim, who initiates prosecution when the elements of criminal
conduct have been determined. The prosecutor and the judge, not the
victim, determine whether the case is prosecuted or dismissed."
2 29
By stressing that domestic violence was like any other crime, the Final
Report denied any larger social roots of the problem and cemented the
notion that domestic abusers act, not because of prevailing gender
sentiments, but in contravention of social norms.2 30 The Final Report, in
fact, rejects the notion that traditional gender messages contribute to
domestic violence and instead asserts that the way to curb domestic abuse is
to emphasize family values. It concludes:
As important as our families are to us individually and to the health
of the nation, it is crucial that public policy support and strengthen
family values and family well-being. The family is the bedrock of
civilization. America derives its strength, purpose and productivity
from its commitment to strong family values. For our nation to
thrive and grow, we must do all that we can to protect, support, and
231encourage America's families.
More recently, task force member John Ashcroft has been particularly vocal
in his belief that the true harm of domestic violence is that it renders
parents unable to fulfill their obligation to instill family values. At a 2002
domestic violence symposium, he stated:
In [my] book, I was able to narrow the list of my most cherished
beliefs down to twenty. And prominent among these twenty life
lessons is that the greatest responsibility of a culture is the
transmission of values from one generation to the next. Values
begin and end in the family. As children, we learn values; as
parents, we transmit them. Our children absorb the values we pass
on to them; and they in turn pass these values on to their children.
But when families are wracked by violence and abuse, values are
228. FINAL REPORT, supra note 225, at 4.
229. Id. at 30.
230. Feminists vehemently reject the view that domestic violence is a garden-variety crime
without social implications. They see domestic violence as an outgrowth of legal, institutional,
and social patriarchy. See supra Part I.
231. FINAL REPORT, supra note 225, at 119.
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corrupted. The messages transmitted by parents are messages of
212violence, cruelty, and powerlessness.
Perhaps, however, the conservative embrace of domestic violence
reform would have the effect of making victims' rights and tough-on-crime
ideologies more progressive. The popularity of criminalization as a response
to social ills was due, in part, to stereotypical characterizations of victims and
233criminals. The victims' rights movement and popular media painted a
picture of young, white, innocent, non-poor female victims terrorized by
monstrous, ethnic, poor men.234 Acceptance of domestic violence reform
might be beneficial in helping to explode such racial thinking. If society
were to recognize the problem of domestic violence and accept feminists'
assertions that domestic violence happens at every level of the socio-
235economic spectrum and in every racial group, it would have to abandon
236the notion that criminals are minorities and victims are white. Society
would realize that criminals could actually be middle- and upper-class white
men.
Unfortunately, the de-racialization of tough-on-crime ideology did not
happen. Domestic violence reform did not require the widespread
abandonment of stereotypical racial thinking. First, those lobbying for
232. John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the Annual Symposium on
Domestic Violence (Oct. 29, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ovw/nac/agremarks.htm.
233. These stereotypical characterizations are manifested in domestic violence reform.
Popular media and politicians emphasize cases involving ideal, blameless, abused women and
monstrous abusers. "The simple and sensationalist story lines encouraged by tragic cases of
domestic violence and law and order frameworks also serve media and political interests.
Dramatic cases and 'tough on crime' policies are easily communicated in the mass media and
have ready appeal to voters." Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases:
Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y
& L. 567, 588 (2003).
234. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text (describing racial characterizations of
victims and perpetrators).
235. See, e.g., Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing
Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE
L. REV. 115, 121 (1991) (stating that "domestic violence occurs in all socio-economic and racial
groups"); Mordini. supra note 41, at 298; White, supra note 51, at 767. VAWA provides funding
for training about "sex stereotyping of female and male victims of domestic violence and dating
violence, myths about presence or absence of domestic violence in certain racial, ethnic,
religious, or socioeconomic groups, and their impact on the administration of justice." 42
U.S.C. § 13992(13) (2000). But see Goodmark, supra note 22, at 38 ("Women in low-income
households experience violence at significantly higher rates than women with higher annual
incomes." (citing CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
BUREAU OF STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 4 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
gjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf)).
236. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the victims' rights movement's
incorporation of racial stereotypes).
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domestic violence reform were white middle to upper-class women. '7 Poor
minorities could hardly be said to be the group behind the call for being
tough on domestic violence."" Additionally, domestic-abuse discourse and
policy tended to assume a burning-bed-type stereotype of a meek, serially
abused, non-poor, white woman. 3 9 Nicole Brown Simpson, a white,
attractive, upper-class woman, was the icon around which the public
galvanized in its support of domestic violence reform.240 Consequently, even
though feminists argued that domestic violence affected all spectra of
society, the public and conservative policymakers were lobbied by white
women and affected by the publicity surrounding white domestic-abuse
victims.
At the very least, accepting white women as prototypical victims,
policymakers would have to accept their partners (most likely white men) as
perpetrators. Logically, then, the result of domestic violence reform would
be the vigorous enforcement of criminal laws against middle-class white
men. As one might expect, however, domestic violence reform did not lead
to widespread arrest of white middle-class men.24 ' By effectuating mandatory
237. See Barbara Fedders, Note, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the
Politics of the Battered Women's Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 294 (1997)
(describing advocates for VAWA as "overwhelmingly white and middle-class").
238. See id.; see also Coker, supra note 42, at 1014. Donna Coker notes that the domestic
violence reform movement has "the tendency to ignore or undervalue the significance of race
or ethnicity in shaping the efficacy of universal intervention strategies." Id.
239. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1991) (asserting that the movie The Burning Bed created a cultural
image of the battered woman as an ultimately innocent, meek creature subjected to terrorism-
like violence); see also Coker, supra note 42, at 1028-29 ("Research purportedly about 'battered
women' or 'domestic violence' frequently rests on data gathered only or mainly about white
women.").
240. Professor Linda Ammons discusses the case of Pamela Hill, an abused African
American woman who killed her abuser during a struggle. The prosecutor in Hill's case stated
during closing arguments, "[A] lot of people would have you believe Pamela Hill is carrying the
banner of Nicole Simpson." Ammons, supra note 155, at 1006 (quotingJames Ewinger, Woman
Gets Prison in Boyfriend's Killing, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 20, 1994, at 3B). Ammons
remarks:
The imagery and stereotypes that were raised by the prosecutor's comparison of
Pamela Hill and Nicole Simpson cannot be missed. Nicole Simpson was white,
beautiful, rich, portrayed as a good mother, and brutalized. Pamela Hill is black,
poor, an unwed mother, and considered violent. Hill was convicted and received a
sentence of five to twenty-five years. The prosecutor, in making the statement
about Pamela Hill "carrying the banner of Nicole Simpson," wanted to make sure
that the jurors had a picture in their minds of a real battered woman.
Id. at 1006-07.
241. Power elites are generally exempt from the reach of criminal law, which is essentially a
tool of maintaining social order over the poor in a capitalist society:
[N]otions of what is wrong, what is socially harmful, and what is proper
punishment reflect political choices that disfavor lower class people-who of
course have less access to the political power and influence over the legal system
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policies without changing the systemic biases of the criminal justice system,
the oxymoronic but unsurprising result was that, although domestic violence
reform became a reality because of the desire to protect white women, 24 2 it
resulted in the widespread incarceration of minority men.243 Consequently,
tough-on-crime advocates could rally around domestic violence reform while
continuing to internalize and perpetuate racial characterizations of victims
and criminals.
Finally, conservatives had little to lose and much to gain by supporting
increased criminalization of domestic violence. First, by prescribing criminal
law as the cure to domestic violence, conservatives could continue to
maintain the concept that domestic violence occurred because of deviant
bad guys and not because of deeply entrenched socio-economic inequalities
244that were maintained by the government and elites. George W. Bush
necessary to define the boundaries of criminality in the first place.... This process
simultaneously criminalizes whole populations of lower class, urban males, usually
racial minorities, while discounting the socially destructive behavior of more
powerful groups ....
Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law's Uncertain Fate in Modern
Society, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 759, 788 (2005). A 2001 Milwaukee, Wisconsin study reported that
although Blacks represented only 24% of the population, they constituted 66% of prosecuted
domestic violence arrests. By contrast, Whites, who comprised 62% of the population,
represented only 32% of prosecuted domestic violence arrests. Sarah M. Buel, The Pedagogy of
Domestic Violence Law: Situating Domestic Violence Work in Law Schools, Adding the Lenses of Race and
Class, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 309, 319 (2003) (citing David Doege, Police Practices
are Behind Racial Disparities, Panel Suspects, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Aug. 20, 2001, at 05B
(citing studies)).
242. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 93 (Martha A.
Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (noting that politicians were relatively unconcerned
with domestic violence when it was considered a minority issue).
243. Donna Coker notes that "disproportionate numbers of African American and
somewhat lower but still disproportionately high numbers of Latinas/os are the subject of
criminal justice intervention in domestic violence cases." Coker, supra note 42, at 1034-35
(citing JoAnn L. Miller & Amy C. Krull, Controlling Domestic Violence: Victim Resources and Police
Intervention, in OUT OF THE DARKNESS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 239
(Glenda K. Kantor & Jana L. Jasinski eds., 1997) (citing studies on domestic violence in
Milwaukee, Colorado Springs, and Omaha)); see also LINDA MILLS, FROM INSULT TO INJURY:
RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE 31 (2003) ("Men of color are likely to be
arrested and prosecuted for intimate abuse crimes at disturbingly disproportionate rates when
compared with their white counterparts."); MaGuigan, supra note 99, at 439 ("Certainly, African
American men and Latinos are disproportionately represented among domestic violence
defendants in criminal courts....").
244. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing the socio-economic
conditions precedent to battering); see also Peter Margolis, Representation of Domestic Violence
Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search ofAccess, Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1995) (asserting that limited job opportunities, lack of affordable housing,
and unavailability of welfare benefits may contribute to ongoing spousal abuse); supra notes
105-13 and accompanying text (asserting that the conservative position denies social
responsibility for crime).
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advanced the domestic violence cause by declaring "war" on domestic
violence the same way Reagan declared war on drugs. Bush stated:
Our government is engaged in the fight, as it should be.
Government has got a duty to treat domestic violence as a serious
crime, as part of our duty. If you treat something as a serious crime,
then there must be serious consequences; otherwise it's not very
serious.... Our prosecutors are doing their job. They're finding
the abusers, and they're throwing the book at them. And that's
important.
People who commit must understand with certainty there is a
consequence. One way to change behavior is to make it clear to
people in our society, if you break the law, if you beat up a woman,
if you abuse your wife, you will be held to account. There must be
certainty in the law, and we must have prosecutors who understand
245that we expect them to be tough. And they are.
Moreover, the government and elites could absolve themselves of any
responsibility for continued domestic violence by blaming individual women
for their failure to take advantage of the now-ample opportunities to avail
themselves of the criminal justice system .4  Finally, the government's
245. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Domestic Violence
Prevention, Bush Proclaims October Domestic Violence Awareness Month (Oct. 8, 2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031008-5.html. Bush also
used the domestic violence issue to further his religious policies. In a subsequent speech he
asserted:
Faith-based and community organizations are also making vital contributions in
the effort to combat domestic violence. These organizations are fostering an
environment where victims can step out of the shadows and get the help and care
they need. Through initiatives like the Faith-Based and Community Organization
Rural Pilot Program and the Safe and Bright Futures for Children Initiative, the
Departments ofJustice and Health and Human Services are providing funding to
support these organizations in their life changing work.
President George W. Bush, National Domestic Violence Awareness Month, 2005, A
Proclamation by the President of the United States of America (Sept. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050930-12.html.
246. John Ashcroft's remarks indicate that the more resources the government pours into
domestic violence reform, the more responsibility the battered woman has for eradicating her
"family" of domestic violence. He states:
As a society, it is our responsibility-and our privilege-to pass on our values to the
next generation of Americans. We must work together to ensure that each victim
has the opportunity to escape violence and to transform her life and the lives of
her children. One victim of domestic abuse who found help described this
transformation better than I ever could. She said, "I finally realized the truth, that I
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philosophical and financial support of domestic violence criminalization
had the effect of diverting feminist efforts toward criminal law and away
247from other more radical endeavors, endeavors which would, in fact,
challenge the very structure of power in society. This allowed the
government and powerful society members to simultaneously undermine
general feminist reform while claiming to be pro-woman because of their
support for tough domestic violence criminal laws. 48
was hurting not only myself, but I was hurting my children even more. I was
teaching them by example that they deserved to be abused and that violence was
acceptable."
Ashcroft, supra note 232 and accompanying text. See Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in
Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1258 (2001) ("All too often, conservatives... interpret
opportunity for action to be the same as control over the abuse, and therefore, believe it is
justified to penalize battered women anytime they do not use their opportunities and control to
end the abuse."); Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between "The
Truly National and the Truly Local," 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1133-34 (2001) ("[A] ttention to
criminal remedies actually contributes to skepticism that battered women continue to face
difficulties in the courts. . . . Claims that domestic violence cases suffer in the courts are
received with disbelief and dismissal, and are met with a view that women have undeserved
advantages.").
247. There can be no dispute that in the last ten years the idea of being "tough" on
batterers has gained widespread acceptance among policymakers, society members, and even
our own students. From my own and other scholars' anecdotal evidence, this acceptance has
curiously coincided with a larger rejection of "feminism" and the study of "women's issues."
One female law professor observes:
Over the past ten years, I have watched as fewer students, men and women, express
any interest in gender and law classes. Students have told me that they fear that
having such courses on their transcripts might make employers hesitant to hire
them. Women who might, under other circumstances, be open to studying the
gender issue are intimidated by the possibility of being labeled "feminazi" or worse
yet, lesbian if they express too much interest in "women's" issues. This trepidation
is tragic.
Linda L. Ammons, Dealing with the Nastiness: Mixing Feminism and Criminal Law in the Review of
Cases of Battered Incarcerated Women-A Tenth-Year Reflection, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 891, 911 (2001)
(footnote omitted).
248. For example, while advocating a "war" on domestic violence, President Bush is hardly
an ally of feminists on other fronts. He opposes choice in abortion; see The First Gore-Bush
Presidential Debate (Oct. 3, 2000), available at http:// www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html
("I think a noble goal for this country is that every child, born or unborn, need to be protected
by law and welcomed to life." (statement of Gov. George W. Bush)); is philosophically adverse
to the welfare state, see id. (criticizing Al Gore for planning "to grow the federal government in
the largest increase since Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1965" (statement of Gov. George W.
Bush)); opposes gay marriage, see The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate (Oct. 11, 2000),
available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000b.html ("I'm not for gay marriage. I think
marriage is a sacred institution between a man and a woman." (statement of Gov. George W.
Bush)); criticizes robust anti-discrimination laws, see Press Release, President Bush Discusses
Michigan Affirmative Action Case (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/01/20030115-7.html (asserting that University of Michigan's diversity
admissions policies are unconstitutional); and appointed Justice Alito, who has a notoriously
poor record on women's rights, see Senator Charles Schumer, News Conference on the
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B. ESSENTIALISM AND OBJECT/A GENCYDISCOURSE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REFORM
Even more disturbing than the conservative appropriation of the
domestic violence issue is the way object-and-agency characterizations have
wormed their way into reform discourse. Many advocates have adopted a
practice of denying victims autonomy in order to support prosecutorial
goals. Although there were salient reasons for feminists to reform the
criminal justice system,249 once they engaged state power, it became the
primary if not singular focus of the movement.25° Particularly distressing is
the extent to which certain reformers will go in order to defend
prosecutorial policies against detractors from within the feminist movement.
In order to support mandatory policies, some domestic violence reformers
go so far as to characterize battered women as defective creatures and
demonize opposing feminist voices as anti-woman. 251 Reformers, of course,
defend harsh criminalization policies on the ground that they "work," much
in the way conservatives posit that tough-on-crime policies, like the death
penalty, deter crime.252 Although my criticism of mandatory domestic
violence policies, like my critique of tough-on-crime reforms, is not
empirical, I will nonetheless briefly address the deterrence argument.
Nomination of Judge Alito to the Supreme Court, Transcript: Sen. Schumer's Remarks on the Alito
Nomination, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR2005103100707.html ('A preliminary review of his record
raises real questions aboutJudge Alito'sjudicial philosophy and his commitment to civil rights,
workers' rights, women's rights, the rights of average Americans which the courts have always
looked out for."). Similarly John Ashcroft has been a bold supporter of criminal laws against
domestic violence while exhibiting a poor record on women's rights elsewhere. See supra note
226; see also Morrison, supra note 102, at 83 n.9 ("Domestic violence allows the politician to be
sensitive especially to women and children, get support from women's or feminist organizations
and yet be tough on crime.").
249. See supra Part II.A (discussing history of domestic violence criminal law reform).
250. See MS. FOUND. FOR WOMEN, SAFETY &JUSTICE FOR ALL: EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE WOMEN'S ANTI-VIOLENCE MOVEMENT AND THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM 10 (2003),
available at http://www.ms.foundation.org/user-assets/PDF/Program/safety-ustice.pdf.
According to the report:
To achieve a better response from law enforcement, which has traditionally been
unresponsive to violence against women, the movement has devoted considerable
energy to legal reform and to getting the legal-judicial systems to take the problem
seriously. This has led to an over-emphasis on, or "over-resourcing" of, the legal
system to the virtual exclusion of other alternatives.
Id.
251. See infra notes 363-70 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Sarah Mausolff Buel, Recent Development, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic
Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 213, 216 (1988) (asserting the deterrent effects of mandatory
arrest); Hanna, supra note 11, at 1895 (stating that mandatory prosecution "protects not only
the victim, but also other women who might enter into a relationship with the abuser"); Marion
Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough?,
1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 535 (noting that "supporters believe mandatory arrest laws will curtail
domestic violence").
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The feminist hope that criminalization policies would stop domestic
violence was palatable to the government because it aligned with the
conservative desire to stop domestic violence and its attendant costs without
having to make widespread reforms to equalize the genders.253 Reformers
were heartened by the 1984 Minneapolis domestic violence experiment,
which seemed to provide objective support for the proposition that
mandatory arrests decrease domestic abuse. 2 4 The experiment analyzed
three different police responses to domestic violence complaints: arresting
the suspect, sending the suspect away for eight hours, and giving the suspect
advice. The scientists compared the efficacy of the three procedures over six
months by analyzing police records of repeat violence and victim reports.
Based on the findings, the scientists concluded that "police should probably
employ arrest in most cases of minor domestic violence." 5 This experiment
has been the subject of much criticism both by legal scholars and
scientists. 256 They argue, for example, that the methodologies of the
253. See Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence As Judicial Anomaly: Between "The Truly
National and the Truly Local," 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1133 (2001) (asserting that criminal
remedies "do not provide women with the resources to establish secure lives with their children
at home, at the workplace, or in their communities").
254. Steven Schulhofer explains:
In Minneapolis, police conducted an experiment to determine the effect of arrest
in misdemeanor assault cases. The result was dramatic support for mandatory
arrest: by every measure, arrest was reported to be more effective than other
responses such as counseling the parties or sending the suspect away. The results
were widely reported and enthusiastically received; numerous police departments
adopted rules requiring arrest in domestic assault cases, and more than a dozen
states enacted statutes mandating that approach statewide. By 1989, only five years
after the study results were released, 84% of urban police agencies reported having
mandatory or preferred arrest policies for domestic violence cases.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2162
(1995) (citations omitted).
255. Lawrence Sherman & Vichard Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, in
MILLER & WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 299-303 (2d ed. 2000).
256. See, e.g., id.; Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, The Scientific Evidence Is Not Conclusive:
Arrest Is No Panacea, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 337 (Richard J. Gelles &
Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993); Coker, supra note 42, at 1034 n.102. Schulhofer observes:
Unfortunately, the rapid and uncritical acceptance of the Minneapolis findings was
premature because flaws in the study made it hard to be sure that reported
deterrent effects of arrest were not spurious. To afford a more complete picture,
experiments testing the effects of mandatory arrest were repeated, among broader
demographic groups and with better data-collection procedures, in five other
cities. In three of them, arrest had a greater deterrent effect than other responses
only in the short run; the effect tended to diminish over time, and within a year
after the initial intervention, suspects who had been arrested were more likely to
engage in repeat violence than those who had merely been warned. A reanalysis of
the Minneapolis data revealed a similar pattern in that city. Over time, in other
[20071
THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME
experiment were flawed and the time frame in which the experiment was
conducted rendered its results tenuous at best.25 7 Scholars also question the
accuracy of any study on arrest rates, given that mandatory policies create
serious disincentives for women to report violence.258 Since 1984, other
experiments have contested the conclusion that mandatory arrest
procedures decreased incidences of domestic violence and have concluded
that mandatory policies actually increase the amount of harm suffered by259
women. However, the Minneapolis experiment continues to be the most
well-known experiment and one that appears in leading criminal law
260casebooks. Steven Schulhofer comments:
[T]he tentative Minneapolis study and its recommendations for a
more punitive approach received widespread attention and an
immediately favorable reception, but public officials and the media
have either attacked or ignored the more thorough studies that
suggest the opposite conclusion. Theoretical and ideological
commitments to punitive strategies and to a rights-oriented
response to aggression seem to dominate any concern for
designing operational programs which actually help abused
261women.
In addition, mandatory arrest and prosecution were suboptimal, quick-
fix responses to the patriarchal psychology of police and prosecutors
because the policies forced law enforcement officials to act without
addressing the underlying reasons regarding why they had failed to act
words, arrest often seems to have an "escalation effect," aggravating the subsequent
violence.
Schulhofer, supra note 254, at 2162-63 (citations omitted).
257. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 42, at 1034 n.102 ("[C]onfidence in the result of these
studies is compromised by their small sample size and the problems with comparability between
'incidents' for the before/after comparison. Comparing past incident or severity rates are
subject to problems of subject recall as well.").
258. See Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459, 1489 (2001)
(reviewing SCHNEIDER, supra note 27) ("[Tjhe chief deterrent effect of mandatory arrest
policies may well be their tendency to deter calls to police .... "); Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note
256, at 346.
259. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal
and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680, 686 (1992) (finding that among
unmarried and unemployed batterers, arrest was associated with 53.5% increase "in the annual
rate of subsequent violence"); see also Pamela Blass Bracher, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence:
The City of Cincinnati's Simple Solution to a Complex Problem, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 178 (1996)
(noting that "[s]tudies have failed to show a nexus between arrest and deterrence"); Buzawa &
Buzawa, supra note 256, at 337, 343 (citing studies); Micchio, supra note 43, at 294 (stating that
"faith in the deterrent effect of mandatory criminal intervention is misplaced" and citing
studies).
260. See, e.g., Sherman & Berk, supra note 255, at 299-303.
261. Schulhofer, supra note 254, at 2164 (citation omitted).
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before. 62 The reforms did not speak to the pervasive view among police
officers that domestic violence was acceptable, private, or the woman's
fault.2r" As a consequence, police and prosecutors still found ways around
mandatory policies6 or enforced them in such a way that the woman,
265
herself, was punished for resorting to state intervention. Statistics reveal
that the percentage increase in the number of women arrested pursuant to
266mandatory policies far exceeds the percentage increase in men arrested .
In addition, many feminist scholars have questioned whether increased
267criminalization has made women safer. They argue that the ability to press
or drop charges empowers battered women to bargain with their abusers for
safety. 26s In addition, taking discretion away from battered women puts their
262. Dan Kahan notes that the legal reforms feminists secured often reflected their
powerful advocacy in legislatures rather than a general shift in social thinking. As a result,
police were psychologically and sociologically unprepared for reform and reluctant to
implement it. He states:
Well organized and intensely interested advocacy groups can often secure
legislation that is out of line with the preferences of the median voter. That is what
happened in the fields of domestic violence law and rape law, where legislative
reforms reflected strong, feminist-inspired critiques of norms that had not yet been
fully repudiated by society at large. Because the feminist advocacy groups did not
enjoy the same influence over enforcers as they did over legislators, the reform
efforts predictably generated resistance at the enforcement stage.
Kahan, supra note 72, at 629.
263. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (describing police attitudes).
264. See Sack, supra note 27, at 1698 (footnotes omitted) (describing police and prosecutor
resistance to instituting mandatory policies).
265. See Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 339, 344 (1995) (asserting that police arrest women as a form of resistance to
mandatory policies); Andrea D. Lyon, Be Careful What You Wish For: An Examination of Arrest and
Prosecution Patterns of Domestic Violence Cases in Two Cities in Michigan, 5 MICH.J. GENDER & L. 253,
298 (1999) (citing studies showing the "high incidence of women arrested" and highlighting
possible police resentment and retaliation toward women who have previously called police and
then returned to their batterers); see also Coker, supra note 42, at 1044-45 (describing arrest
and prosecution of victims for various charges including assault, child abuse, and neglect).
266. See L. Kevin Hamberger & Theresa Potente, Counseling Heterosexual Women Arrested for
Domestic Violence: Implications for Theory and Practice, 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 125, 126 (1994)
(noting that a mandatory arrest law resulted in a twelve-fold increase in arrests of women but
only a two-fold increase for men); Carey Goldberg, Spouse Abuse Crackdown, Surprisingly, Nets
Many Women, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at A16 (observing that pro-arrest policies in New
Hampshire and Vermont led to significant increases in the percentage of women arrested for
domestic violence).
267. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing
Victims' Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 465, 469 (2003) (asserting that the harm of no-drop policies "is twofold: the
prosecution may have failed to make the victim safe from future attacks and, in addition, by
coercing the victim's participation the state may have taught her to distrust the system"); see also
infra notes 270-73.
268. See David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process,
Problems and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION
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fates in the hands of outsiders unfamiliar with the details of their
situations.26 9  Many feminists assert that domestic violence victims,
themselves, are in the best position to assess what they need to do to keep
safe. 270 These feminists conclude that mandatory policies have the overall
effect of diminishing the safety of battered women. Scholars also emphasize
the economic harms that mandatory reforms impose on victims.
2 7 1
Finally, harsh criminalization policies have had the empirical effect of
disproportionately disadvantaging minorities. Soon after states began to
implement mandatory policies, a growing body of scholarship emerged, set
forth most prominently by women-of-color scholars, criticizing mandatory
policies. The criticisms focused not only on the policies' tendency to subject
disproportionately high numbers of minority men to criminal penalties, 72
but also on the fact that they resulted in minority women being subject to
various criminal and civil sanctions. Minority women victims often found
themselves arrested as "mutual combatants" under mandatory arrest
127, 150-51 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (citing a study showing that battered women bargain for
their safety); Coker, supra note 42, at 1018 ("Interviews with battered women demonstrate that
women sometimes drop protection orders or refuse to cooperate with prosecution because they
were successful in using the threat of legal intervention to gain concessions from their abuser.");
Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job Description for the Battered Woman's Prosecutor and
Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 183, 191 (1997) (asserting that the victim's
"opportunity to make that choice [to prosecute] may be just the power the battered woman
needs to stop the violence in her life").
269. See Mills, supra note 268, at 191 (arguing that the perverse effect of such a tactic may
be "to align the battered woman with her batterer, to protect him, and to further entrench her
in the abusive relationship").
270. See Mordini, supra note 41, at 323 (noting that the woman "is in a better position to
choose, as she knows best what her partner is capable of and what is likely to occur from the
separation"). But see Wills, supra note 75, at 181 ("The criminal justice system, on the other
hand, sees a wide spectrum of batterers. It also has more resources to assist in evaluating the
danger a batterer poses to the victim.").
271. Donna Coker describes the grave costs of the message-sending goal of Miami-Dade
Florida's mandatory policies:
[Tlhe County Commission in Miami-Dade, Florida enacted an ordinance in 1999
that, among other provisions, requires the clerk of court to notify the employer of
anyone convicted of a domestic violence offense. The sponsors of the legislation
argue that "it sends a message," but regardless of the intended message, the result
was direct and predictable harm for poor women of color. Professional men are
not likely to lose their jobs if their boss is notified of a misdemeanor conviction,
but men working in low skill jobs, where men of color are disproportionately
represented, are likely to be fired. The ordinance takes money directly from poor
women and their children by diminishing their possibility for receiving child
support. The ordinance probably increases women's danger, as well, since
unemployed men may be more likely to engage in repeat violence.
Coker, supra note 42, at 1016 (footnotes omitted).
272. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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policies2 71 or later embroiled in the abuse-and-neglect system relating to
some perceived maltreatment of their children. 274 Race scholars also
criticized the negative effects mandatory policies imposed on immigrant
communities. Because domestic violence, unlike non-domestic forms of
simple assault, rendered defendants eligible for deportation, mandatory
275policies posed special problems for immigrants. Immigrant victims were
torn between reporting domestic violence, which may result in deportation
of victims or their spouses and cause emotional and financial hardship, and
276allowing abuse to continue.
Some defenders of criminalization dismiss the racial critique as
277providing a "license" for men of color to abuse. These reformers
273. A minority scholar has observed:
First, [mandatory policies] could decrease the number of black women who would
actually call the police for fear that they would be contributing to the already
unbearable level of criminal justice intrusion into the lives of black men. Second,
mandatory arrest policies might actually heighten the rate and severity of violence
that women were experiencing. They could also lead to an increased number of
women of color being charged with domestic violence, since the police and the
courts do not view black women as victims of domestic violence, but rather as
mutual combatants in assault cases.
Jacobs, supra note 224, at 806 (footnotes omitted); see also Fenton, supra note 224, at 54
(criticizing the image of "the uncontrollable, promiscuous black woman who is capable of
sustaining greater physical abuse than her white counterpart, and who is herself capable of
violence").
274. See Coker, supra note 42, at 1047-48 (discussing negative impacts of mandatory
policies on victims).
275. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) (2) (E) (i) & (ii) (1997) provide:
(i) Domestic violence, stalking and child abuse. Any alien who at any time after
admission is convicted of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a
crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment is deportable....
(ii) Violators of protection orders. Any alien who at any time after admission is
enjoined under a protection order issued by a court and whom the court
determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order
that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment,
or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued
is deportable.
276. In addition, undocumented immigrant victims who become involved in the criminal
system may themselves face deportation. See Coker, supra note 42, at 1049 (describing story in
which domestic violence victim who "fought back" was arrested, convicted, and faced
deportation); Jessica Dayton, Note, The Silencing of a Woman's Choice: Mandatory Arrest and No
Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 281, 290-91 (2003).
See generally Hannah R. Shapiro, Battered Immigrant Women Caught in the Intersection of U.S.
Criminal and Immigration Laws: Consequences and Remedies, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27 (2002)
(discussing the adverse impact of mandatory domestic violence policies on immigrant victims).
277. Sarah Buel testified to Congress that cultural and racial considerations were no more
than prosecutorial cop-outs:
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rationalize that domestic violence prosecution benefits all women equally
because domestic violence affects women on every level of the
socioeconomic and racial spectrum. They thus reject a racially conscious
approach to mandatory policies:
[I] n our efforts to be racially, culturally, and economically sensitive,
we cannot allow violence to go unchecked under the rationale that
state intervention is always racist, ethnocentric, or classist.... The
underenforcement of domestic violence laws and the refusal to
mandate participation for certain groups ultimately denies women
legitimate state protection and enforcement of the right to be free
from violence in their homes and in their communities. An equal
and effective response to domestic violence requires that all.• 278
citizens be subject to the same prosecution policies.
So does criminalization "work"? The evidence is inconclusive. 79
Moreover, even if harsh policies have had some effect on deterring domestic
violence, they have also created many other problems. Reformers, however,
would assert that empirical utility was not the only reason to support
criminalization, citing the "norming" function of criminal law as a basis for
reform. 10 Criminalization, according to reformers, sends a message to
I am constantly hearing from police and D.A.'s and judges, whenever the
defendant is of color, that somehow that is relevant to the abuse .... [They do
this] because of the denial and because of the desire to distance themselves from
the abuser, that if they can say this is part of the Latino culture or this is something
that foreigners do, because he is from Iran, that this is how this man behaves ....
Women and Violence: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 124 (1990)
(statement of Sarah Buel).
278. Hanna, supra note 11, at 1881-82. While pro-prosecution reformers assert that
mandatory prosecution will prevent police from implementing racist attitudes, skeptics question
the ability of such laws to restrain police bias. See Barbara Fedders, Note, Lobbying For Mandatory-
Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics of the Battered Women's Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 281, 293 (1997) ("[E]ven in a mandatory arrest regime, the police still must make
probable-cause determinations about whether violence has occurred; probable cause is not a
colorblind calculation.").
279. Deborah Epstein argues that mandatory policies might actually lead to less compliance
with law enforcement because men will perceive the criminal justice system as unfair. She states,
"The likelihood of a person's compliance with the dictates of police and probation officers, or
with court orders issued in civil or criminal cases, is at least as firmly rooted in his perception of
fair process as in his satisfaction with the ultimate result." Epstein, supra note 2, at 1846.
Considering all the evidence from the Minneapolis study and the replication studies, scholars
have concluded that the empirical evidence does not unequivocally demonstrate that
mandatory policies decrease domestic violence. See Sack, supra note 27, at 1676 (noting the lack
of conclusive evidence on the impact of mandatory policies on safety and recidivism); see also
Arthur L. Rizer III, Mandatory Arrest: Do We Need to Take a Closer Look?, 36 UWLA L. REV. 1, 15
(2005) ("Just as there are studies that say... [mandatory arrest] deters violence, many studies
indicate that it does not.").
280. See, e.g., Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in Do ARRESTS AND
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 115, 129 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (asserting
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society that domestic violence is neither legitimate nor merely a private
problem. '5 1 While it is clear that we should not go back to treating domestic
violence as a legitimate expression of male dominance, emphasizing that
domestic violence is solely a criminal problem does not necessarily send the
best message possible.
Concededly, the increased awareness of domestic violence as a crime
has effected a change in social mindset. Even chauvinistic males who believe
that the "woman's place is in the home" are reluctant to admit publicly that
domestic abuse is valid. Rather, people now uniformly look upon "wife
beaters" with hatred and disdain. While change in mindset is an
achievement, it is limited in the sense that society has not abandoned the
structures of inequality that foster battering. Many men have adopted the "if
I ever see a man hit a woman I'd beat him" attitude.282 The idea is that the
woman is a helpless object in need of protection while the man is a deviant
2813bad guy deserving of retribution. This is similar to the victims' rights
movement's emphasis on weak, helpless victims and evil, autonomous
criminals.2 4
Accepting such binary characterizations of abusers and victims dispels
the government and society's responsibility for creating the conditions
that even if they do not deter, mandatory policies serve the "indirect function of setting a
standard of zero tolerance for battering that other institutions can emulate").
281. Cheryl Hanna openly supports the norming function of mandatory policies, even if
such policies impose substantial hardships on abused women. She states:
[Mandatory policies] may indeed cause women to face financial hardship and to
experience real emotional trauma. Women who have been sanctioned for failure
to cooperate may be treated poorly in other legal proceedings such as divorce and
custody cases .... Nevertheless, a state can employ several strategies to lower the
costs associated with mandated participation by reducing its reliance on victim
testimony as the sole means of securing a conviction. Should these measures prove
inadequate, however, the state should consistently apply a mandated participation
policy once the prosecutor decides to pursue the case and needs the victim's
testimony at trial. Only after adopting a consistent policy will the state send a clear
message that domestic violence is criminally unacceptable, providing women fair
and equal protection under the law.
Hanna, supra note 11, at 1898 (footnote omitted).
282. One poll reported that although men are willing to intervene directly in domestic
violence, they are unlikely to rally politically against domestic violence. See Hon. Ronald Adrine
& Michael W. Runner, Engaging Men and Boys in Domestic Violence Prevention Strategies, J. CENTER
FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 175, 180 (2005) (citing Peter D. Hart Research Assocs., Family
Violence Prevention Fund Study No. 5702c (2000) (unpublished study)), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/ 12.Adrine.pdf.
283. One study revealed that men define domestic violence specifically in terms of physical
abuse and are less likely to see other forms of control as illegitimate. Men and Women
Define Domestic Violence Differently, http://www.planetpsych.com/zPsychology_101/
domestic_violence.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
284. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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precedent to domestic abuse.28' The message criminal law sends is that a
distinct group of wicked people commit domestic violence and that once
these persons are managed, the problem is solved. 6 Thus, although
criminal reform may have vindicated the view that domestic violence is
wrong, it also entrenched the view that it is an insular rather than endemic
2817wrong. Elizabeth Schneider notes that criminalization indicates that
domestic violence is "a problem in and of itself and not linked to the larger
issues of women's economic situation, gender socialization, sex segregation,
reproduction, and women's subjugation within the family."2 8 Consequently,
much like the assertion that tough-on-crime policies are good because they
"work" and "send a message," reformers' contention that mandatory policies
"work" and "send a message" should be viewed with ajaundiced eye.
My main critique of current domestic violence reform, however, is not
empirical. Rather, I am particularly disturbed by the ideological and
discursive moves made by certain reformers to account for women who
oppose prosecutorial policies-moves that entrench essentialism and
object/agency characterizations. Much like the victims' rights movement has
no tolerance for victims without vengeance, 289 domestic violence reform
systematically denies the autonomy of female victims who are not pro-
prosecution. 9" Pro-criminalization domestic violence reformers support
mandatory policies that formally strip victims of any control over the destiny
of their domestic violence cases. They also criticize restorative-justice and
therapeutic-juisprudence approaches to domestic violence on the ground
that they are too easy on abusers. 29' State actors express disdain for victims
292who refuse to engage in separation-based legal programs.
285. Again, the government can appear pro-women while ignoring the economic, social,
and legal conditions that give rise to battering. Namely, women's lack of economic
empowerment, society's patriarchal beliefs about home and family, and women's inability to
access legal and social resources. See SCHNEIDER, infra note 310.
286. See Mahoney, supra note 239, at I1 (asserting that judicial opinions treat domestic
violence as "aberrant and unusual").
287. Cf Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1, 1-5 (2004) (asserting that a narrow focus on individual family structures and the
well-being of children within them obscures a larger focus on economic and gender
disparities).
288. Battered Women Symposium, supra note 96, at 359; see also Mahoney, supra note 239, at 12
("Societal denial amounts to an ideology that protects the institution of marriage by
perpetuating the focus on individual violent actors, concealing both the commonality of
violence in marriage and the ways in which state and society participate in the subordination of
women.") (footnote omitted).
289. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (describing mandatory policies); infra
notes 292-96 and accompanying text (describing the objectification of uncooperative domestic
violence victims).
291. See, e.g., Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2171 (1993) (asserting that there is a "culture of battering"
that is incompatible with mediation); Holly Joyce, Comment, Mediation and Domestic Violence:
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Reformers justify ignoring women's choices in a variety of ways. One
way is to espouse the ideology that domestic violence reform laws do not
exist primarily for abused women but rather for the protection of society in
general. 293 Because many of the leading domestic violence reformers are
prosecutors, they articulate a more global view of victimhood, namely, that
the true domestic violence victim is not the woman but rather society
294members forced to live amongst domestic abusers. These reformers argue
Legislative Responses, 14J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 447, 453 (1997) ("[M]ediation dilutes
the message that violence in any context is unacceptable."); Kelly Rowe, Comment, The Limits of
the Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence Cases Should Not be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J.
855, 868-69 (1985) (rejecting mediation because it does not reflect the serious criminal nature
of domestic violence).
292. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 1857 (noting that district attorneys believe that
uncooperative battered women "'waste precious prosecutorial resources'" (quoting Naomi R.
Cahn, Innovative Approaches Overview, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 161, 163 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992))); Mills, supra note 268, at 194
(asserting that prosecutors "become mechanical, legalistic, and uninterested in those victims
who are unwilling to help pursue a perpetrator"). One domestic violence advocate recounts
with remorse objectifying her client by pushing prosecution on her client:
In retrospect, I realized that my reaction was inappropriate and, to a certain
degree, insulting and offensive to Joan. Wanting to hold Mike accountable for his
criminal behavior was a typical response, but for me to assume the role of "big
brother" to my client was just the opposite end on the abuse pendulum. Like Mike,
I was exercising control over Joan's life. While Mike wanted to punish her for
taking away his authority in the relationship, I wanted to protect her when I
impulsively-and unilaterally-decided that Mike should be prosecuted and Joan
needed rescuing.
How could I possibly know what was best for Joan after only a brief session with
her? Besides our short conversation before the interview, I knew absolutely
nothing about Joan or the abuse she endured. Had Joan not pulled my coattail, I
would have escalated the abuse by indirectly implying that she was feeble, helpless,
passive, and incapable of knowing what was best for herself.
White, supra note 51, at 725-26.
293. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 225; see also Toni L. Harvey, Student Work, Batterers
Beware: West Virginia Responds to Domestic Violence with the Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest Statute,
97 W. VA. L. REv. 181, 205 (1994) (asserting that tough criminalization policies "ensure that
domestic violence will be perceived and treated as a crime against 'society as a whole,' rather
than as merely an offense against the individual victim" (internal citation omitted)); Wanless,
supra note 252, at 567 (arguing that when a prosecutor "acquiesce [s]" to a victim's wishes, she
"fails to recognize that domestic violence is a crime against society as well as the victim").
294. See Wills, supra note 75, at 182 ("As guardians of public safety, prosecutors must
proceed against domestic violence offenders with or without victim cooperation as long as there
is legally sufficient evidence."). Similarly, Cheryl Hanna asserts that first and foremost, a
prosecutor serves the entire "community" and should prosecute on the basis of the "seriousness
of the offense and sufficiency of the evidence." Hanna, supra note 11, at 1908. Only to the
extent that the victim's wishes affect the sufficiency of the evidence are they relevant. Any
philosophical reason for taking the victim into account should be ignored. She states,
"Prosecutors need to be able to look beyond the theoretical dilemmas.., and to stop worrying
about whether the choice to pursue a case conflicts with their feminist (or nonfeminist) ideals."
Id.
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that victims' wishes should have little or no bearing on whether society's
right to punish criminals is vindicated, and victims simply do not have the
right to dictate the destiny of criminal cases.29 5 Cheryl Hanna, for example,
defends the prosecutor's choice to jail Maudie Wall, an uncooperative
domestic violence victim, on the grounds that Ms. Wall's reluctance cost the
state money:
Feminists overwhelmingly criticized the prosecutor who jailed
Maudie Wall overnight, claiming that the state had gone too far.
Much of that criticism is misplaced. First, Ms. Wall's overnight stay
in jail may have been the first time that she recognized the serious
abuse against her. Second, her inaction had consequences for the
state. Resources had been expended in the case against the abuser.
If such cases are dismissed, 'wasting' resources on cases never
pursued, already tight prosecutors' budgets could come under
further attack.
2 96
This defense of domestic violence reform far removes the movement
from its feminist roots, which concerned fighting patriarchy and vindicating
women's autonomy.2 97 Reformers have abandoned the basic premise that
the well-being and equality of women is the basis for policy reform298 and
instead espouse the view that reform is defensible on the garden-variety
295. See Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of "Ideal Victims": Assaulted
Women's "Image Problems" in Law, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 140 (2004) ("Arguments in
favour of using the punitive powers of the criminal justice system against the very women who
are the victims of domestic violence are premised on the idea that these 'bad' victims need to
be brought into line and compelled to assist the state.").
296. Hanna, supra note 11, at 1892 (footnotes omitted).
297. See Micchio, supra note 43, at 259 (noting that early reformers adopted a "governance
model" which emphasized women's agency).
298. Hanna advocates treating abused women like other "reluctant witnesses," such as
witnesses in "organized crime, gang- and drug-related" cases. Hanna, supra note 11, at 1891.
From my experience representing such witnesses in other contexts, they are subpoenaed
against their wills, sometimes jailed on material-witness warrants, charged with perjury for
"lying" in cases and to grand juries, and charged with contempt for refusing to testify on the
stand. Once the case is over, the prosecution does not follow up to see how they are doing.
Some of these "reluctant witnesses" (often snitches) end up dead. Indeed, this type of treatment
seems to be catching on in the domestic violence context:
[S]ome prosecutors resort to extreme measures to get victims into court. For
example, some prosecutors threaten to: take the victim's children away; prosecute
the victim for child endangerment, neglect, or disturbing the peace; drop the case
entirely; or not prosecute future domestic violence incidences, if the victim refuses
to testify. In the most extreme cases, prosecutors threaten to or do, in fact, jail the
victim prior to testifying, to ensure the victim's presence in court on the day of the
trial.
Jeanine Percival, Note, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases in Light of
Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 213, 241 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
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ground that "criminal prosecution vindicates society's injuries."2  One
scholar has noted that the domestic violence issue "has moved from one
raised on the margins to one that has been appropriated by the government
... . [F]eminist liberatory discourse challenging patriarchy and female
dependency, which shaped this work, has been replaced by discourse
,9300emphasizing crime control.
In addition to treating female victims as objects by asserting that
criminal law should be relatively unconcerned with victim choice, some
reformers justify criminalization policies by characterizing uncooperative
victims in demeaning and objectifying ways. Because the appeal to the
prosecutorial role as justification for ignoring the victim has proven fairlyS301
unpersuasive, reformers have constructed arguments to undermine the
importance, accuracy, and value of the victim's voice. The starting point for
these types of arguments is quite logical and is based in a good-faith effort to
recognize agency. Reformers assert that battered women elect not to
prosecute precisely because they are controlled by their abusers; therefore,
honoring victims' choices not to prosecute does not secure autonomy but
rather cements their objectification by abusers. °2
299. The concept, vigorously advocated by reformers, that domestic violence is like any
other "crime against society," necessarily implies that the victim has less control over the fate of
the case. See Andrew Ashworth, Responsibilities, Rights, and Restorative Justice, 42 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 578, 578 (2002). Ashworth notes:
What is the significance of the phrase 'a crime against society'? The idea seems to
be that, when it is decided to make certain conduct a crime rather than simply a
civil wrong, this implies that it should not be merely a matter for the victim
whether some action is taken against the malefactor; and even that there is a
public interest in ensuring that people who commit such wrongs are liable to
punishment[.]
Id. at 579.
300. SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 183.
301. As a matter of principle, victims' rights advocates deny that the victims' role in the trial
is merely that of a passive government witness. See Gruber, supra note 37, at 653 (observing that
the victims' rights movement sees the victim as more than just an essential witness). Moreover,
feminists see domestic violence as a distinct gender issue and not just one of crime control. See
Hanna, supra note 11, at 1876-77 ("Simply renaming domestic violence a public crime in order
to justify mandated participation neither dissolves the theoretical dilemma posed by the
public/private distinction nor eases the burden of the difficult choices lawyers and judges
inevitably must make.").
302. See Hanna, supra note 11, at 1891 ("No-drop policies that do not compel victim
cooperation lack credibility. When a batterer and his defense attorney know that a victim's
failure to cooperate may result in case dismissal, they control the judicial process."); see also
Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for
Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 687 (1997) ("Because batterers have such
overwhelming control over their victims, and the system required victims to control the
prosecution, batterers, in effect, were being given control over the disposition of their own
criminal case."); Wills, supra note 75, at 180 ("[E]mpowering victims by giving them the
discretion to prosecute, or even to threaten to prosecute, in actuality only empowers batterers
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However, even assuming, arguendo, that battered women are reluctant
to prosecute primarily because they are afraid, there are still problems with
mandatory prosecution. First, even though the woman's choice is
constrained by her situation, it does not necessarily mean that she did not
make the best choice. Moreover, by prescribing that the solution to
women's constrained autonomy is ignoring their choices, domestic violence
reform has alleviated all pressure on the government and society to remove
the constraints on women's agency.3° If the solution is ignoring domestic
violence victims' deficient decisions and prosecuting without them, there is
no incentive to create the conditions in which victims can make good
decisions. If prosecutors are required to get a victim's consent to prosecute,
there is a much greater impetus for the state to make sure that victims are in
a situation in which they are safe and economically viable, and therefore
able to consent to prosecution. Of course, reformers could reply that rather
than securing such conditions, prosecutors will drop the cases. Whether
prosecutors value domestic violence prosecution when it requires a major
expenditure of effort is a question of prosecutorial ethos. I assert that,
presently, the ethos is, "We must prosecute and are willing to force the
victim to participate," rather than, "We must prosecute and will put the
victim in a condition where she feels comfortable assisting." How to change
prosecutorial ethos is a difficult question, which this Article takes up in Part
IV.305
Furthermore, fear of reprisal from abusers is not the only reason why
battered women refuse to prosecute. There is much scholarship to support
the view that women decline to prosecute for a variety of reasons, including
concerns over money and children, 3 6 distrust of law enforcement,307 the
308existence of an emotional bond with the defendant, or other reasons.
to further manipulate and endanger their victims' lives, the children's lives, and the safety and
well-being of the entire community.").
303. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (articulating the argument that the battered
woman is in the best position to know how to protect herself).
304. See Randall, supra note 295, at 142-43 (suggesting that the state "shift[] the object of
the inquiry away from the woman's responses and onto the barriers which interfere with and/or
limit the possibility of a successful prosecution").
305. See infra Part IV (discussing the differences between the victims' rights movement and
domestic violence reform).
306. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 769 (2005)
("[A] victim's reluctance to assist the prosecution may result from her economic dependence
on the batterer. She may fear that her family would be unable to make ends meet if the primary
breadwinner went to jail.").
307. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of increased
criminalization); see also Rivera, supra note 44, at 498 ("People of color, and women of color in
particular, are isolated and have little faith in our legal system.").
308. SeeJudith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger ofJoint Custody Presumptions, 25
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 403, 415 (2005) (observing that women fail to prosecute abuse because of
"fear of losing the financial or economic support the abuser provides, desire to keep the family
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Again, by ignoring the myriad of social, economic, racial, and emotional
reasons why women are reluctant to prosecute domestic violence,' °9 these
reformers give license to society to ignore its complicity in creating the
problems that lead to domestic violence. Furthermore, characterizing
women victims as pro-prosecution or scared of their abusers tends to
essentialize the battered-woman experience in a way that excludes the most
subordinated members of that group.310 Reformers ignore the experience
of, for example, minority or poor women who fear state interference in their
311lives or immigrant women who have specific concerns over deportation.
Domestic violence reforms have thus internalized the paradigm of a white,
vengeful or afraid, middle-class victim.
Consequently, like the victims' rights movement's construction of an
ideal victim,3 12 certain domestic violence reformers have constructed an
ideal battered woman. They believe the criminal justice system should
account for only two types of domestic violence victims--ones who are pro-
prosecution and ones who have lost all of their free will from fear of
abuse. 314 Pro-prosecution victims present no obstacles to mandatory policies,
unit intact, concern for their children's emotional attachment to the abuser, and perceived or
real lack of options to leave the abuser and become self sustaining").
309. Donna Coker describes the diversity of reasons for women to reject separation. Coker,
supra note 42, at 1017. She notes that women fail to leave because they lack resources to
practically achieve distance from their batterers. They also stay because ending their union will
pose financial hardships to their children and themselves. Id at 1019. She further observes that
poor women often correctly surmise that the state will not be able to protect them. Id. at 1017.
Finally, Coker takes into account the emotional attachment between victims and their partners.
Id.
310. See, e.g., Wills, supra note 75, at 177 ("[T]he great majority of domestic violence victims
have one characteristic in common: after making the initial report, they have neither the will
nor the courage to assist prosecutors in holding the abusers criminally responsible."). Elizabeth
Schneider critiques essentialism in the domestic violence context:
Just as the term "battered woman" is static and incomplete, so too is the notion
that one paradigmatic "battered woman" exists. Feminist legal theorists are not
sensitive to the problem of essentialism. Over the past several years, important
developments within feminist legal theory have challenged the notion of a single
feminist perspective. Many feminist critics have written powerfully about the way
the notion of womanhood has been described as a single uniform experience,
thereby excluding a multiplicity of experiences based on race, class, ethnicity, age,
sexual orientation, and other dimensions.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 62 (footnote omitted).
311. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text (analyzing the effects of mandatory
policies on immigrant women).
312. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing the power of the victims'
rights movement).
313. See generally Randall, supra note 295.
314. See id. at 144-45 (observing that cooperative victims are seen as "true victims" whereas
"the 'uncooperative victim' is entirely helpless and fails to appear or refuses to testify about the
abuse because she is paralyzed by fear").
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and anti-prosecution victims are characterized as objects of their abusers.1 5
So long as reformers can believe that the woman's choice is shaped only by• • 316
her fear, they can discount her desires."
In addition to essentializing battered women as controlled by their fear,
certain reformers objectify women in other disturbing ways to justify denying
them agency. In the face of evidence that women are uncooperative even
when there is no immediate threat, reformers have characterized battered
women as psychologically defective and unable to reason.3 17 When reformers
do this, the assumption of constrained autonomy constantly follows the
318battered woman. Some reformers embrace the idea of the objectified,
defective automaton victim so much that they even reject reforms targeted at
directly empowering domestic violence victims through mediation:.39 They
argue that even with ample support from advocates and lawyers and in the
controlled context of mediation, a battered woman is unable to exercise
315. Cheryl Hanna even characterizes uncooperative victims as untruthful. Hanna, supra
note 11, at 1899. She states, "[V]ictims of domestic violence often understate the situation, try
to protect the batterer, or blame themselves for the violence. As a result, they do not always tell
their stories in ways that accurately describe the violence and its effects." Id. at 1900.
316. See, e.g., Wills, supra note 75, at 179 ("[Prosecutors] need to be able to say that despite
a battered woman's ambivalence, we did everything within our discretion to reign in the
batterer, to protect the victim and her children, and to stop the abuser before it was too late.").
317. See O'Connor, supra note 65, at 960 ("Th[e] commonly held notion of battered
women as weak, passive or even pathological for staying with abusive men has fueled a societal
disbelief and distrust of the victim and her perspicacity."); Randall, supra note 295, at 154 ("We
need, among other things, theoretical frameworks of violence in women's lives which are
more focused on women's strengths, resilience, and resistance as a way to correct the
pathologizing and stigmatizing discourses which construct women as damaged, helpless, and
irrational victims .... ').
318. See Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive
Control, 58 ALB. L. REv. 973, 975 (1995) (calling such characterizations of battered women a
"traumatization model" that "provide [s] an inaccurate, reductionist, and potentially demeaning
representation of woman battering").
319. See, e.g., Kerry Loomis, Comment, Domestic Violence and Mediation: A Tragic Combination
for Victims in California Family Court, 35 CAL. W. L. REv. 355, 360 (Spring 1999) ("Passivity
towards the abuse causes women to forego their legal rights to property, to their liberty, and
more importantly, to their right to not be beaten. These fears do not spontaneously disappear
upon entering into the quasi-safe atmosphere of a controlled environment in a mediation.")
(footnote omitted). Proponents of mediation, however, assert that it enhances victim
empowerment:
Women often find mediation to be empowering. They report that participation in
mediation enhances their ability to stand up for themselves, assume responsibility
for themselves, solve problems, and express their views. Most women studied
prefer mediation and their satisfaction levels are not associated with power related
marital issues such as abuse, who won arguments, or difficulty being heard.
Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making about Divorce Mediation in the
Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 183 (2002-03) (footnotes
omitted).
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rational choice-unless of course that choice is separation and
incarceration.
3 20
Such arguments come disturbingly close to characterizing adult women
as suffering from an incapacity that prevents them from exercising their
rights. 32 ' For example, reformers justify the state's substitution of its
prosecutorial decisions for the woman's choice by claiming that the woman
is in no shape to make her own decisions. 2 2 Not only is such infantilizing of
women upsetting in and of itself, even if it were true that battered women
are incapacitated, the state's claimed benign paternalism is illusory.
Prosecutors do not substitute their judgments for battered women's
323decisions in a fiduciary effort to do what is best for the women. Rather,
they proceed with distinctly prosecutorial goals against victims' wishes.2 4
Certainly, mandatory policies do not ask prosecutors with cooperative
victims to decline to prosecute when they think doing so is in the victims'
best interests.
In addition, by characterizing the psychology of anti-prosecution victims
as pathological rather than a product of other circumstances, reformers
deny social and governmental complicity in keeping battered women
silent.325 Under this view, battered women refuse to participate in the
criminal system because of their condition, not because they feel the system
is racist, they face economic destitution, or they could be deported: 6 Thus,
society bears no responsibility for creating the conditions in which women
may safely and beneficially participate in state intervention. Elizabeth
320. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 291, at 864. Rowe explains:
The passivity and subordination of the battered woman make it difficult for her to
assert herself in a bargaining situation, negotiate for her needs, and reject
solutions which do not meet those needs. She is apt to be more easily worn down,
more suggestible, and less able to be confrontive than the average disputant,
whether in domestic or nondomestic situations.
Id. (footnote omitted).
321. Some reformers advocate outright guardianship for abused women. See, e.g., Ruth
Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88
GEO. LJ. 605 (2000).
322. See, e.g., Wills, supra note 75, at 173-74 (arguing that prosecutors know better than
victims how to protect them from abusers).
323. Even reformers who explicitly characterize battered women as incapacitated advocate
for a third-party guardian rather than a prosecutor to represent their wishes. See Jones, supra
note 321, at 642.
324. See O'Connor, supra note 65, at 960 ("Mandatory criminal intervention policies are
most concerned with providing safety through punishment of perpetrators, and therefore are
less attentive to differentiating the needs of individual domestic violence victims.").
325. See Randall, supra note 295, at 153 (noting that such "decontextualized and
individualized formulations of women's experiences . . . are severed from an analysis of the
deeper structures of sexual inequality").
326. See supra notes 307-08 and accompanying text (describing the variety of reasons why
women might resist state intervention).
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Schneider describes how the focus on individual victim pathology obfuscates
the issue of state accountability:
In the media and in legal and legislative arenas, the problems that
battered women face are viewed in isolation; they are rarely linked
to gender socialization, women's subservient position within society
and the family structure, sex discrimination in the workplace,
economic discrimination, problems of housing and lack of
childcare, lack of access to divorce, inadequate child support,
problems of single motherhood, or lack of educational and
community support. The focus is still on the individual woman and
her "pathology" instead of on the batterer and the social structure
that supports the oppression of women and that glorify or
otherwise condone violence. 27
In a similar vein, the focus on criminalization entrenches the view that
batterers are wholly autonomous agents who bear sole responsibility for
domestic violence.3 By treating domestic violence like any other crime
against society, feminists missed an important opportunity to counter the
agency essentialism used to subordinate criminal defendants. 29 Giving
consideration to the variety of reasons why domestic violence victims are
reluctant to prosecute could help dismantle the essentialist characterizations
327. SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 72. I would take issue, however, with the contention that
criminal law reform does not focus on the batterer. It is clear that reform does speak to the
individual culpability or incapacitation of the batterer. The problem is that focus on batterer
pathology similarly obfuscates the role of the state in supporting and maintaining domestic
violence. See also Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women:
Some Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251, 251-52 (2003).
Goldfarb says:
Domestic violence occurs on a continuum along with other manifestations of sex
discrimination, including inequality in the workplace, deprivation of reproductive
rights, and inadequate access to welfare, child support, and child care. Every aspect
of women's oppression renders them vulnerable to violence, and in turn, violence
makes women more vulnerable to other forms of disadvantage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
328. Experts assert:
[I]t is possible to think that the men who perpetrate violence against women are
deviant individuals with an unhealthy need for power and control, understood in
terms of distortions in their personal psyches. While attention to the factors which
make some men act out violence towards women while others do not is of crucial
importance, the larger point I am making here is that the problem of men's
violence against women is too pervasive to be understood as a pathology of a few
individual men. Instead, it must be analysed within the context of the larger
patterns of presumed male entitlement, authority, and power constructed in the
culture more broadly.
Randall, supra note 295, at 112.
329. See supra notes 208-10 (discussing agency characterizations).
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of defendants as wholly autonomous monsters. 30 In the zero tolerance for
domestic violence era, however, reformers have been reluctant to consider
abusers as human beings.33 ' They fear that focusing on the reason why
batterers batter will send a message that battering is a benign and curable• 332
psychological condition.
Domestic violence, however, does not occur in a vacuum because of
deviant defendants. Social forces constantly interplay both in the creation of
domestic abuse and the prosecution or non-prosecution of such abuse.3
The modern domestic violence movement includes much less discourse on
how to prevent people from becoming batterers or battered than on how to
punish or deter persons once they are batterers. 33 Similarly, it emphasizes
dismantling abusive relationships much more than it emphasizes repairing
them.33' Theoretically, there is room to both consider something a crime
and also engage in efforts to reform the social predicates of the crime.
Unfortunately, experience demonstrates that the more government and
society focuses on criminalization, the less it focuses on reform to alleviate
the conditions causing crime.336 Scholars note that the emphasis on
330. Many scholars link the perpetration of domestic violence, not only to patriarchal
values, but also to economic inequality and racial discrimination. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich,
Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC
L. REV. 251, 291-300 (2002) (explaining that domestic violence may often be a case of
"compensatory subordination" in which lower-status men "subordinate others in order to
compensate for their own vulnerability and powerlessness"); Zanita E. Fenton, Silence
Compounded-The Conjunction of Race and Gender Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
271, 282 (2003) ("'[Domestic violence], like substance abuse, crime, and unwanted adolescent
pregnancy, are symptoms of living systematically deprived in a society that is designed to
dominate and control third world people.'" (quoting Beth Richie, Battered Black Women: A
Challenge for the Black Community, BLACK SCHOLAR, Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 41)).
331. See, e.g., Wills, supra note 75, at 182 ("Th [e] policy of aggressive prosecution adopts the
wisdom that '[t] here is no excuse for domestic violence.'" (quoting National Campaign Slogan,
Family Violence Prevention Fund (1993))); Joan Erskine, Note, If It Quacks Like a Duck:
Recharacterizing Domestic Violence as Criminal Coercion, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 1207, 1208, 1216-20
(1999) (observing that "batterers have become the perfect bad guys, enjoying villainous roles in
film and on television").
332. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 23, at 1562-70 (arguing against focusing on psychological
reasons why men batter and because research should not "provide an escape route for abusive
men to avoid criminal responsibility").
333. Naomi Cahn states that "the perpetuation of domestic violence is incomprehensible
without an understanding of women's status in society; the enforcement of domestic violence
laws is similarly incomprehensible without such an understanding combined with systems of
male privilege and women's subordination." Cahn, supra note 78, at 829.
334. See Adrine & Runner, supra note 282 (observing that the majority of efforts have been
directed toward criminal responses and calling for therapeutic intervention strategies directed
towards men and boys).
335. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing domestic violence reforms'
emphasis on separation).
336. See generally supra Part II. Holly MaGuigan quotes Richard Sherman, "one of the
authors of the 1984 arrest experiment that was instrumental in refocusing police responses to
domestic violence," as saying, "'[u]ntil you admit that mandatory arrest is a failure in our inner
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domestic violence criminalization has come at the cost of deflecting focus
from economic empowerment, education, and other non-punitive goals. 1
33
Finally, similar to the way victims' fights advocates demonize defense
attorneys and civil libertarians for aligning with horrific rapists and
murderers, some domestic violence reformers rhetorically chastise feminists
who critique criminalization policies. These reformers argue that those
who criticize criminalization reforms are allies of batterers and
pseudofeminists, and who wish to send the women's movement back twenty
years.339 By reproaching critical feminists through allying them with the
cities, you won't get anybody to spend a penny on looking for alternatives.'" MaGuigan, supra
note 99, at 444 (quoting Deborah Sontag, Fierce Entanglements, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 17, 2002, §
6, at 52 (quoting University of Pennsylvania Professor Richard Sherman)).
337. Criminal law is an easy and politically expedient solution to social problems:
Concentrating primarily on criminal law issues is also easier than pursuing the
more complex, expensive and less politically palatable goal of expanding social
programs in other areas. For instance, victims across social class lines have a huge
unmet need for legal services and for other supportive services, whether or not
their abusers are ever arrested, prosecuted or incarcerated. Of course, the
provision of better legal and social services might in some cases make it possible to
avoid the need for criminal law involvement altogether.
Freedman, supra note 233, at 588-89 (citations omitted).
338. See, e.g., Annalise Acorn, Surviving the Battered Reader's Syndrome, or: A Critique of Linda
G. Mills' Insult to Injury: Rethinking our Responses to Intimate Abuse, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 335,
338, 355 (2005) (criticizing Linda Mills's book, INSULT TO INJURY. RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES
TO INTIMATE ABUSE (2003) through ad homonym attacks, including the assertions that Mills's
arguments have "no place in credible scholarship" and Mills "doesn't read the law"). In Part 1, I
discuss extensively the reasons why feminists initially aligned with law enforcement in the fight
against domestic violence. The question remains why certain reformers seek to defend
incarceration policies against all odds, despite the multitude of cautionary tales from feminist
and race scholars about the illiberal nature of these policies. I hint at two reasons: (1) the fact
that many of such reformers are prosecutors as well as feminists and thus have already de-
problematized the question of state power, and (2) success is addictive-unlike many feminist
policy proposals, mandatory reforms were incredibly well received by the public. Linda Mills,
however, offers a psychological reason for reformers' support of such policies. She asserts that
.women, as members of a patriarchal society, are so deeply influenced by male expressions of
power that their ability to reflect on these dynamics is hampered, even destroyed." Mills, supra
note 20, at 568. This explains "the contradiction between the feminist commitment to women's
self-development and empowerment and some feminists' complete disregard for these
principles in their unwavering support for mandatory policies." Id. at 568-69. Otherwise, Mills
asserts, "It is hard to imagine that women unencumbered by the influence of such oppression
would reproduce the abusive dynamics they otherwise claim to reject." Id. at 569.
339. Domestic violence reformer Emily J. Sack uses these characterizations to describe
opponents of criminalization policies from outside the feminist movement. She argues that
abandoning mandatory policies in favor of discretionary ones would put the movement where it
was "twenty-five years ago." Sack, supra note 27, at 1688. She further disparages Linda Kelly and
Linda Mills as "pseudofeminists" because they have focused on female aggression as
contributing to domestic violence. Id. at 1700-18. Sack asserts that the domestic violence
movement is in crisis and sets up a false dichotomy that contrasts mandatory policies, which are
"true feminism," with immoral theories. She says that the movement has solely two alternatives:
Forge ahead with criminalization policies and tinker with them to try to reduce harm to women
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unquestionably horrific abuser, ° defenders of the current domestic
violence system are utilizing the same kind of pernicious essentialism as
conservative victims' rights proponents. 34' They rely on stereotypical and
absolutist characteristics of "bad" abusers to evoke feelings of repulsion and
silence those who lodge systemic critiques by allying them with the repulsive
element.34
2
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE THOUGHT
The prescription of solutions to thorny social problems is difficult and
should not be undertaken hastily. Indeed, as Elizabeth Schneider says, there
is a "murky middle ground" between the antiquated view that domestic
violence is not a crime and an over-reliance on state prosecutorial power.343
While the treatment by certain reformers of women victims as objects is
problematic, the solution is not to reverse the characterization and treat
them as unconditional agents. 3" Recognizing the problem of women's
constrained agency, many thoughtful reformers have crafted nuanced
approaches to domestic violence law. Holly MaGuigan, for example,
emphasizes reforms outside of criminal law and asserts that states should
or adopt a philosophy that "attacks and blames battered women pushes us backwards." Id. at
1739-40.
340. There is a striking parallel between such rhetoric and the Bush Administration's
assertion that civil libertarians are on the side of "terrorists." Attorney General Ashcroft
responded to criticism of overreaching by the Department ofJustice, stating:
To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my message
is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists--for they erode our national unity and
diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to
America's friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face
of evil.
Department ofJustice: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 316 (2001) (statement prepared byJohn Ashcroft, Att'y Gen.
of the United States).
341. James Cavallaro and Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou explain:
Where public outrage against crime leads to the demand for harsh justice, those
who defend rights and criticize the retributive model on that basis become
themselves open to attack. Such attacks frequently are leveled not only by police
officers and victims' rights groups, but also by politicians seeking to seize political
advantage. Those who defend human rights are often accused of protecting
criminals and ignoring the rights of victims; they are blamed for hindering the
police and obstructingjustice.
James Cavallaro & Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Public Enemy Number Two?: Rising
Crime and Human Rights Advocacy in Transitional Societies, 18 HARv. HUM. RTs.J. 139, 151 (2005).
342. David A. Super states that modern conservatives "demand ever harsher treatment of
those determined unworthy and attack anyone calling for moderation as lacking conviction
about the importance of the moral judgments being made." Super, supra note 114, at 2072.
343. SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 196.
344. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (describing the treatment of battered
women as total agents as a method of denying state accountability for their welfare).
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institute no future mandatory policies but rather carve out a safety exception
to pre-existing mandatory policies. Donna Coker advocates an intricate
approach to domestic violence reform whereby localities analyze a number
of factors about the relevant communities and their relationship with the
police to determine the best course of action . 46 Others support therapeutic-
justice approaches to domestic violence.347
345. She states:
At a minimum, we must not enact additional mandatory arrest laws. Where they
exist, we should urge prosecutors to use discretion in making decisions about
which victims will have their safety endangered by prosecution. We must
encourage prosecutors not to adopt no-drop policies. When we know that we have
enough information to be persuasive, we must ask legislatures to reverse
themselves if they have passed mandatory arrest legislation.
MaGuigan, supra note 99, at 443-44.
346. Coker suggests a "material resources" test that focuses on the needs of poor women of
color to guide policy. She proposes the following for domestic violence policy-makers:
In determining the preferred policy in their locale, activists should examine the
quality of relations between poor communities of color and the police, including
the presence of anti-immigrant sentiment. Relations between police and
communities may be measured by a number of factors, including: the
adequacy/inadequacy of police resources in a given community; the frequency of
police brutality, harassment, and related complaints in a given locale; the degree
to which methods are in place to report such police misconduct and the efficacy of
those methods; the commitment of local police leadership to both racial fairness
and to responding to domestic violence calls. Local advocates must also evaluate
the strength of domestic violence community services for poor women of color and
the degree to which state actors-notably prosecutors and child protection service
workers-understand the circumstances of poor women of color in their locale.
Coker, supra note 42, at 1050 (footnotes omitted).
347. See BruceJ. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC
L. REV. 33, 56-58 (2000) (applauding the Miami-Dade County domestic violence court system's
therapeutic approach). See generally Amanda Dekki, Note, Punishment or Rehabilitation? The Case
for State-Mandated Guidelines for Batterer Intervention Programs in Domestic Violence Cases, 18 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 549 (2004) (describing battering intervention programs). I am
reluctant to advocate mandatory therapy because I believe that rehabilitation often manifests in
our system as no more than a slightly abstracted way to put defendants in jail without the bother
of their civil rights. See James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the
Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2003) (noting that rehabilitative programs
often down-play due process and may become coercive when applied in an overzealous
fashion). See generally Jane M. Spinak, Why Defenders Feel Defensive: The Defender's Role in Problem-
Solving Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1617 (2003) (observing the challenge of defense practice in
specialized courts). From personal experience working in District of Columbia domestic
violence court, a "specialized court" often materializes as "especially hostile to defendants."
Indeed, specialized domestic violence courts require judges to take special measures in a
directly one-sided way-they are to communicate solely to alleged victims their options and to
create procedures that aid victims in obtaining civil relief, often to the direct detriment of
defendants' interests. See Jennifer Thompson, Comment, Who's Afraid of Judicial Activism?
Reconceptualizing a Traditional Paradigm in the Context of Specialized Domestic Violence Court Programs,
56 ME. L. REV. 407, 428-29 (2004) (describing the role of judges in specialized domestic
violence courts). Batterer "therapy" often means delaying incarceration by a few months-long
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I am reluctant, however, to propose a criminal law solution to the
348problem of domestic violence, given the current political climate. While
reforming mandatory arrestm and no-drop prosecution policies"O is one
possible response to many of the concerns outlined in the paper, I see
problems with any kind of criminal enforcement in the absence of
widespread social changes. Even "progressive" criminal reforms rest on the
assumption that proper education of state actors will enable the criminal
enough for the defendant to fail out of the programs and anger authorities. See infra notes 393-
95 and accompanying text (describingJamal's experience with therapy).
348. It is highly unlikely that local and national leaders will support receding from a tough-
on-battering approach to domestic violence law. See supra note 245 and accompanying text
(noting President George W. Bush characterizing the fight against domestic violence in war
terms).
349. 1 do see the wisdom of returning to a discretionary arrest system. One solution could
be presumptive rather than mandatory arrest. Police could fail to arrest only in two situations:
(1) the victim would be placed in greater danger by an arrest, or (2) the victim specifically
requested that no arrest take place. If the latter situation occurred, the police would be under a
new set of obligations. First, they would have to try to determine the complainant's reasons for
wanting no arrest. If, after a conversation with the victim, police determined that the victim
would be placed in imminent harm by failure to arrest, police would be able to go against the
victim's wishes. Cf ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (2001) (making arrest mandatory only in
cases "involving the infliction of physical injury or involving the discharge, use or threatening
exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument"). In all situations in which the police
acquiesced to the victim's resistance to arrest, they would provide the victim with information
on shelters and advocates and offer transportation to the shelter. Cf id. (stating that "the officer
shall inform in writing any alleged or potential victim of the procedures and resources available
for the protection of the victim"). Of course, such reform would only work if accompanied by
appropriate education, perhaps anti-essentialist training, on the complexities of domestic
abuse, from both victims' and defendants' perspectives. See Candice Hoyes, Here Comes the Brides'
March: Cultural Appropriation and Latina Activism, 13 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 328, 351 (2004) ("In
light of a long history of tensions between police and Latina/os, among other poor, immigrant,
and racial minority communities, police sensitivity education is essential.").
350. I like Linda Mills's suggestion that prosecutors develop close relationships with victims
in order to foster trust and the ability of the prosecutors to discern victims' desires. See Mills,
supra note 20, at 604-19. Similarly, Deborah Epstein argues that the criminal system can
"maximize battered women's ability to engage in optimal decision making" by offering "victims
extensive legal and nonlegal advocacy services. Such advocacy includes: providing information
about and access to a wide range of social services; strengthening victims' emotional support
network; providing information about the civil and criminal justice systems; and safety
planning." Epstein, supra note 2, at 1889-90. For those victims whose decisions not to prosecute
are based primarily on fear of continued abuse, prosecutors or advocates would communicate
to the victim the types of protection she could obtain as well as the efficacy of such protection,
and help the woman obtain such protection. For women who wished to stay out of the system
for other reasons, the prosecutors could try to offer assistance to ameliorate their concerns. If
after such advocacy, the battered woman still wishes to avoid prosecution, prosecutors should
recognize her choice. Unfortunately, such a system would require an enormous amount of
prosecutorial time and resources-much more than the common practice of mailing subpoenas
to victims and speaking to them the day of the court hearing. Moreover, prosecutors would
have to be trained and take the time to recognize the variety of reasons why battered women
wish to stay out of the criminal system.
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system to empower rather than subordinate minorities.3 5 1 I am skeptical of
this possibility and hold the suspicious belief that, however well-intentioned,
most criminal law reforms end up becoming yet another procedural vehicle
for warehousing the worst off.
3 5
1
This Article is a cautionary tale about the conservatization of a
progressive movement. To that end, my suggestion is simple, but it may
ruffle many feathers: I propose that feminists just stop advocating increased
13criminalization of domestic violence in the United States. There was a
time when such advocacy may have been critical to formal equality, but the
pendulum has swung. Today, domestic violence criminal policies are
arguably tougher than other criminal policies. Society has heard the
message that domestic violence is a crime, and conservatives have run with
it.354 They have found it convenient to support criminalization, as it does not
require reorganization of the social structure or abandonment of
institutionalized privilege. 55 If feminists were to stop advocating for
criminalization policies tomorrow, judges, prosecutors, politicians, and
victims' rights reformers would likely take up the mantle of that fight.
351. Certainly, proposing solutions to the problem of de facto racism and discrimination in
the criminal justice system is beyond the scope of this Article.
352. Mary Becker, in a different context, states:
We often think that all we need is more education, more education of prosecutors,
more education ofjudges, but we have to stop and think if the education is going
to be effective and what the effect will be. We do not have any empirical studies on
the effect of education or on what kinds of education work in domestic violence.
We do have some empirical studies on employer sponsored education on diversity
and sexual harassment, and those studies indicate that education can hurt rather
then help. Education is not necessarily effective and can reinforce stereotypes and
actually do harm.
Mary Becker, Keynote Address, Symposium, Domestic Violence and Victimizing the Victim: Relief
Results, Reform, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 477, 487-88 (2003). During my practice, I found that
educated judges in domestic violence court often retained the belief that no matter the
circumstances and parties involved, the men were guilty, the women scared or incapacitated,
and release of the men would lead to an eventual murder.
353. Of course, this suggestion does not apply to scholarship that addresses domestic
violence in an international context.
354. See supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text (noting arguments that characterize
battered women as pathological).
355. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text. Donna Coker states:
[C]rime control politics make criminal law a particularly attractive area of law
reform. Politicians who oppose increased government spending on "social
programs" have been happy to spend funds on "fighting crime." Fighting crime
has political appeal to legislators in part because it is one of the few concerns that
reaches across differences in fractious American politics.
Coker, supra note 99, at 803-04.
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The feminist fight is the fight for equality and autonomy of women.356
Feminists should not be channeling their efforts into helping the
government find new, better, and easier ways to incarcerate people (most
likely minority people), 5 7  while remaining relatively silent on the
government's and society's maintenance of patriarchy.358 My suggestion that
feminists stop supporting incarceration is mainly directed towards scholars
and activists as a framework for advocacy.
This is not to say that feminist scholars should necessarily argue for de-
criminalizing domestic violence. Although I am skeptical about the ability of
criminal law to solve social inequality problems, 59 there may be good
reasons to keep domestic violence crimes solidly "on the books." My
argument is merely that the feminist movement went awry by putting the
majority of its eggs in the criminal law basket. As G. Kristian Micchio states,
feminists' "challenge for the twenty-first century [is] to reclaim a movement,
to reform a vision, and to resituate ourselves within a feminist politic that
refuses to sacrifice women's experience and autonomy to the prerogatives of
the state. "36° Additionally, because the call for criminalizing domestic
violence has become so intimately entwined with mandatory policies, it has
entailed the development of a feminist theory of female objectification.
Feminists engaged in the defense of mandatory policies spend much of their
efforts finding justifications for silencing opposing women. 361 Many of these
justifications, in turn, rely on essentialist and denigrating characterizations
of women to show that their choices are unimportant.
62
356. See supra Part I (characterizing feminism as a movement of resistance). Carlin Meyer
describes the five "tenets" of feminism as eradicating oppression, economic equality, systemic
change rather than mere participation, coalition-building, and self-reflection/humor. Carlin
Meyer, Not Whistlin' Dixie: Now, More Than Ever, We Need Feminist Law Journals, 12 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 539, 543-44 (2003).
357. Today, feminists continue to propose new and improved domestic violence crimes. See,
e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Ciminalize
Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 1019-20 (2004) (proposing a new law
making it a crime for a person "to engage[] in a course of conduct directed at a family or
household member... [h]e or she knows or reasonably should know.., is likely to result in
substantial power or control over the family or household member"); see also supra notes 272-76
(discussing the negative impacts of domestic violence reform on minorities).
358. See supra note 247 (describing how feminism has lost its appeal in areas outside of
domestic violence).
359. See Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 355, 396 (2001) (arguing that today there are no "good" prosecutors because we live "in
an extraordinarily harsh and punitive time, a time we will look back on in shame").
360. See Micchio, supra note 43, at 323.
361. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text (discussing reformer's arguments
supporting criminalization in the face of feminist and racial critiques).
362. See supra notes 189-214 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which the
domestic violence victim is objectified).
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In addition, although it might theoretically be possible to engage a
patriarchal system and break it down from within,36 3 this is not what
happened when feminists allied with conservatives. Rather than
conservatives becoming more progressive, the net effect of domestic
violence reform has been a subsumption of the feminist movement into the
state's goal of managing undesirables. Today, society and government365
accept and applaud feminist criminal law reforms, while disparaging
feminism generally.366 The fact is that the state and society still resist female
empowerment,367 such that the mere mention of the word "feminism"
evokes virulent reactions in ordinary citizens:.3" Experience shows society
fears movements that seek to change social structure. 369 Ann Bartow
describes the prevailing distrust of feminism:
The negative phenomena rhetorically linked to feminism are both
myriad and mind-boggling. Feminism as a social construct has been
blamed for promulgating terrorism, ruining sexual relationships,
causing road rage and traffic congestion, and undermining healthy
families. Feminists have been accused of being hostile to "serious"
science, of urging women "to become just as promiscuous and
irresponsible as . . . men," and of engaging in "the systematic
363. See Gruber, supra note 162, at 1207 (asserting that it is possible to "confront the
institutions of privilege and subordination by using one's ability to participate in those
institutions to subvert them from within" (quoting statement by Charles Pouncy to author)).
364. See supra notes 303-10 and accompanying text.
365. See supra Part IV.A (conservative acceptance of tough domestic violence laws).
366. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1, 8 (2004) (noting "the conservative backlash to feminism's advances"); see also Nancy
Levit, Keeping Feminism in its Place: Sex Segregation and the Domestication of Female Academics, 49 U.
KAN. L. REV. 775, 796 (2001) ("In popular culture, negative images have long been associated
with the term feminist': 'Feminists are portrayed as bra-burners, man-haters, sexists, and
castrators.'" (quoting Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 3 (1988))).
367. Many of the charges against feminism are led by right-wing women. Beverly LaHaye of
Concerned Women for America stated, "'Feminism is more that an illness.., it is a philosophy
of death.'" SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 239
(1991) (quoting LaHaye). Rebecca Hagelin, Vice President of the conservative Heritage
Foundation, argues passionately for the elimination of women's studies, decrying the fact that
"[o]nly the pro-lesbian, egocentric, sexually perverse 'Women's Studies' majors and minors are
considered politically correct." Stirring the Caldron of Radical Feminism, WORLD NET DAILY, Aug.
31, 2006, http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=51754.
368. See supra note 247 (describing resistance to feminism from students).
369. See Victoria Nourse, The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 951, 977 (2000) ("People resist feminism because it seems to place them
in positions in which they may have to question their most intimate relationships, their identity,
and their daily lives."); see alsoJoan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the
Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 89 (1998) (arguing that
resistance to reformation in the workplace manifested as blaming feminists for the "demise of
domesticity in America").
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eroding of the moral foundation of our society in the name of
freedom. 370
In short, women still have a long road to travel to gain even a fairly
rudimentary status of equality.
Although I suggest that feminists stop advocating for and supporting
criminalization, I recognize the trend towards addressing the problem of
domestic violence through criminal law will likely continue, and feminists in
the legal arena will not be able simply to ignore the criminal system.
Considering this reality, I do have some modest practical suggestions for
scholars who teach in this area. I have indicated the importance of police
and prosecutors engaging in anti-essentialism and understanding the
diversity of reasons why women choose to participate or not participate in. 371
criminal prosecution. It is highly unlikely, however, that a prosecutor's
office would give in-house training to prosecutors to drop cases for reasons
372other than State priorities. Moreover, such training would require more
commitment, expertise, and resources than many prosecution offices are
willing to give. 73 In addition, prosecutorial ethos often involves insensitivity
to the collateral consequences that prosecution poses on minority and
370. Ann Bartow, Some Dumb Girl Syndrome: Challenging and Subverting Destructive Stereotypes
of Female Attorneys, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 221, 222-23 (2005) (quoting Chancey,
You Don't Know Feminism, http://www.visionforumministries.org/issues/family/
you-dontknowfeminism.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) and Trevor Bothwell, A Handbag of
Hypocrisy, http://opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/bothwell_20021206.html (last
visited Oct. 24, 2006)).
371. See supra notes 267-76 and accompanying text.
372. Deborah Epstein et al. explain:
[Mandatory] policies fall squarely within prosecutorial tradition, thus inheriting at
least two problematic features. First, the primary emphasis of these policies is to
ensure offender accountability, a goal consistent with the prosecutor's
responsibility to 'seek justice.' Because prosecutors view crimes as violations of the
social contract, and thus offenses against the state, the potential impact of the
prosecution on the victim is not considered particularly relevant.
Epstein et al., supra note 267, at 466-67 (footnote omitted). In addition, individual prosecutors
tend to adhere to essentialist notions of victims, defendants, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.
See Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1179 (2005) ("The
criminal court prosecutor commonly thinks of himself as 'the good guy,' the savior in the white
hat who rides into town to restore order and to save the helpless victim."). Levine discusses the
reluctance of prosecutors to work with "difficult" victims. Id.; see also supra note 13 (discussing
prosecutors' views of defense attorneys).
373. See White, supra note 51, at 760 (noting that a victim-centered approach to domestic
violence is often unattainable because of scarce prosecutorial time and resources).
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immigrant communities: Many prosecutors, for example, would be
reluctant to drop minor charges against immigrants because of the
possibility of deportation, reasoning that the "criminal did it to himself."
37 5
All prosecutors, however, were once law students. Law school is an
opportunity to disabuse future prosecutors of prevailing conservative beliefs
about domestic violence and the efficacy of separation and incarceration.
It is a time in which students can learn how to advocate on behalf of victims
without objectifying them or subordinating their autonomy to the goals of
the state. A student can be made aware of the nuances of domestic violence
before she becomes part of the great machine of state control: y
374. See Douglas Litowitz, Reification in Law and Legal Theory, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 401,
413 (2000) (describing "the attitude of prosecutors who are obsessed with obtaining convictions
and sending criminals to long jail terms, without giving broader consideration to the failure of
our penal system as a whole"). Prosecutorial sentiments often have more to do with winning
advocacy than systemic justice:
The prosecutor does not even think about "doing justice" in the sense the ethics
professors envision. What prosecutor would not believe he is doing justice by
fulfilling his concomitant duty to be a zealous advocate? Isn't the whole idea of
becoming a prosecutor to put the bad guys behind bars and keep the public safe?
And didn't the prosecutor sign up for an adversarial system of justice? Most
prosecutors would be surprised to find out that the admonishment to "do justice"
involves keeping one eye on the defendant's rights. In an adversarial system of
justice, one would think that is the defendant's lawyer's responsibility: "asking
prosecutors simultaneously to advocate within a process and assure that the
process is fair is inherently contradictory-and perhaps hopeless." The general
feeling is that defendants and their attorneys are slimy, guilty cohorts, and the idea
of helping the defense seems almost antithetical to justice.
Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1133, 1140-41 (2005) (citations omitted).
375. See David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs, Then Why Is It
So Hard to Find ?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663, 1669 (2000) ("Prosecutor culture also can advance
the notion that all offenders are bad people, and need to be prosecuted zealously, regardless of
the human side or equities in a case."); Smith, supra note 359, at 380 ("Prosecutors have a
tendency to see things as black and white, fight or wrong, guilty or not guilty. There is little
interest in the various shades of grey that color most people's lives.").
376. Unfortunately, thinking outside of traditional paradigms has not necessarily flourished
in the law school academy. Carlin Meyer asserts, "Feminist perspectives on law are by no means
adequately represented in law school teaching, nor in mainstream publications, whether 'e-' or
not, nor in law school curricula, textbooks, and classroom content." Meyer, supra note 356, at
539; see also Levit, supra note 366, at 781 ("Law schools do not merely reflect social reality; they
construct it. One way that gender differences are produced in law schools is by the structure of
the curriculum.").
377. Scholars argue that the current methodology of law teaching has created a
prosecutorial aversion to problem-solving. See Levine, supra note 372, at 1186. Levine notes:
[Prosecutors] learn the case method of legal analysis in law school and are taught
to hone their litigation skills by engaging in adversarial contests on important
matters. Their educational training and the lawyer subculture steer them in a
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Many domestic violence prosecutors were themselves in battered-
women's advocacy groups or domestic violence clinics and seminars during
law school. Clinic students or new practitioners are sometimes shocked to
find that battered women come with a multiplicity of unanticipated issues.
78
They are surprised to discover that victims are involved in the criminal
system themselves, deeply distrust law enforcement and the court system, or
wish to forgive the batterer 79 New practitioners can be unprepared for
difficult situations in which a victim's zealousness, reluctance, or
ambivalence toward prosecution may vary with the level of immediate fear,
380anger, or forgiveness she feels for her partner. In turn, a student's initial
reaction may be to discount the victim's desire or impose judgments on
her. 8 ' In addition, students sometimes never become cognizant of the long-
particular direction, one that values courtroom advocacy and argument and pays
little attention to community building or people service skills.
Id.
378. See, e.g., Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1295, 1339-40 (1993)
(recounting an incident in which clinic students confronted unanticipated racial issues and
how it fostered race-conscious discussion).
379. One clinician observes:
Indeed, many students are baffled by the notion that a woman could want to
continue a relationship with a physically and emotionally abusive man. Some
students have been quick to offer, "That would not be me. The first time someone
looks at me wrong, I am gone. I would not care that we have a child together."
Simply put, students have been too quick to judge their clients without having first
made an attempt to understand the clients in their "full context."
Cynthia M. Dennis, Expanding Students' Views of the Dilemmas of Womanhood and Motherhood
Through Individual Client Representation, 46 How. L.J. 269, 284-85 (2003) (quoting Michelle S.
Jacobs, People From the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 345, 352 (1997)).
380. See Meier, supra note 378, at 1345 ("[I]nexperienced lawyers often either fail to
register signs of their clients' ambivalence, or react critically to those signs they do notice.").
Domestic violence practitioner and clinician Lisa Smith lists things she "wish[es] [she] had
known as a practitioner before entering the practice":
You have to have a lot of patience and tenacity. You have to be really interested,
and you have to understand that you're opening a Pandora's box when you're
working in the field because you have to be willing to think about yourself as a
social worker, and as a psychologist. You have to understand the cultural problems,
language barriers, and other barriers because people come in with a lot of
handicaps and disabilities.
Symposium, Domestic Violence in Legal Education and Legal Practice: A Dialogue Between Professors and
Practitioners, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 409, 441-42 (2003) [hereinafter Legal Education Symposium].
381. See Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between Lawyer and
Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REv. 1019, 1041-42 (1997)
(asserting that ideas instilled by the "dominant" theories "that portray women primarily as
victims" lead students to distrust domestic violence victims and impose their own judgments on
them).
[2007]
THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME
term consequences of a six-month jail sentence or even just a criminal
conviction on the social and economic health of a family:" Instead, students
might believe that such intrusion is a minimal "slap on the wrist."38 3
Further, many students unfortunately self-select to be domestic violence
prosecutors because of pre-conceived notions, informed by the prevailing
social sentiments, about the vulnerability and purity of victims and314
immutable malevolence of perpetrators. Moreover, many of these students
see their role solely as that of an oral advocate who convinces judges and
385juries to put batterers in jail.
Consequently, I support the general calls for incorporating domestic
violence discourse into "traditional" law courses and adding specialized
courses on domestic violence, 6 but suggest that the teaching of domestic
violence specifically and prosecution practice generally must consider the• 387
problem of domestic violence multidimensionally: Any discourse on
382. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 700 (2002) (noting that in minor offenses
"traditional sanctions such as fine or imprisonment are comparatively insignificant. The real
work of the conviction is performed by the collateral consequences").
383. Cf Jacobs, supra note 379 (noting the effects of cultural predispositions on students'
perceptions of indigent, minority clients).
384. See generally Mahoney, supra note 239, passim (discussing popular and legal stereotypes
of battered women). See also V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who's Listening? Introducing
Students to Client-Centered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a Clinical
Setting, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 83, 97-98 (2002) (describing students' perceptions of themselves as
"rescuers" or altruists who can change the world).
385. This is partially attributable to the nature of being a student. As Enos and Kanter point
out:
Although the majority of students enrolling in a domestic violence clinic express
an altruistic desire to help battered women, most assume their role will consist
solely of pursuing legal solutions through applying their knowledge of the law and
legal systems to the client's legal problems. Accordingly, from the first moment
students begin their clinical training, they are anxiously focused on developing
their legal knowledge, their facility in case preparation, their abilities to negotiate
and parry with legal adversaries, and their oral advocacy skills in the courtroom.
Enos & Kanter, supra note 384, at 86.
386. See generally Legal Education Symposium, supra note 380, at 409; John F. Mahon & Daniel
K. Wright, The Missing Ingredient: Incorporating Domestic Violence Issues into the Law School
Curriculum, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1351, 1351-72 (2004) (discussing methodologies of and issues
with incorporating domestic violence law into the first year or elective law school curriculum);
Buel, supra note 241, at 309.
387. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal
Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 633-34 (1997) (describing
"multidimensionality" as a theory that emphasizes the interplay of both different subordinating
and privileging traits in order to understand the unique harms that disempowered people
face); see also Enos & Kanter, supra note 384, at 84 ("Clients dealing with complex and
multidimensional problems need service providers who approach problem-solving in a way that
is client-centered, client-empowering, and incorporates multidisciplinary and community-based
solutions and resources.").
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domestic violence would be incomplete without a larger discussion of
patriarchy, racism, and economic disparity.3ss Sarah Buel asserts:
[L]aw students must learn the theory and practice disparities that
constitute additional barriers for women of color seeking legal
remedies. This revisiting of the intersectionality of race, gender
and violence is part of the academy's role in taking a proactive
stance in addressing the cultural incompetence of white, legal
389stakeholders, including current and future lawyers.
In addition, the domestic violence discussion must be accompanied by
analyzing the history of women's objectification. By situating domestic
violence law in the larger struggle for anti-subordination, law professors can
help distance domestic violence law from the larger mechanism of state
control.
Nothing in this article is meant to deny the amazing achievements of
the domestic violence reform movement over the past thirty years. Yet, as
reformers recognize, feminism generally and domestic violence reform in
particular are at crossroads. 9 It is at this critical point, when feminists
should redirect their efforts toward challenging structures that subordinate
not only women but other disadvantaged minorities. Feminist legal scholars
can engage in this challenge by helping their students to break out of the
typical thinking that domestic violence is an insular crime caused by a
deviant bad person. Students can then bring this context to their practice
when they become lawyers. In this way, feminists can help temper the
negative effects of domestic violence criminalization in this tough-on-crime
era.
EPILOGUE
The day ofJamal's criminal trial arrived. Britney had called me just the
night before to say that she was not coming. She had tried to talk to the
"domestic violence lady" to tell her to drop the case, but could not reach
her. Although I was pretty sure Jamal's charges would be dismissed for want
of prosecution,' 9' I prepared for trial just in case.
388. See generally Margaret E. Johnson, An Experiment in Integrating Critical Theory and Clinical
Education, 13 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 161, 161-85 (2005) (describing the integration
of critical theory into domestic violence clinic at American University, including the assignment
of readings on intersectionality and victim stereotyping).
389. Buel, supra note 241, at 321.
390. See supra notes 215-17.
391. See supra note 6 (discussing dismissals for want of prosecution).
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When the case was called, the prosecutor informed the judge that the
complainant was absent but he was prepared to go forward on "excited
utterances," specifically Britney's initial statements to the police.392 Jamal
told me he did not want to risk going to jail and would rather agree to
deferred sentencing. In D.C., a first-time offender may be eligible for
deferred sentencing, in which he enters a guilty plea to the criminal charges
and the sentencing is postponed for a period of time, most commonly nine
months to a year. During that time, the defendant must pay a fine, go on
probation, and complete many "rehabilitative" programs. If the defendant
completes the time with no problems, his case is dismissed. If he violates any
392. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),
trial courts had allowed prosecutors to prove their cases in chief solely by introducing the out-
of-court statements of domestic violence complainants. The Crawford decision, however, cast
severe doubt on this practice. In Crawford, the Supreme Court revisited its prior holding in Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), that the admission of out-of-court statements falling in a
"'firmly rooted hearsay exception'" or bearing "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'"
comported with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60
(quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). The Court overruled Roberts and held instead that all
"[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial" are admissible only "where the
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine." Id. at 59. While not precisely clear on the meaning of "testimonial" the Court did
note that the essence of "testimonial" was purposeful declaration in response to questioning. Id.
at 51. The Court stated, "An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
not." Id. at 51. In Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Court of
Appeals framed the issue as follows:
This appeal presents to this court, for the first (but assuredly not the last) time, a
question as to the proper application of the principles of Crawford to alleged
"excited utterances" which have been admitted into evidence in domestic violence
cases under an exception to the hearsay rule. As the court observed in Fowler v.
State, 809 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), "[o]ne recent scholarly article estimates
that between eighty and ninety percent of domestic violence victims recant their
accusations or refuse to cooperate with a prosecution." Id. at 965. Prosecutors in
this jurisdiction obviously face the same problem and, as the trial judge explicitly
recognized in this case, the government has frequently gone forward with domestic
violence prosecutions without the alleged victim's cooperation or testimony,
ordinarily by introducing into evidence, as excited utterances, out-of-court
statements made by the alleged victims, or by other eyewitnesses, to investigating
police officers or, in some cases, to 911 operators.
Id. at 807 (internal citations omitted). Applying the ruling in Crawford to the domestic violence
situation, the court of appeals held that initial on-the-scene questioning did not necessarily
produce testimonial statements, but subsequent investigative questioning would produce
testimonial statements inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 812. The court of
appeals recently vacated the Stancil opinion and granted rehearing en banc. Stancil v. United
States, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Thus, the ultimate issue of admissibility of domestic
violence "excited utterances" remains to be resolved with finality.
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of the conditions, he is immediately sentenced. Jamal entered a guilty plea
and was given deferred sentencing for nine months, with the condition that
he pay a fine, go on probation, and complete twenty-seven domestic violence
classes and ten anger management classes. He would have to pay eight
dollars for each class.
A month later, I received a show-cause order alleging that Jamal had
violated the terms of his deferred sentence. Jamal explained that he had
been turned away from several of the classes because he did not have the
money to pay. We went to court, and the judge found Jamal in violation of
his conditions and sentenced him to one-hundred days incarceration. Jamal
went to jail, and Britney struggled to pay for the apartment and baby by
herself. The couple lost their eligibility for public housing because ofJamal's
conviction.395
Two months after his release from prison, Jamal, Britney, and the baby
were living with Jamal's aunt, who told the couple to be out by the end of
the month. Britney told me that prison had changed Jamal: He was
withdrawn, angry, and depressed because he was still unable to find a
"legitimate" job.396 Jamal's assault conviction turned out to be the first of
several convictions he would have over the next couple of years, none of
393. See Brawner v. United States, 745 A.2d 354, 357-58 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (describing
deferred sentencing and finding that the deferred sentencing agreement which put the
determination of whether the agreement had been violated solely in prosecutors' hands did not
violate separation of powers).
394. See Epstein et al., supra note 267, at 494, which states:
In a deferred sentencing program, the defendant agrees to plead guilty up front.
In exchange, the government agrees to recommend that sentencing be deferred
for an extended period, during which time the defendant must strictly abide by
various conditions, such as attending batterer's treatment sessions, complying with
the terms of any civil protection order, or testing clean for substance abuse.
Id.
395. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)(ii) (requiring tenants to "assure that no tenant, member
of the tenant's household, or guest engages in: (A) Any criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents; or (B) Any
drug-related criminal activity on the premises"); cf Alvera v. Creekside Village Apts., HUD ALJ
No. 10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Portland, Or., Oct. 22, 1999) (evicting a
domestic violence victim from public housing under a "zero-tolerance" for violence policy), cited
in Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence,
11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POLy & L. 377, 378-82 (2003).
396. See McGregor Smyth, Hostile is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney's Guide to
Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 479, 480 (2005) ("We know
from experience that if formerly incarcerated persons cannot find work, shelter, or help, they
are much more likely to be caught in a recurring cycle of crime.").
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which were for domestic violence.3 9 ' During Jamal's second stint in jail,
Britney and the baby became homeless.
397. Ex-offenders face a multitude of disabilities upon release from prison:
A prison record, in addition to minimal education and a lack ofjob skills, limits ex-
offenders' employability in many cases. In addition, society has created a vast
network of collateral consequences that severely inhibit an ex-offender's ability to
reconnect to the social and economic structures that would lead to full
participation in society. These structural disabilities often include bars to obtaining
government benefits, voting disenfranchisement, disqualification from educational
grants, exclusion from certain business and professional licenses, and exclusion
from public housing. Without structural support or intervention, these individuals
face a wide range of obstacles making it virtually impossible for them to pursue
legitimate means of survival.
Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255,
258 (2004).
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